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ABSTRACT 
 As the People’s Republic of China begins to accumulate influence on the 
international stage through strategic usage of soft power, the history and 
application of soft power throughout the history of China will be important to 
future scholars of the politics of Beijing. This study will examine Beijing and its 
government official’s perceptions of its soft power and how there have been 
historical parallels between the modern People’s Republic of China and the Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644) in regard to soft power politics and China’s search for its 
legitimacy as a rising global power. This study will use two examples that have 
similar parallels: The eunuch admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) and his journey’s 
through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and the 
Confucius Institute, a teaching and cultural exchange program under the 
auspices of the Office of Chinese Language International, known colloquially as 
Hanban, an organization under the direct control of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s leadership.  
 What connects these two topics is the subject of soft power, a term coined 
by Joseph S. Nye, relating to the kind of power wielded by countries that does 
not involve military force and uses a “Charm Strategy” to support favorable 
treatment amongst its trading partners. Zheng He sailed the oceans to 
neighboring countries, in an attempt to give legitimacy to Ming China through the 
imperial tribute trade system. The Confucius Institute continues that legacy 
today, teaching a view of China that is shaped in Beijing. I will show the parallels 
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between this historical figure and that of the Confucius Institute, showing that the 
pursuit of soft power is not a recent phenomenon in Chinese politics but a theory 
and a motivation that has existed in China since medieval times in China’s 
endless search for legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbors. I will be researching 
the life and journeys of Zheng He, along with the controversies surrounding the 
Confucius Institute and how all of these factors relate to China attempting to re-
instate a legacy that the nation has was lost over since the nineteenth century’s 
“Century of Humiliation”.  This loss of prestige was a result of European colonial 
power’s ambitions in the area. I will also use evidence to prove the importance of 
Confucianism in regard to the development of soft power in China. As China 
seeks to find its legitimacy, we will see that this has been some centuries in the 
making and plays a crucial part of Chinese politics today. The re-assertion of 
China’s place in the world as a rising world power will have geopolitical 
implications for decades to come.      
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CHAPTER ONE 
THESIS, METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, PURPOSE OF THE 
STUDY AND DEFINITIONS OF SOFT POWER 
 
     
    Why mount such a diplomatic charm offensive? As  
    China  turns its gaze to nearby seas in search of  
    prosperity and secure energy supplies, it   
    has embarked on a naval  buildup unprecedented in  
    modern history. Beijing evidently hopes to allay  
    suspicions aroused by its bid for sea power. In so  
    doing, it hopes to discourage the coastal nations of  
    East, Southeast and South Asia from banding   
    together-or with powerful outsiders such as the United 
    States-to balance the growth of Chinese power. At  
    home, Chinese leaders summon up Zheng He to help 
    turn the attention of the populace seaward,  
    rousing rank and file for seaward pursuits. Maritime  
    history, in short, now suffuses Chinese politics abroad 
    and at home.    
                 -James R. Holmes in “Soft  
        Power at Sea1 
    Introduction and Thesis 
In the study of world politics today, there is a great deal of focus on the 
soft power aims of the People’s Republic of China. However, there is a very 
common misconception that the PRC’s push for soft power is a recent affair. 
Indeed, China has been seen as a rising power in the last few decades but has 
                                                          
1 James R. Holmes, Soft Power at Sea: Zheng He and China’s Maritime 
Diplomacy”, University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, 
(2006). 
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taken a unique view of its own power as non-hegemonic. From the point of view 
of the PRC, the PRC is a non-hegemonic power and claims that the recent 
amount of soft power that the PRC has gained in the last few decades has been 
a result of China’s peaceful rise. However, the perception of what soft power is 
may differ from that of western nations and Beijing. Joshua Kurlantzick a special 
correspondent for The New Republic in his book Charm Offensive makes an 
interesting observation in that “Beijing offers the charm of a lion and not a 
mouse”.2 In the last year, the United States under the Trump administration has 
moved away from international cooperation and the possibility that Trump is 
ceding America’s global leadership role becoming more apparent. As the United 
States seems to push away from globalization and as America has been willing 
to push away former allies and interests, China under President Xi Jinping has 
been more than willing to fill the void.  This can be seen in a historical light as 
well. China has long considered the nineteenth century as its “century of 
humiliation” when colonial powers forced a series of unequal treaties during the 
two Opium Wars with Great Britain. In the first years of the twentieth century the 
anti-foreign Boxer Uprising’s aftermath also forced humiliating concessions on 
the waning Qing Dynasty who in 1911 would fall from power, replaced with the 
Republic of China. In 1927, the Nationalist movement and later in 1948, Mao 
Zedong’s Communists came into power, making the twentieth century a century 
                                                          
2 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming 
the World”, (New Haven: Yale University Press.) 2007, 6.  
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of upheaval in China. Beijing’s international relations today are often motivated 
by an urge to recapture the lost glory of the “Middle Kingdom” and through soft 
power methods and China has found a way to accomplish this through the use of 
finding ways to improve Beijing’s international image. While some scholars would 
refer to this method as “soft power” as a collective term for Beijing’s motivations, 
there are problems with portraying these motivations as purely an issue of soft 
powers vs. hard power. What Beijing and the PRC’s perception of what soft 
power is can be very different from that of the United States and the European 
Union for example. Beijing’s perception of its soft power in some cases may blur 
the lines of the original concept of soft power as originally defined by Joseph S. 
Nye. In any case, it seems that the term soft power may be a problematic 
concept to give simple definitions to. It will be important to distinguish and unpack 
what soft power means and also discuss the problematic concept of soft power in 
itself and critically examine if Beijing’s diplomatic practices can be considered 
soft power at all.                  
The use of soft power in China’s history has hardly been a recent 
development however. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Admiral Zheng He 
(1371-1433) a eunuch military commander and explorer exercised soft power 
during the rule of Zhu Di, the Yongle Emperor (1402-1424) and third emperor of 
the Ming Dynasty. Zheng He traveled through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean along the way visiting numerous countries along the way in an 
effort to show both the wealth and power of the Ming Dynasty, a charm offensive 
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in its own right. In the modern day, the Confucius Institute an educational and 
cultural exchange program run by Hanban and organization with ties to the 
PRC’s politburo has in many ways taken up Zheng He’s mantle as a soft power 
force.  These two examples of soft power will serve as the two main examples of 
this study which is to not only show that there are historical and modern-day 
components to the PRC’s recent soft power but that the most core component of 
all in terms of China’s recent interest in soft power is the search for legitimacy in 
its soft power relations with the nations of the world.   
The thesis of this study is that there are parallels between Zheng He and 
the Confucius Institute in two periods of China’s soft power: the fifteenth century 
and the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the perceptions and meanings of soft 
power in China may be different than that of other nations or other periods of 
time. Joshua Kurlantzick noted that China’s soft power resembles that of a “lion 
and not a mouse”.  This form of power may be different from traditional soft 
power in that it is used by authoritarian regimes as a form of coercing other 
countries viewpoints to the regimes point of view. The National Endowment for 
Democracy, a Washington based think-tank has defined this as “sharp power”.    
This paper will examine the soft power efforts of the PRC, using the Confucius 
Institute and Zheng He as examples to show the historical parallels between the 
two while examining the motivations of the PRC government which is the search 
for legitimacy. 
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This legitimacy that is perceived by members of the PRC government to 
have been lost in the nineteenth century and only started to be regained in the 
waning years of the twentieth century.3 One of the main ideas of this paper is 
also that there is an explicit link between the ideas of Ming glory, non-hegemonic 
expansion and the Confucius Institute. A common claim made by the PRC 
regarding the foreign policy of China is that historically and today China remains 
a non-hegemonic power with the peacefulness of its rise often being touted by its 
leadership, which has an implied claim that China’s rivals such as the United 
States do not follow a similar policy. In September 2011the Information Office of 
the State Council of the PRC released a white paper titled: “China’s Peaceful 
Development” that gives a summary of this point of view held by the PRC 
government: 
China has declared to the rest of the world on many occasions that it 
takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world 
peace and promoting common development and prosperity for all 
countries. At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century and 
on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), China declared solemnly again to the world that 
peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize 
modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and make more 
contribution to the progress of human civilization. China will unswervingly 
follow the path of peaceful development. 4 
This idea of cooperation and common development has been a crucial 
part of China’s recent success in diplomacy within the last decade. Rather than 
                                                          
3 Valarie Hilton, The Open Empire: A History of China to 1800, (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 2015), 420.  
4 PRC Government, PRC State Council, “China’s Peaceful Development”, 
(Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2011) 1.   
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seeing China as an antagonist on the world stage, the PRC has allowed a more 
benevolent and non-interventionist image of the country to be formed in its new 
state propaganda. This new view allows Beijing to wield its soft power in a way 
that allows former adversaries to become partners. Whether or not the 
Communist system of government of the PRC can survive in its present form in 
the future under the face of such pragmatism will also be something to consider 
in the coming decades.    
 The lionization of historical figures of the Ming as soft power heroes such 
as Zheng He, have been used by leaders such as Xi Jinping to prove to the world 
that China has always been and peaceful and non-hegemonic power. This study 
will attempt to establish the link between this idea of idealizing the past and using 
figures of the past to promote modern China’s rise in importance to the world and 
show that the Confucius Institute’s mission at its core is to promote similar ideas 
to the world of non-hegemonic power regarding the PRC. The paper will also 
show who has explicitly pushed this form of historical soft power, starting with 
Confucian and eunuch officials in the fourteenth century and the Ministry of 
Education and the in the twenty-first.     
 The Confucius Institute has today, a stated goal of influencing foreign 
perceptions of China and spreading Chinese culture, with teaching and cultural 
studies as the Confucius Institute’s method of choice. The first stated by-law of 
the Confucius Institute’s constitution lays out clearly this mission statement of the 
Confucius Institute: 
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Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of 
people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the 
Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language 
and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural 
exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to 
deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the 
development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.5 
The Confucius Institute’s funding comes directly from the PRC 
government. showing there is direct government control.6 Zheng He sailed with 
his fleet to spread China’s influence and to increase the prestige of the Dragon 
Throne. Zheng He used trade and goodwill as a carrot, but he also wielded the 
threat of military force (the stick) when required, hoping the Ming Dynasty’s 
neighbors to see China as a powerful but benevolent super power.7 However, 
what often can be defined as soft power may also have some hard power 
elements or indeed may not be soft power at all. For example, in 2006, Nye 
wrote an article in Foreign Policy regarding the difficulty in defining soft power 
titled: Think Again: Soft Power. In this article Nye uses the example of economic 
sanctions being considered a form of soft power and how that point of view is 
erroneous. Nye writes: 
Economic Strength Is Soft Power: No. In a recent article on options for 
dealing with Iran, Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation refers to soft 
power options such as economic sanctions. But there is nothing soft about 
sanctions if you are on the receiving end. They are clearly intended to 
coerce and are thus a form of hard power. Economic strength can be 
converted into hard or soft power: You can coerce countries with 
                                                          
5 Hanban, Constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institute, 1.  
6 John Sudworth, “Confucius Institute: The Hard Side of China's Soft Power,” 
BBC News, 22 Dec. 2014, 
7 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, The Treasure Fleet of the 
Dragon Throne, 1405-33, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 20.    
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sanctions or woo them with wealth. As Walter Russell Mead has argued, 
economic power is sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels. There 
is no doubt that a successful economy is an important source of attraction. 
Sometimes in real-world situations, it is difficult to distinguish what part of 
an economic relationship is comprised of hard and soft power. European 
leaders describe other countries desire to accede to the European Union 
(EU) as a sign of Europe’s soft power. Turkey today is making changes in 
its human rights policies and domestic law to adjust to EU standards. How 
much of this change is driven by the economic inducement of market 
access, and how much by the attractiveness of Europe’s successful 
economic and political system? It’s clear that some Turks are replying 
more to the hard power of inducement, whereas others are attracted to the 
European model of human rights and economic freedom.8 
 The key point that Nye is coming across here is that coercion is the main 
determining factor between the difference between soft and hard power in the 
case of economic sanctions. This is an example of the problematization 
regarding of what exactly defines soft power. So, if the PRC for example were to 
use economic sanctions against another country, this would be a form of 
coercive hard power on the part of the PRC by Nye’s definition. It is important to 
consider also that just because soft power does not use military force as part of 
the process of soft power, it does not mean that soft power is inherently peaceful 
or even as Nye points out in the article, the most humane option. 
By studying what defines soft power and proving that the PRC has utilized 
both a historical and contemporary trend of using soft power in its approach to 
politics, we can gain a better understanding of what the PRC’s political goals will 
be in the coming decades by using the methods of history and political science. 
Just as Zheng He’s two voyages across the vast ocean to Africa served for the 
                                                          
8 Joseph S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, Feb 23, 2006. 
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dual purposes of benefiting from trade and spreading Chinese culture, so too 
does the PRC, by way of its Confucius Institute gain influence and build 
infrastructure in order to benefit from modern day African nation’s supply of 
resources.  As James R. Holmes explains, economic development has been the 
key driving influence in China’s recent interest in expanding sea power.9 Other 
nations and especially those of us in the United States, would do well to learn 
from the historical nature of Beijing’s soft power methods. 
This study will be divided into six chapters and will examine Zheng He’s 
life and how it relates to modern soft power politics to China today and how it 
influences China’s perceptions of its own power. I will use and problematize the 
very concept of soft power in itself to show that the PRC’s perception of soft 
power does not necessarily align with other concepts of the definition of soft 
power. I will also explore the idea of the Confucius Institute as a tool of modern 
day soft power strategy as well as a parallel to Zheng He. I will also examine the 
PRC’s efforts to find legitimacy and respect around the world. By examining the 
methods of teaching practiced in western universities, I will attempt to prove that 
there is also a threat to academic freedom from these teaching approaches. 
Finally, this study will also examine the historical roots of soft power in Confucian 
thought, using quotes from Confucius as primary sources to show the long 
                                                          
9 Holmes, Soft Power at Sea, 5.  
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historical trend soft power has had not only on the politics of Beijing, but in the 
ancient culture itself.    
This chapter (Chapter One) will focus on a review of the literature 
examined for this study’s sources and show the methodology used as well as 
give a brief overview concerning the history and development of soft power as a 
political theory. The second chapter will focus on Zheng He himself and will give 
historical examples of his usage of both soft and hard power and how the Ming 
have been historically used by succeeding dynasties and governments to 
promote ideals of national and on some occasions, racial unity, especially in 
terms of the Han ethnic group which connects Ming glory to aspects of Han 
chauvinism.  Chapter Three will focus on the Confucius Institute, giving examples 
of the Confucius Institute’s policies and the controversy surrounding its actions in 
universities around the world. Chapter four will examine Confucianism and the 
history of the eunuchs of the court who were the rivals of the Confucian scholar 
officials during the lifetime of Zheng He and lead to him nearly being erased from 
the historical record. 10 But most importantly, Chapter Four will also focus on 
using quotes from Confucius to show that the practice of soft power has long 
been a part of Confucian thought and is therefore a long-term practice in Chinese 
culture itself.11 Chapter Five will consist of defending my thesis statements with 
                                                          
10 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 34. 
11 Anja Lahitan, China's Soft Power: Challenges of Confucianism and Confucius 
Institutes, Journal of Comparative Asian Development, vol. 14 no. 2, (24th July 
2015): 200-226.  
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counter-arguments, giving common arguments against the supposed “peaceful” 
nature of Zheng He’s voyages as well as showing the Confucius Institute’s point 
of view when dealing with the controversy surrounding them. The sixth and final 
chapter will be my conclusion to the sources I have collected and will make the 
concluding arguments of this study. Finally, I will focus on what possible future 
research can be done with this topic and how it might benefit students of history 
and the other social sciences. 
                                         
Research Questions, Definition of Terms and Sources 
There are several questions that will be important to consider during the 
writing of this study. These questions will allow the reader to examine the 
methodology of this study, which will use a documentary form of analysis using 
primary and secondary sources as evidence. Some examples of these questions 
will be questions such as: Was Zheng He a peaceful explorer or an Imperialist? 
Is the Confucius Institute a mere teaching organization or is it a soft power 
gambit used by the PRC, or perhaps both? Is there a historical continuity with 
China starting to show interest in gaining resources in Africa, similar to Zheng 
He’s travels to Africa for trade purposes? What role did the Ming tribute trade 
system have in the treasure voyages? Perhaps the most important question that 
can be asked is what benefit will this study have in the research of Chinese 
history as well as modern day Chinese politics? What can students learn from 
12 
 
this study, and what benefits will there be for these future students to study this 
topic? This study will attempt to answer these questions throughout the entire 
work and these questions will also help the reader understand the arguments 
that will be made in this study.  
Before the concept soft power is to be defined, it is important to give the 
reader some knowledge about the numerous sources being used in this study. 
The following sources are the ones of most importance, a full list of sources can 
be found in the bibliography.  
     
Primary Sources 
One of the most important Primary Sources I will be using is the Mingshi 
(The history of the Ming) which is the official history of the Ming Dynasty written 
throughout 18th century during the Qing Dynasty. By examining passages in the 
Mingshi, there will be a greater comprehension of what the political world that 
Zheng He lived in was like for the purposes of this study. Several of the 
passages of the Mingshi that I will be using come from Edward L. Dryer’s 
translations in his book Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty 
which he includes in his appendices. This chapter of the Mingshi has a lot value, 
especially since it shows what the total size of the military forces and crew 
13 
 
members were.12 Dryer’s translations of the Mingshi will also be insightful into 
what concepts of Imperial Chinese rule entailed such as the tribute trade system. 
Excerpts from the Mingshi will give insight into what Chinese scholars of the time 
thought about nearby foreign nations and what their role was deemed to be as 
“clients” of the Dragon Throne. 
Another primary source that will be used are the stele inscriptions that 
Zheng He left behind in the ports of Liujiang and Fujian that were erected by 
Zheng He himself. These inscriptions were erected in preparation for Zheng He’s 
seventh and final journey (1431-33).13 Dryer has two of these inscriptions 
translated in his book and they will both be used to show what Zheng He thought 
of the Treasure Voyages himself and what his own motivations were according to 
Zheng He himself. Zheng He also mentions firsthand what his perceptions of 
numerous foreign nations were in the context of how well they submitted to 
accepting client state status under the Ming Dynasty. For example, Zheng He, 
admits to the kidnapping of foreign rulers who in his words “resisted 
transformation.”14 These inscriptions are also useful for cross-referencing 
different accounts of Zheng He from both past and modern-day scholars. 
                                                          
12 Edward L. Dryer, Zheng He and The Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty, (New 
York: Pearson Education, 2007), 187.  
13 Zheng He, Zheng He’s Liujiang Inscription, Translated by Edward Dryer, (New 
York: Edward Dryer. 2007) 191. 
14 Zheng He, Zheng He’s Changle Inscription of 1431: Record [of Prayers] 
Answered by the Divine Spirit of the Heavenly Princess, Translated by Edward 
Dryer, (New York: Edward Dryer. 2007), 198. 
14 
 
The Confucian Analects will be used in this study to show what Confucian 
thought was in terms of foreign relations between nations as well as what the 
Confucians thought of foreign wars and their justification. This is meant to show 
what the Confucian view of hard and soft power are. Furthermore, by studying 
the Analects we can compare and contrast the Confucian scholar officials’ view 
of foreign policy with that of the Eunuch officials as detailed in Mingshi. The 
Confucians tended to also disapprove of foreign policy adventures such as the 
Treasure Voyages due to the Confucian belief that “lesser” nations should come 
to China rather than China come to them, as well as seeing mercantile profit as 
being an unworthy thing. This is the opposite view of what the Yongle emperor’s 
eunuch officials who saw a lot of profitability, as well as gains in power for the 
empire if direct foreign interventionalist actions and relations were pursued.15 
Therefore, study of both the Analects and the entries in the Mingshi can give an 
informative look at what Ming era politics were like in Zheng He’s time and what 
the motivations for these two factions were.  
Ma Huan who was one Zheng He’s lieutenants and served on the treasure 
fleet as a translator is also a crucial primary source as he was one of Zheng He’s 
contemporary’s and accompanied him on many of the treasure voyages. His 
work the Ying-Yai Sheng-lan (Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores” details and 
gives many first-hand accounts of the places Zheng He journeyed to and remains 
                                                          
15 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 175. 
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one of the few surviving primary sources remaining of one of the treasure fleet’s 
members and gives first hand descriptions of the places Zheng He traveled to, 
especially his descriptions of Calicut.16 Another contemporary of Zheng He, Fei 
Xin wrote the  Xingcha Shenglan (Overall Survey of the Star Raft) dated 1436 
which was three years after the death of Zheng He.17 Fei Xin also writes of the 
countries that Zheng He visited, which he (Fei Xin) was a part of. These two-
primary sources will prove invaluable by giving a narrative of Zheng He by men 
who knew him.       
The primary sources that I will be using for the Confucius Institute will be 
newspaper articles and scholarly journals as well as statements from the 
Confucius Institute themselves. While a good portion of this study will be focusing 
on the criticisms of the Confucius Institute, it is important to give the Confucius 
Institute’s side of the issue as well.  Marshall Sahlin’s, a professor at the 
University of Chicago and one of the leading critics of the Confucius Institute’s 
practices regarding academic freedom will also be a useful but not unbiased 
source of information. Sahlin’s pamphlet Academic Malware gives a good 
account of a lot of the controversy that has surrounded the Confucius Institute in 
universities in North America18  His pamphlet has proven to be a large resource 
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for newspaper sources as he cites many of the controversies surrounding the 
Confucius Institute in his book and it has links to many newspapers articles and 
scholarly journals that can prove to be useful sources for this work, although it is 
equally important to realize that there is some considerable bias in this material.   
Another valuable source that will be used in this study will also be the 
numerous white papers and government reports that are published by the 
governments of the PRC and the United States. These will give perspective into 
the soft power that is wielded by both nations in international affairs. The white 
papers will also be used to show what the opinions of both the US and PRC are 
in regard to the Confucius Institute and what their role is in the world. Using these 
government sources will help answer questions such as “what does soft power 
and hegemony mean from the perspective of the US and the PRC?” for example.  
 
Secondary Sources 
One of the most important sources used in this study is Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics. by Joseph S. Nye Jr. Nye, the creator of the 
term “soft power” gives an overall layman’s understanding of soft power in this 
book. Nye defines power itself as the ability to get outcomes one wants.19 While 
written under the George W. Bush Administration, the book is still relevant to soft 
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power studies today. as we see the soft power of the United States start to slip 
away. Nye argues that America’s “go at it alone” approach to foreign affairs such 
as the Iraq War have cost America power and friends.20 Nye argues that soft 
power was always the foundation of America’s power and that America should 
refocus on its soft power elements if it wants to regain prestige. While not about 
China per-se the Nye book is a good introductory text to the concept of soft 
power and explains it very well in ways a person new to the concept of soft 
power would understand. Another important source concerning soft power is 
Charm Offensive by Joshua Kurlantzick. Kurlantzick is a journalist from 
Baltimore, Maryland who is a Fellow on the Council of Foreign Relations. 
Kurlantzick gives an in-depth history of the rise of Chinese modern soft power 
and China’s new place in the world economy. Kurlantzick argues that it's 
important for the US to understand this soft power and warns that China is 
making friends and inroads in economic partners while the US is facing a decline 
in its standing in the economic world.21 Overall, Kurlantzick’s book gives a good 
explanation of the rise of China’s soft power and how the US should pay more 
attention to it. 
Michael Barr in his work, Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of 
Chinese Soft Power argues that China being seen as a threat is a result of the 
insecurity of the government in the US. Barr’s book looks at China’s rising 
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economy and its role in creating soft power, but does so by having some 
criticisms of the West. There is often a fear in the United States that since China 
is not following Neoliberal policies, it might not meet western democratic 
standards. Barr dismisses a lot of these notions as sinophobia and sinomania 
and looks into issues of ethnocentrism and models of development. Barr feels 
that a lot of the arguments against China’s rise comes from a massive “chip on 
the shoulder” of Americans concerning China. Barr argues that many concerns 
about China in the west are outdated and needlessly aggressive and stem from 
fears of losing soft power in the world to China.   
When studying the subject of Zheng He, one of the most important books 
available to western readers is Louise Levathes’ book, When China Ruled the 
Seas. Levathes makes the argument that had the Ming Dynasty continued its 
naval buildup, China may have well become the premier colonial power instead 
of European nations.22 In the beginning of Levathes’ book she gives a brief 
overview of the voyages and the political machinations that ended them. 
Levathes argues that the conflict between the eunuchs at the Ming Court and the 
Confucian Scholar Officials was one of the primary reasons that Zheng He fell 
from grace and how the voyages were unable to reach their full potential. 
Levathes also examines the inner workings of the Yongle emperor’s court as well 
as technical specifications on the ships that Zheng He had in his treasure fleet. 
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Levathes also looks into the power play politics Zheng He engaged in, such as 
interfering in the Ceylon civil war, gaining the submission of foreign leaders to the 
Dragon Throne and the establishment of client states in Southeast Asia and 
India. Overall, Levathes’ work is one of the most complete works regarding 
Zheng He and has often been used as an important source by many studying the 
subject of the treasure voyages.  
Besides Levathes, there is another book that many China scholars refer to 
in the study of Zheng He. China historian Edward L. Dryer’s book, Zheng He: 
China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty gives a very detailed account of 
Zheng He’s life. Dryer gives an explanation of why Zheng He’s fleet despite 
being far better funded and organized did not achieve the successes of his 
European counterparts.23 Dryer takes a very methodological approach to the 
subject matter and relies heavily on primary sources for his research many of 
which are his own translations. One of the more interesting things that Dryer 
argues is that while Zheng He’s ships probably were the largest in the world at 
the time, their size may have been exaggerated in the historical record.  
A well cited secondary source when discussing the impact that the first 
Ming ruler Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-1398) has had on both historical and modern 
soft power in China is Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder across 
Six Centuries of East Asian History which is a collection of essays by numerous 
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historians edited by Sarah Schneewind. While Zheng He and Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
son Zhu Di are the main focus of this work in terms of historical soft power, 
Schneewind’s work will be valuable in showing that soft power politics were also 
being practiced both at the time of the Ming founder’s death and for six centuries 
beyond. Using Zhu Yuanzhang as a national “hero” in both Nationalist China and 
the PRC has proven to be an effective tool of propaganda and has helped 
China’s domestic soft power in considerable ways which will also be examined.     
Geoff Wade takes a look at Zheng He in a much different perspective in 
his journal article published in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society titled The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment. Wade argues 
and gives a revisionist view of the Zheng He voyages. Rather than seeing these 
as “friendship voyages” Wade argues instead that they were examples of 
Imperialism of the Yongle emperor and connects them to the invasions of Dai 
Viet and Yu-Nan. Wade argues that these were attempts to create a Pax Ming in 
the East Asian maritime world. Wade argues that these voyages were essentially 
proto-colonialism.24 Wade’s work will serve as an effective counterpoint to the 
thesis of its study giving credence to the argument that Zheng He’s voyages 
were not as entirely peaceful as portrayed. One of the final major sources that is 
important to this work, is a journal article by Barbara Peterson titled The Ming 
Voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He). Barbara Peterson gives basic background on 
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the life of Zheng He, his early life and death and the specifications and the 
purpose of Zheng He’s treasure ships as compared to the ships Columbus sailed 
in. Peterson’s main argument in this article is that the purpose of the voyages 
was to both consolidate power at home and impress and build allies while 
projecting Ming power at the same time.25  
 
Definitions of Important Terms and Historical Figures  
Related to the Study 
 
Soft power is a term coined by Joseph S. Nye in regard to a type of 
political and social power. Soft power is the ability to use peaceful negotiation, or 
ideally charm for one party to force a more favorable outcome on another. This 
concept is contrasted with hard power, which is often achieved with coercion, 
most famously with military power. soft power by contrast, is accomplished 
through the promotion of culture, using negotiation and influencing social and 
public opinion. soft power is generally defined with the analogy “the carrot” which 
is part of the famous “carrot and stick” analogy representing reward and 
punishment. The use of soft power in modern day diplomacy and politics is 
considered to be highly important and is an integral part of U.S., EU and PRC 
diplomacy all around the world. One of the biggest advantages it gives is allowing 
smaller countries without much military power to “punch above their weight”. 
                                                          
25 Barbara Peterson, The Ming Voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He) 1371-1433, 
(Perth: Australian Association for Maritime History Vol. 16, 1994), 43.  
22 
 
Hard power on the other hand, is “the stick” form of the hard power/soft power 
dynamic. Hard power can be seen as a form of power and negotiation using 
force to achieve one’s objectives. The most famous form of this power is that of 
military strength. This military strength (or implied usage of it as a threat) is a 
central tenant of the concept of hard power, but other forms of hard power can be 
shown through economics as well, such as the use of sanctions. Hard power is 
often distinguished from soft power due to its coercive nature. 
The problem regarding soft power in many cases is a matter of perception. 
Looking back at the article in Foreign Policy written by Nye, we see a clear 
problematization in modern day perceptions of soft power. Economic sanctions, 
recalling or the resignation of ambassadors in protest of a country’s policy and 
trade wars may be perceived by the casual observer as soft power. As Nye 
argues, this is a misinterpretation of soft power. Soft power in itself is non-
coercive and relies on charm for the method to work.26 There is also the idea that 
it is rare that soft power and hard power work in complete isolation of each other. 
A country can use charm and wealth to woo a country, but that very same wealth 
can be used to conduct trade wars and military funding for the recipient nations 
rivals. It is important in the study of soft power not to confuse popular perceptions 
of soft power with the reality and nature of this method of diplomacy.    
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 When studying the connection between historical soft power and modern 
day soft power, the historical figure Zheng He is often brought up as the most 
prominent example of this connection. Zheng He was Ming era Admiral who is 
famous for his diplomatic missions to Southeast Asia, Ceylon and Africa. Zheng 
He was a eunuch who had great favor in the court of the third emperor of the 
Ming Dynasty, Zhu Di (1360-1424). Among his many accomplishments was the 
recognition of Chinese authority with China’s neighbors, the establishment of 
trade ties in Palambang, Ceylon and Sumatra as well as in Africa and Indonesia. 
He also engaged in a brief land war against the kingdom of Kotte in 1411 in 
modern day Sri Lanka after the expedition fleet was attacked. After the death of 
Zhu Di in 1424, Zheng He’s fortunes and favor fell somewhat but were briefly 
resurgent in the reign of the fifth Ming emperor, Zhu Zhanji. After 1433 there 
were no more treasure voyages and Zheng He died shortly afterward, either in 
1433 on the way back to China or in 1434 shortly after the completion of the final 
voyage.  
The dynasty which Zheng He served at that time was the Ming Dynasty.  
Founded in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the first Ming emperor, the Ming Dynasty 
was the final native Han Chinese dynasty of Imperial China. The dynasty rose in 
the final chaotic years of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, and became the dominant 
power in East Asia. In the context of this study, the Ming Dynasty was the 
dynasty in power during Zheng He’s tenure as admiral of the treasure fleet. The 
Ming Dynasty lasted two hundred and seventy-six years until it was overthrown 
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the Li Zicheng who then established the short lived Shun dynasty. The Shun 
dynasty was overthrown shortly after by the Manchu-led Qing in 1636 which 
would be the last dynasty of China 
  The treasure fleet is a general term referring to the armada of Zheng He 
that sailed across the Indian Ocean in the 14th century. The fleet was both a 
display of Ming military might use to awe the nations it visited, but also to show 
off the technological might of China and serve as an example of Ming prosperity. 
The fleet was decommissioned at the end of the final treasure voyage in 1433 
due to Ming hostility to foreign travel. One of the most important technological 
innovations of these ships was watertight bulwark compartments that the Ming 
shipwrights modeled on the multichambered structure of a bamboo stalk. In 
addition, the treasure ships also had a balanced rudder which placed itself as 
much of the rudder towards the stern of the ship as behind it, making the 
steerage of the ship much easier.27 The treasure fleet was a technological marvel 
of its time period and showed the advanced nature of Ming shipbuilding. 
During Zheng He’s tenure as admiral of the fleet, the emperor that he 
served was the Yongle Emperor also known by his personal name, Zhu Di. Zhu 
Di came to power in 1402 after the conclusion of a brutal civil war lasting from 
1399-1402. In the context of this study, Zhu Di is an important historical figure 
due to his long-lasting friendship and patronage of Zheng He. Zhu Di came to 
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power as a usurper, and therefore was obsessive in finding ways to show off his 
legitimacy as a ruler. One-way Zhu Di intended to show off his power and 
legitimacy was gaining recognition of his supremacy from foreign neighbors and 
this was done through Zheng He’s journeys. Zhu Di was also famous and distinct 
from his father Zhu Yuanzhang by showing great favor to the eunuch members of 
the Ming court, at the expense of the Confucian Scholar officials. 
Another important term in understanding the soft power politics of the 
Ming era is the tribute trade system. The tribute trade system was the official 
system that numerous Chinese dynasties, and most famously the Ming and Qing 
dynasties, used to deal with trade agreements with neighboring nations. The 
implication of this system was that the countries wishing to trade with China were 
considered inferior due to their “barbarian” status and that they were obliged to 
recognize the Chinese emperor’s suzerainty over them. Most famously during the 
Qing dynasty this was shown in a physical sense when foreign emissaries would 
“kowtow” to the Emperor during formal audiences. This kowtowing was a form of 
submission demonstrated by the supplicant going on to one’s hands and knees 
and pressing their head to the floor several times. This was meant to show that 
China was the “center of the world” (The Middle Kingdom) and that the Emperor 
and therefore China, was the “elder brother” of these nations. In reality however, 
nearly all of these tribute states were de-facto independent nations and these 
rituals were merely a formality that had to be performed to participate in trade. In 
the nineteenth century, this ritual kowtowing would become a point of 
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concertation with European Empires such as the British Empire which saw these 
rituals as an insult to their pride and standing. 
 In the history of the Ming Dynasty, Confucian scholar officials played a 
role as one of the two major factions in court life at the time of Zheng He’s life. 
The scholar officials had thrived under the first Emperor of the Ming Zhu 
Yuanzhang, but by the time of Zhu Di’s reign they had lost a degree of influence 
in favor of their rivals the palace eunuchs. The scholar officials as good 
Confucians, were against the treasure voyages as it violated the Confucian policy 
that foreign nations should come to China for diplomacy instead of the other way 
around.28 After the death of Zhu Di much of their lost power and influence was 
restored to them and they regained influence in the court.  
 The Palace Eunuchs were officials who had undergone castration at a 
young age and were the only one’s trusted to oversee the concubines of the 
emperor, and under Zhu Di served in high office. Zheng He was amongst their 
number. Often taken as prisoners of war at a young age and castrated, they were 
given unique positions close to the imperial family since due to their castration 
they posed no threat of overthrowing the emperor and forming their own dynasty. 
They flourished under Zhu Di and were ardent supporters of the treasure 
voyages, and were often rivals of the Confucians.            
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 Besides the political and historical aspects and terms used in this paper, 
there are aspects of philosophy and education that are related to Chinese identity 
and power politics. The history of soft power in China is intimately related to a 
philosophy and moral guidance system known as Confucianism which is based 
on the teachings of Chinese philosopher and educator Confucius (551-479 BC). 
The teachings developed by Confucius placed a large emphasis on the family 
and filial piety to one’s parents was considered one of the main tenants of the 
philosophy. By the time of the Ming Dynasty, officials in high positions of the 
government would have been scholars of the Confucian school and based their 
foreign policy around Confucian principles. These principles tended to favor 
isolationism in foreign affairs and also a dislike of engaging in foreign conflicts.29 
While Confucianism was suppressed in the early years of the PRC, Confucius 
has been “rehabilitated” in modern day China and his name has been given to 
the Confucius Institute. This signals a revival of Confucius as a central figure in 
Chinese educational life.30   
 The Confucius Institute was started in 2004, as a PRC-led non-profit 
public educational organization, overseen by the Office of Chinese Language 
Council International, also known as Hanban. The goals of the Confucius 
Institute are to promote Chinese culture, language and perform cultural exchange 
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in countries outside of China. The Confucius Institute cooperates with its 
associated colleges, with many CI’s in a number of universities around the world 
including North America, Europe, Australia, Africa and Asia. The Confucius 
Institute is sometimes compared to other language and cultural institutes such as 
Académie Francaise from France and the Goethe Institute in Germany. The 
Confucius Institute can also be seen as an aspect of the PRC’s soft power 
policies, hoping to present an image of China that is consistent with the principles 
the PRC government wishes to promote. The Confucius Institute is controlled by 
Hanban which is the colloquial abbreviated form of the Office of Chinese 
Language Council International. Hanban is a self-described “Non-governmental 
Organization” but has explicit ties to the Chinese Ministry of Education as 
reported by The Economist.31  In the context of this study, Hanban is the 
organization that is in charge of The Confucius Institute. The current director of 
Hanban is Xu Lin, who also serves as a vice ministerial official in the politburo of 
the People’s Republic of China.   
 A rival to the Confucius Institute has emerged in the form of the Taiwan 
Academy. The Taiwan Academy is the Taiwanese government’s foreign teaching 
organization. Unlike the Confucius Institute they are known for teaching 
traditional Chinese characters in their language program as opposed to simplified 
Chinese writing which is common in the PRC. While the Taiwan Academy 
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officially denies they are competing with the Confucius Institute, it has 
nevertheless shown signs of competition and rivalry, with both organizations 
promoting their respective government’s views and definitions of China to foreign 
students. However, their reach and power are minor compared to that of the 
Confucius Institute which is far better organized and funded and has many more 
associations with foreign universities.32  
  
Methodology 
For the methodology of this work, I will be using a documentary method of 
analysis, due to much of this study being related to the field of history and 
political science and primarily the former. I will be analyzing numerous 
documents, that have to do with the Confucius Institute and Ming China and 
other documents relevant to the time period. This will allow a type of research 
that will help make the argument for my thesis much stronger. Books and 
newspapers will of course be one of the primary documents that I will be 
analyzing, but I will also be giving a lot of attention to scholarly journals by 
experts in the field, primary source documents such as the afore-mentioned 
Mingshi, as well as the writings of famous Confucian scholars.  Additionally, I will 
use all forms of media both written and broadcast and biographies. The two 
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schools of the arts and sciences that I will be using in this form of analysis will be 
that of history and political science. The historical method of analysis will use 
historiography and primary sources to argue for the thesis of this work while 
political science will be used in a historical and modern sense. In the historical 
sense I will show the inner workings of the Ming Court especially concerning the 
conflict between the main two factions of the court: the court eunuchs and the 
Confucian scholar officials.       
This documentary form of analysis will be used in a way that attempts to 
present a non-biased view of events. For example, not will I only use documents 
that argue for the Confucius Institute’s controversies but also show the Confucius 
Institute’s side of the story as well. By examining primary sources for historical 
context and supplementing them with secondary sources from authors and 
experts on the subject of Zheng He, a balanced narrative will be given that is 
concise and attempts to be free of bias. From a historical standpoint, this will also 
analyze why Zheng He’s journeys have been considered historically to have 
been “failures” in the long term as compared to that of the European explorers of 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which gave rise to the empires forged by 
European colonialism. I will also examine the numerous allegations against the 
Confucius Institute and delve deep into why the Confucius Institute is considered 
to be controversial, but most importantly I will show why the Confucius Institute is 
at its very heart a method of modern day soft power, which parallels with similar 
soft power policies of the fifteenth century.   
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Understanding Hard and Soft Power 
    Power is like the weather, everyone depends on it  
    and talks about it, but few understand it. Just   
    farmers and meteorologists try to  forecast the   
    weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe  
    and predict changes in power relationships. Power is  
    like love, easier to experience than to define or  
    measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells  
    us that power is the capacity to do things. At this most 
    general level, power means the ability to get the  
    outcomes one wants. The dictionary also tells us that  
    power means having the capabilities to affect the  
    behavior of others to make those things happen. 
         -Joseph S. Nye in  
         “Soft Power”33    
Before a lengthy and critical examination of historical and modern soft 
power in China can be attempted it will be prudent to define what “power” 
actually means. At a basic level, power can have many definitions. Is power the 
ability for one group to coerce another group to conform to the other groups will?  
Or is power the absolute measure of a person’s ability to exert his or her will? In 
the time of the Roman Republic and Empire, a man’s personal “command power” 
was called “Imperium” (where the words imperial, empire and emperor have their 
basis in Latin and Germanic based languages) which was defined as how much 
power an individual, such as a senator for example, had at his disposal. The 
higher the Imperium, the more influence or “gravitas” the individual had. From 
Nye’s point of view, power is the ability to get others to do what one wants. This 
kind of power in the political sense at least, is defined by Nye as having two 
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definitions, “command power” and “co-optive power”.34 Hard and soft power is 
therefore defined as being that of “command” and “co-optive” which is a simple 
way of saying that hard and soft power can be defined and related to each other. 
Nye defines these two methods of power: 
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the 
ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The 
distinction between them is one of degree, both the nature of the behavior 
and the tangibility of the resources. Command power-the ability to change 
what others do-can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power- the 
ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one’s 
culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political 
choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences 
because they seem too unrealistic. The types of behavior between the 
command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to 
economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction.35  
From Nye’s perspective, the main thing that differentiates soft and hard 
power is the threat of force in the case of hard power and in the case of soft 
power, “making one’s arguments attractive.” Therefore, charm and coercion are 
what define soft and hard power. Using soft power in modern times has been a 
very attractive way for nations to flex their power on a global scale giving smaller 
nations a more level playing ground with nations that may have much more 
military might and strength. This allows smaller nations to punch above their own 
weight class. Soft power can take many different forms as well. Soft power for 
example, can be things like culture and entertainment, foreign aid and 
development and not just pure economic power. American culture for example, is 
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recognized (although not necessarily universally loved) around the world. This 
can be seen as a far more powerful weapon in America’s political arsenal than all 
the military equipment in the world, and if one is to believe Nye, America would 
be far better off sticking to soft rather hard power, in Washington’s diplomatic 
relations. This definition of hard and soft power has been traditionally in 
diplomacy been referred to as the “carrot and the stick.” This idiom comes from 
the concept of a cart driver with a mule using carrots and sticks as an example of 
reward and punishment. Therefore, hard and soft power can be categorized as 
“reward” and “punishment”. The way to properly wield soft and hard power 
however is to find a balance between the two. When two reasonable actors come 
together it may be more advantageous to use charm and convincing policy for 
the two actors to come to a mutually beneficial (or at least presumed mutually 
beneficial) arrangement with one another. This can come in the form of treaties 
and trade agreements which are two very common examples of the results of 
soft power policy. This is not to say that all agreements and treaties are won 
through soft power. The 1918 Treaty of Versailles was certainly seen as “the 
stick” by the German government of the time period, which helped usher in even 
more destructive war two decades later, showing the coercive nature of hard 
power.    
A true problem rises however, when two non-rational state actors meet 
and “the stick” may be the more prudent choice to use in a confrontation. But 
ideally this should be seen as a last resort, where one can see no path forward 
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through simple negotiation. Of course, much like soft power, hard power is not 
easily defined, since hard power can be the utilization of force, but it more often 
is the implied threat of force that tends to win the day when hard power is 
utilized. War is after all, expensive and the threat of war is usually more 
successful (in the short term) in these kinds of negotiations. Another great 
equalizer in the hard power and soft power dynamic is the threat of nuclear 
weapons. In 2014, Andrew Cottey a researcher for the Royal Irish Academy 
published a paper titled “The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Soft Power and 
the Bomb?” which discusses the impact nuclear weapons have on soft power 
policies. The abstract sums up the problem between the reach of soft power and 
the unwillingness for all the EU member states to have a coherent nuclear policy: 
In the last 20 years the European Union has sought to play a larger role in 
 international  efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It’s 
 member states have advanced common EU positions in the main global 
 non-proliferation frameworks; it is a leading provider of technical and 
 financial assistance to other states and multilateral organizations in 
 support of non-proliferation; and it has used its political and economic 
 leverage to support non-proliferation (in particular, in relation to Iran). The 
 EU’s non-proliferation strategy reflects a primarily soft or normative power 
 approach, emphasizing support for multilateral institutions and 
 international norms. The EU’s soft power is limited, however, by 
 continuing differences between its member states in relation to nuclear 
 weapons and the difficulty of persuading other states to buy into the EU’s 
 approach.36 
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There is difficulty in finding a coherent soft power approach in many 
international affairs as the example of the EU as shown in Cottey’s work 
demonstrates. This is also a good example of where the perceived nature of soft 
power is problematized. What exactly are the methods being used by the EU in 
pursuit of non-proliferation? Do they involve sanctions? Who do these sanctions 
affect? Can these methods truly be called soft cower when there is a threat of 
coercion? By using Nye’s measurements of power there are some hard-power 
elements in the coercive nature of these actions. It suffices to say that while 
charm and wealth can be used to woo a nation, hard power and soft power rarely 
work within full isolation each other. Coercion is not soft power and it is important 
not to label any non-violent political policy as a soft power policy.             
In the case of China, even a casual observer can see that soft power has 
had an impact how the PRC has been conducting Beijing’s diplomatic affairs. 
China has for example, been doing a lot of aid and development in African 
nations rich with natural resources. In these nations, China has been creating 
better roads, funding education and has even played a large role in the African 
Development Bank, signaling clear economic intent in these areas. China may 
not be doing these actions for purely altruistic reasons, but their effect has been 
undeniable. China’s soft power polices have also caused academic leaders such 
as Kurlantzick to re-assess Nye’s definitions of soft power. Kurlantzick claims 
that in Nye’s definition of soft power he excluded other elements such as 
investment, trade and formal diplomacy, instead defining soft power as a nation 
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advertising its “brand”.37  Kurlantzick, however, claims that China has significantly 
changed the game, and therefore the definitions of soft power. Kurlantzick claims 
that China defines soft power as anything outside the military and security norm 
and can include “coercive” economic levers like development and aid. Kurlantzick 
finishes this idea by saying “Indeed, Beijing offers the charm of a lion, not a 
mouse: it can threaten other nations with these sticks if they do not help China 
achieve its goals, but it can offer sizable carrots if they do”.38     
The most apparent observation that can be taken from both Nye and 
Kurlantzick’s views of soft power is that while its definition may change, the 
overall goal of “charming” another nation instead of using force is apparent. In 
the case of China’s understanding of its power, it has been a huge boon for the 
nation’s rise to relevance in the world stage and has also allowed China to 
change the image in its country by accumulating political capital through soft 
power. China’s new “charm offensive” has also allowed China to engage in an 
increasingly effective way in the economic world. BRICS, which is an acronym for 
an association of five major national economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa respectively), has recently emerged as a rival to the World Trade 
Organization. China is a founding member of the BRICS bank and the bank is 
becoming a rival to the WTO. No longer can America claim to be the sole nation 
in charge of the world and the world economy. Many nations are now turning up 
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their nose to American aid and development, and are instead turning to China as 
the next world leader. As both Nye and Kurlantzick have pointed out, it would be 
in the United States’ best interest to re-examine Washington’s foreign policy and 
start embracing soft power policies, which contrary to popular belief the United 
States has a long history of and at least for now, leads in terms of popular 
culture, entertainment and many other advantages. But these will not necessarily 
last forever and now that a new cultural rival has emerged on the scene perhaps 
it time for the United States to adopt a charm strategy of its own? 
China’s history with soft power politics is often times erroneously said to 
have its origins in response to the 19th and early 20th century, which is known as 
the “century of humiliation” in popular Chinese historical thought.39 The century of 
humiliation refers to the era of colonial exploitation by European colonial powers 
between 1839 with the First Opium War (1839) and the 1949 establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China. This was the era when great colonial powers 
such as Great Britain and France took advantage of China’s political weakness 
and imposed multiple unfair treaties on China which turned China into a second-
rate power. Beijing’s modern-day rise is therefore seen by many Chinese as a 
“reclamation” of its past glory rather than China being the new kid on the block.40 
Much as Beijing has now reclaimed its place in the world, there is vast historical 
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evidence that the PRC government is now reclaiming a centuries old tradition of 
soft power. China has often been portrayed as a “closed empire” but this 
perception, often held by western nations, does not take into account the 
centuries of Chinese diplomatic missions to other nations, the Tribute Trade 
system and the massive influence China has had on the culture of nations 
surrounding it such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam. China has had many 
numerous foreign wars in its past as well as centuries of trade with other nations 
and due to China considering all nations it traded with to be client states, it shows 
that the numerous Chinese dynasties did care greatly about wielding power 
either through military force for nations hostile to China, to trading peacefully and 
acting as a “big brother” to nations China considered in its sphere of influence. 
The Ming was the best example of both hard and soft power being wielded to 
benefit the Ming state and its divine emperor, and will be a great example of 
historical usage of soft power that the PRC has inherited from China’s past.  
However, to completely ignore the impact that the “gunboat diplomacy” of 
the nineteenth century had on China would also be an error. China in modern 
times has been in a search for legitimacy in the eyes of the world and a lot of 
China’s motivations to gain that legitimacy is due to past humiliations. Evidence 
for this point of view can even be found in the government documents that China 
publishes every year. In the “what it is about” section of the “China’s Peaceful 
Development” white paper there is a statement that details the need for 
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legitimacy as well as past humiliations being a motivator for this new strategy on 
the part of the PRC: 
Over the past 5,000 years, people of all ethnic groups in China, with 
diligence and wisdom, have created a splendid civilization and built a 
unified multi-ethnic country. The Chinese civilization has a unique feature 
of being enduring, inclusive and open. The Chinese nation has 
endeavored to learn from other nations and improved itself through 
centuries of interactions with the rest of the world, making major 
contribution to the progress of human civilization. In the mid-19th century, 
Western powers forced open China's door with gunboats. Internal turmoil 
and foreign aggression gradually turned China into a semi-colonial and 
semi-feudal society. The country became poor and weak, and the people 
suffered from wars and chaos. Facing imminent danger of national 
subjugation, one generation of patriots after another fought hard to find a 
way to reform and save the nation. The Revolution of 1911 put an end to 
the system of monarchy which had ruled China for several thousand 
years, and inspired the Chinese people to struggle for independence and 
prosperity. However, such efforts and struggle failed to change the nature 
of China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, or lift the Chinese 
people out of misery. Living up to the people's expectation, the CPC led 
them in carrying out arduous struggle, and finally founded the People's 
Republic of China in 1949. This marked the realization of China's 
independence and liberation of its people and ushered in a new epoch in 
China's history. 
In the past six decades and more since the founding of New China, and 
particularly since the introduction of the reform and opening-up policies in 
1978, the Chinese government has worked hard to explore a path of 
socialist modernization that conforms to China's conditions and the trend 
of the times. Overcoming difficulties and setbacks, the Chinese people 
have advanced with the times, drawn on both experience and lessons 
from the development of China itself and other countries, deepened 
understanding of the laws governing the development of human society, 
and promoted the self-improvement and growth of the socialist system. 
Through arduous struggle, the Chinese people have succeeded in finding 
a path of development conforming to China's reality, the path of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.41 
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The idea of the “path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been 
used by the PRC to justify using capitalist business practices while still being in 
theory a communist state. This practice has been used since the time of Deng 
Xiaoping and has been continued by all succeeding presidents of the PRC, 
including Hu Jintao and more recently Xi Jinping. To understand the concept of 
soft power from the point of view of China it is important to look into both China’s 
past and present. The travels of Zheng He indeed had soft power elements to his 
journeys but the “century of humiliation” is also a crucial part in understanding 
why Beijing wishes to have a legitimate role that is taken seriously by other 
nations on the world stage in the modern day.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EMPEROR AND THE ADMIRAL: THE LIFE AND 
ADVENTURES OF ZHENG HE AND ITS IMPACT  
ON MING SOFT POWER RELATIONS 
 
   
   Rebellion, (that is plotting against the dynasty) and  
  lese-majeste (that is plotting to desecrate imperial  
  ancestral alters, mausoleums, and palaces). All  
  conspirators  regardless of whether they are leaders  
  or followers shall be executed by slicing. Their   
  grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons, older   
  brothers, younger brothers, and those who live   
  with them regardless of surname differences; sons of  
  paternal uncles and brothers regardless of whether  
  they  have the same registration; if they are sixteen  
  years of age  or over, regardless of serious or   
  crippling disease, they shall be executed. Those  
  fifteen or below, mothers, daughters, wives, and  
  concubines older and younger sisters, sons’ wives  
  and concubines, shall be given as slaves to the  
  households of titular nobility. Their property shall be  
  confiscated by the government… 
     -Excerpt from the Penal   
     Section of The Great Ming Code  
     42     
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The Origins of the Ming Dynasty 
 Before getting into the specifics of Zheng He’s life, it would be prudent to 
present a basic overview of the early history of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), its 
first two emperors, and the rise of Zhu Di the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty, 
and Zheng He’s patron. By looking at these historical figures, we will see the kind 
of world Zheng He lived in, and what the political realities were that he faced. The 
Ming Dynasty was the last ethnic Han dynasty in the history of China. The 
previous dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) founded by Kublai Khan (1215-
1294) was overthrown in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the leader of the rebellion 
against the Yuan, who would come to be known as Ming Taizu (r.1368-1398) first 
emperor of the Ming Dynasty. Like many founders of previous dynasties, Taizu 
was of humble birth,43 but he was able to rally support against the hated 
Mongols, and succeeded in his civil war despite the odds, against the more 
militarily powerful Yuan. Once the Yuan Dynasty fell in 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang 
began to consolidate power in his new capital of Nanjing (Nanking) and began to 
build up state infrastructure. The Confucian scholar officials benefited the most 
from this new arrangement of power and the court eunuchs felt their power 
decrease due to Zhu Yuanzhang’s distrust of them.44 Many of Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
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closest friends and allies took up the position of commanders of the Ming’s 
armies. This arrangement would not last forever. After the purges of 1380, many 
of the merit-based nobility in the empire were executed and Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
sons would remain as the most powerful military commanders in the empire 
commanding vast armies from their fiefs. 
 The rise to power Zhu Yuanzhang shows the interplay between both hard 
and soft power. Zhu Yuanzhang used the power of charm and persuasion back 
when he was a peasant soldier rebelling against the Yuan Dynasty. Once Zhu 
Yuanzhang came to power however, he used coercion and strict autocratic 
policies to cement his power. This is often a common strategy throughout history 
with autocratic rulers who often play the liberator at first but become the tyrant 
once their power is achieved. Zhu Yuanzhang was very conscious of how he was 
able to overthrow the Yuan through popular rebellion and became increasingly 
paranoid that the same might be done to him. In 1380, he executed Chancellor 
Hu Weiyong on charges of conspiracy and forming a faction (a capital crime) and 
thereafter abolished the chancellery.45 In the wake of this event, Zhu Yuanzhang 
established the Jinyiwei (Embroidered Uniform Guard) as his secret police and 
they would assist considerably in helping Zhu Yuanzhang in the purges of his 
late reign. Zhu Yuanzhang also wrote extensively on the responsibilities of 
rulership and how the founders of dynasties such as himself proved to be better 
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at ruling the common people due to his humble origins. Zhu Yuanzhang himself 
writes on his own brand of populist ideals in this passage of the August Ming 
Ancestral Instruction: 
I have observed since ancient times, when states established their laws it 
was always done by the ruler who first received the mandate. At that time 
the laws were fixed and the people observed them. Thus, was the imperial 
benevolence and authority extended through the realm so that people 
could enjoy peace and security. This was because at the outset of the 
founding the ruler endured hardships, saw many men, and became 
experienced in handling affairs. In comparison to a ruler born and bred 
deep within the palace, unfamiliar with the world, or a hermit scholar living 
alone in the mountains or forests considering himself enlightened, how 
different it was for me. When I was young I was orphaned and poor and 
grew up amidst warfare. At the age of twenty-four I joined the ranks and 
was ordered about for three years. Then I gathered together and studied 
the ways of training soldiers, planning to compete with the warlords. It was 
trying and worrisome. I was apprehensive and on guard for nearly twenty 
years until I was able to unite the empire.46       
Zhu Yuanzhang in this period began abandoning the path of charming and 
wooing the population and instead began to exercise his power of coercion in 
order to maintain his own power. Seeking to prevent that path of power to any 
potential rival, the emperor initiated the brutal purges which would leave many of 
the upper echelons of the Ming government dead. In the case of Hu Weiyong, 
the purge that followed after his fall from power and execution left an estimated 
thirty thousand people dead. Zhu Yuanzhong fathered twenty-six sons and 
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sixteen daughters through the empress Ma and his numerous concubines.47 One 
of these sons, Zhu Di (r.1402-1424) the future Yongle emperor, was born from 
Zhu Yuanzhang’s lesser consorts.  Zhu Di would eventually become the third 
emperor of the Ming Dynasty but not until after winning a successful civil war that 
would not end until 1402 against his nephew Zhu Yunwen (1377-1402) the future 
Jianwen emperor, who would rule as the second emperor of the dynasty. In 
1380, Zhu Di along with the rest of his brothers were ordered to their fiefs in a 
practice known as Zhiguo which was the standard rite of passage for younger 
sons of an emperor.48 Zhu Di’s fief was the region of Yan with the city of Beiping 
(Beijing) as its capital. Zhu Di as the Prince of Yan was therefore given 
considerable military power on the northern border of the Ming Empire. For Zhu 
Di, this base of power would prove crucial in his rise to power.  
After the death of his oldest son in 1392, Zhu Yuanzhang considered 
having Zhu Di, whom he considered the most capable of his sons, succeed him, 
but he was advised against this by his Confucian courtiers. They instead 
recommended his grandson Zhu Yunwen as successor.49 The reasoning for 
selecting Zhu Yunwen had to do with laws of succession that were strictly 
enforced in the Ming Dynasty. According to Hok Lam Chan, a later edition 
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passage of the August Ming Ancestral Instruction translated by Edward L. 
Farmer lays out the order of succession which Zhu Yuanzhang had to grapple 
with: 
If there are no imperial sons (i.e., the eldest son born to an emperor’s 
primary consort) in the court, the succession will pass to the younger 
brother when the elder brother dies. Those born of lesser consorts shall 
not be elevated even though they are older. If there are treacherous 
officials who advocate abandoning sons of the primary consort and 
elevating the sons of lesser consorts, the sons of the lesser consorts shall 
hold fast to their station and not move. They should send a message to 
the son of the primary consort who ought to be appointed. The essential of 
the matter is that the son of the primary consort occupy the throne. The 
throne shall decapitate the treacherous officials immediately.50        
In order to secure a smooth succession for Zhu Yunwen, Zhu Yuanzhang 
launched another purge to ensure none could challenge Zhu Yunwen for the 
throne upon his succession. Fifteen thousand civil officials and military 
commanders were killed in this purge. Upon the death of the first Emperor of the 
Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered his sons to their fiefs and remain there so they 
would not threaten Zhu Yunwen’s ascension. Here we once again see a hard 
power approach in contrast to the revolutionary peasant hero figure of Zhu 
Yuanzhang’s early years. Instead of using persuasion and the granting of favors 
to officials of uncertain loyalty, Zhu Yuanzhang decided that a hard purge would 
be the most effective method to secure his son’s future. By using coercion and 
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terror, the later years of Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign match perfectly with many 
historical autocratic regimes facing their first succession crisis.   
In 1398 Zhu Yuanzhong finally died and Zhu Yunwen ascended to the 
throne as the Jianwen emperor. By 1399, Zhu Yunwen had ordered the death of 
five of his uncles and two more had died of natural causes.51 Zhu Di in a clever 
ruse, feigned madness in order to reduce the suspicion of Zhu Yunwen while he 
quietly built up his forces and consolidated power. Meanwhile in Nanjing, Zhu 
Yunwen surrounded himself with Confucian scholar officials often taking their 
advice in regard to how to consolidate his power as a wise and sagely ruler. Zhu 
Di, no doubt, feared for his life after seeing the very obvious example of what 
happened to his other brothers and soon plotted rebellion against his nephew 
knowing that time was short.  
The Confucian scholar officials that surrounded Zhu Yunwen suggested 
that he carry out a policy in 1398 known as “wasting of the feudatories” which 
was a policy that deprived feudatory fief holders (Zhu Yunwen’s uncles) of the 
military power of the fiefs they controlled. This caused Zhu Di in his fief of Yan to 
be sealed off from the rest of the empire, while Zhu Yunwen took action against 
the weaker fief holders. Zhu Di however played a very successful gambit against 
his nephew in the summer of 1399, convincing his nephew to release his two 
sons who were being held hostage back into Zhu Di’s custody, to ensure loyal 
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behavior from his uncle. Therefore, Zhu Di had quashed the biggest obstacle to 
his seizure of power by manipulating his naïve nephew into returning the only 
insurance of Zhu Di’s cooperation with the new Emperor.52  Zhu Di determined 
that it was then time to strike, and began an open rebellion against his nephew in 
1399. The excuse Zhu Di used to justify his rebellion was that “deceitful 
ministers” (the Confucians) had “corrupted” the young emperor and according to 
Dryer, issued a manifesto that called for “Ancestral Injunctions” which gave the 
Prince of Yan the right to come to Nanjing and “suppress difficulties” with the 
ministers who had “deceived” his nephews.53 This began the long and bloody 
civil war (1399-1402) of Zhu Di which would last four years. Initially, Zhu Yunwen 
underestimated Zhu Di’s military aptitude due to the loyalist’s vastly superior 
numbers. Zhu Di engaged in successful guerilla tactics and raids to sap at the 
supply lines of Zhu Yunwen’s numerically superior forces.  
The first troops sent by Zhu Yunwen were easily routed by Zhu Di’s 
forces. A successful night raid against loyal forces, who were in their camp 
drinking and celebrating the Autumn Festival in Heibei province, resulted in eight 
thousand loyalist forces being killed or captured, and this was further 
compounded by an additional loss of ten thousand soldiers in another ambush, 
with Zhu Di’s soldiers hiding under a bridge underwater using reeds as breathing 
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instruments.54 These successful guerilla tactics devastated the initial forces sent 
to suppress the rebellion and after they retreated and regrouped, Zhu Yunwen 
began to take his uncle’s rebellion seriously. He raised a new army and marched 
straight into the prince of Yan’s lands in 1399 and in December laid siege to 
Beiping itself. This was the First Siege of Beiping (1399) and proved to be a 
decisive victory for the rebel forces. On the very walls of Beiping, the city 
managed to hold due to the resourcefulness and strategy of Zhu Di’s 
commanders and managed to inflict two hundred thousand casualties on the 
loyalist forces.  One of the commanders defending the walls was a young eunuch 
and companion of Zhu Di by the name of Ma He. Ma He and the other 
commanders of the city proved decisive in the siege of Beiping and after the 
Imperial army retreated, it gave the rebel forces some breathing room. After a 
failed invasion of Shanxi in 1400, a second loyalist army was routed. This 
temporary success for Zhu Di came to an end in 1400-1401 when a new fresh 
army forced Zhu Di on to the defensive.  
This was the low point in the rebellion for Zhu Di and a stalemate occurred 
which Zhu Di gave into despair.55 However, the disunity among the eunuchs in 
the Imperial Court gave an opportunity to Zhu Di. The defecting eunuchs, who 
had felt their power being reduced during the reign of the first and second Ming 
emperors, defected to Zhu Di’s cause and brought secrets with them, showing 
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the weaknesses in Nanjing’s defenses. This would be a crucial turning point in 
the war and give Zhu Di the opportunity to seize the Dragon Throne. As for the 
prince of Yan’s companion Ma He, who had played a decisive role in the defense 
of Beiping, this would be the beginning of a very long and fruitful career as the 
right-hand man of Zhu Di. In January 1402, Zhu Di’s armies marched out of 
Beiping with Ma He as one of the commanders of Zhu Di’s army. This would be 
the turning point of the war and would change the young eunuch’s life forever as 
he marched alongside his master, ready to lay siege to the Imperial Capital of 
Nanjing. 
The story of Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise to power is a perfect example of a 
leader using both hard and soft power to achieve their own ends. The emperor 
was able in his early years to craft the image of a peasant hero, a virtuous 
exemplar who fought to liberate the common people using the charm and 
persuasion inherent in soft power politics. After wooing the population however, 
and coming to power, Zhu Yunwen frequently used coercion to get what he 
wanted becoming an autocratic ruler as brutal as the Yuan emperors. The 
comparisons one could make with later figures in Chinese history such as Mao 
Zedong are similar to that of Zhu Yuanzhang and many other autocratic rulers. 
This also shows that once again, hard and soft power rarely work in isolation 
from each other and indeed often complement one or the other 
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Culture Heroes: Soft Power and Uses of Zhu Yuanzhang  
in International Politics and Culture 
 
The early years of the Ming Dynasty have a lot of relevance in perceptions 
of how soft power is used by the government of the PRC. Film and popular 
culture have been a medium of soft power not only in the United States but in 
China as well. The populist peasant revolutionary Zhu Yuanzhang has taken a 
life of its own in film and popular culture. By maintaining the persuasive image of 
Zhu Yuanzhang, the proto-communist revolutionary and ignoring his later 
coercive autocratic hard power tendencies of Zhu Yuanzhang’s later reign, the 
PRC has the perfect icon to show that it has always had a “revolutionary past”. 
This also lends a sort of legitimacy to the PRC government itself as it gives a 
veneer of continuing historical legitimacy being passed on from the Ming and 
Qing dynasties. For example, Michael Szonyi of Harvard University writes about 
“Ming Fever” which is his description of the craze for everything Ming Dynasty 
related in China when in 2007 he noticed this trend take off following the 
successful miniseries detailing the life of the Ming founder. Szonyi noticed back 
in 2005 that the “Ming Fever” had its genesis in the Zheng He story: 
The first symptoms of what would come to be called the ‘Ming fever’ or fad 
appeared in 2005, the six hundredth anniversary of the voyages of Zheng 
He 鄭和 (1371-1433), the eunuch who led a series of massive official 
naval missions throughout southeast Asia, as far as the Middle East and 
the west coast of Africa. The anniversary inspired a host of 
commemorations, culminating in the State Council declaring 11 July to be 
‘China National Maritime Day’ (Zhongguo hanghai ri 中國航海日). There 
were state sponsored conferences and exhibitions, historical 
reconstructions, and a high-budget television drama about the exploits of 
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the fifteenth century traveler. The Nanjing shipyards where Zheng He’s 
boats were built have been developed as a park and museum.56 
The using of Zheng He, Zhu Di and Zhu Yuanzong as popular culture 
icons has proven to be very successful. China in its search for legitimacy in the 
eyes of the world is tempted to use historical personages in its past, even though 
these figures would sharply contrast with orthodox Marxist political theory by 
romanticizing historical rulers who would have been “feudal” by Marx’s 
definition.57 That being said the story of a peasant who led a “people’s revolution” 
can fit nicely into the official narrative of the PRC if certain historical context is 
ignored. Szonyi gives an explanation for this contradiction: 
The People’s Republic (PRC) has always had a complex and fraught 
relationship with China’s history. Mao Zedong read historical works 
voraciously and was fond of quoting from them and employing historical 
allusions. But he also launched campaigns like the Anti-Four-Olds 
movement (po si jiu 破四舊), seeking to destroy the influence of the past 
as well as its material legacies in the hope of producing a blank slate on 
which to build a utopian future. Like other regimes in China and 
elsewhere, the PRC government has frequently used historical narratives 
to construct national identity and to legitimate policies. One has only to 
think of official accounts of the history of Taiwan or Tibet. The current 
Ming fever suggests that the past is still very much part of life in the 
present in China. 58  
One of the key words used here is a recurring theme in China’s past and 
present: legitimacy. The need for legitimacy in the eyes of the world is one of the 
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concepts that has driven China to reclaim its position as a world power. It was 
legitimacy that as one of the primary motivations for the treasure voyages and it 
is the search for legitimacy that plays a crucial part in China being able to use its 
past to prop up heroes that are needed to cement that legitimacy. The fact that 
the PRC also uses practicality in dealing with its past has indeed been an 
effective part of China’s usage of soft power and that practicality also led to 
China becoming a very relevant and very powerful country by the end of the 
twentieth century.59   
There have been further uses of using the Ming as a rallying cry for many 
of China’s upheavals in the twentieth century. In Sarah Schneewind’s edited 
work Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder Across Six Centuries of 
East Asian History, there is an essay written by Rebecca Nedostup titled Two 
Tombs: Thoughts on Zhu Yuanzhang, the Kuomintang, and the Meanings of 
National Heros. In this essay Nedostup explains how national heroes were used 
by Nationalist China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek as “racial heroes” 
of the Han Chinese ethnic group during the 1911 revolution. Nedostup argues 
that despite the autocratic nature of Zhu Yuanzhang, the Ming founder was often 
used by the KMT as a symbol of Han unification, especially in the “racialist” 
nature of the historical figure. Using Zhu Yuanzhang’s rebellion against the 
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Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) as an analogy for the Han fighting against the 
Manchu led Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) proved to be an effective form of 
propaganda to rally the mostly Han revolutionaries against the Manchu Qing and 
served as a way to promote Han nationalism.60 Nedostup’s argument of using 
heroes of the past to promote modern day causes has plenty of analogies in 
modern day politics in China. The anti-corruption campaign of President Xi for 
example, has a historical analogy with Zhu Yuanzhang’s own anti-corruption 
campaign, albeit Xi’s may be less draconian then that of Zhu Yuanzhang’s which 
saw thousands of civilians butchered.61  
This usage of national heroes also in many ways contributes to the soft 
power policies of Beijing’s charm strategy. By using versions of historical that 
may be “sanitized” to fit into the nominally socialist but also practical world view 
of the PRC, national heroes like Zhu Yuanzhang can be used to promote the 
“One China” principle, especially in the sense of national unity. Another paper as 
cited in Schneewind’s written by Gray Tuttle is an essay, Using Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
Communications with Tibetans to Justify PRC Rule in Tibet explains the 
argument that the modern-day PRC has used Zhu Yuanzhang’s communications 
with the Tibetan lama’s in the fourteenth to prove that China and Tibet have been 
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undivided at least since the Yuan Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty by this argument’s 
assertion, inherited in its rise to power in terms of continuance of governance. 
Tuttle gives a refutation of this point of view, pointing out that despite the Ming 
Dynasty giving out certain honors and titles to some of the religious sects in Tibet 
such as the Sagya Sect, this does not mean that the Ming Dynasty ruled Tibet in 
a unified sense, but rather that it was a policy of “pacification” with the Ming 
Dynasty only conferring rule upon on sects that had “control of their own areas”. 
Tuttle also argues that despite the PRC’s claim to the contrary, no one religious 
leader had full control over Tibet during the time of the Ming.62 Nevertheless, the 
PRC has adamantly claimed that Tibet was not independent fully in this time 
period and has used this argument to justify its continued rule of the territory.63 
The soft power benefits of this policy are clear in that they support the idea of an 
“undivided” China, a policy that Beijing is very sensitive to in international affairs.  
If Beijing can convince other nations to adopt the point of view that 
historically Tibet was always a part of China and use the “culture hero” Zhu 
Yuanzhang to achieve this end, then the PRC will be able to gain a considerable 
amount of soft power on the world stage and diminish the Tibetan Independence 
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Movement without firing a shot using coercion. In the larger picture of power 
politics, the PRC can use charm and persuasion to convince nations to accept its 
foreign and national policy, no matter how questionable the historical claims the 
PRC presents as evidence are.  
 
The Early Life of Zheng He and Zhu Di’s Ascension 
 In the aftermath of the toppling of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, the Mongols 
and remnant Yuan forces had retreated to Yunnan, with the newly created Ming 
Dynasty hot on their heels. In 1374, Zhu Yuanzhang demanded that the Mongols 
and their leader Basalawarmi submit to Ming rule and sent envoys to convey this 
message. The envoys were killed, and in response the Ming forces under 
General Fu Youde invaded Yunnan. Fu Youde’s three hundred thousand strong 
army successfully invaded Yunnan and by 1382 had captured the provincial seat 
of Kunming after which the rebellion’s leaders committed suicide to avoid 
capture. Fu Youde then began a reign of terror against the local population, 
killing hundreds of thousands of Miao and Yao tribesmen.64  Another common 
method used against the population was the kidnapping of young boys to serve 
as eunuchs in the imperial court. One of these boys was a young ten-year-old 
child by the name of Ma He. Ma He’s surname Ma, according to Dryer, often but 
not always indicated Muslim faith. Also, according to Dryer, Ma He’s grandfather 
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and father both had the name Haji indicating they had completed the Hajj, a 
pilgrimage to Mecca. While Ma He’s family were of Chinese Muslim extraction, 
Ma He was known to mostly practice Buddhism in his religious life and took a 
Buddhist name 65  The boy was taken by Fu Youde and was subjected to 
castration. According to Levathes, in China in this time period, castration was 
accomplished by the quick stroke of a knife that cut off both the penis and testes 
of the victim with a plug left in the urethra.66  After this brutal act, Ma He was put 
into the household of the Prince of Yan, Zhu Di.  
Growing up in the Prince of Yan’s court, Ma He rose through the ranks to 
become an able military commander. He was one of the commanders during the 
siege of Beijing in 1399.67 Early in his life at court, Ma He had befriended Zhu Di, 
and the young prince and the eunuch had become very close friends.  Ma He 
served as a boyhood companion and later in life as a rising military general. 
These early skirmishes in Mongolia were formative years for Ma He and were 
crucial for him to get the necessary training for a military career. Most 
importantly, these campaigns and hard fighting forged an ever-closer bond 
between Zhu Di and Ma He. These campaigns would also give Zhu Di’s troops 
an opportunity to “cut their teeth” in warfare. These veterans would prove crucial 
to the 1399-1402 Ming Civil War, especially the Mongol defectors of the 
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Uriyangqad tribe who fought for Zhu Di in the civil war.68 In particular, a Mongol 
leader by the name of Nagahachu surrendered to Zhu Di during his campaign 
with Inner Mongolia. Zhu Di treated Nagahachu and his men like honored guests 
and soon convinced them to join his forces. These expert horse-archers would 
prove to be a strategic asset in the civil war.69 This consolidation of forces and 
military power showed that Zhu Di was indeed thinking in the long term, indeed 
his chances of success in the war may have been much slimmer.  
The beginning of the war was nowhere near as dramatic and climactic as 
the final siege of Nanjing in January 1402. Zhu Di had left Beiping with his 
generals, among them was Ma He and Zhu Di’s new Uriyangqad allies. Nanjing 
had formidable defenses, defended by perhaps the longest wall in any city of the 
time period and strict punishments for guards who were found sleeping on duty 
or intoxicated, with the punishment being death or if under a lenient commander 
the removal of one’s ear.70 As well prepared as Zhu Di was for the siege, these 
defenses proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. However, even in the 
context of military siege soft power (intrigue) could have its advantages over hard 
power (an all-out assault, or lengthy siege). The river fleet commander, Chen 
Xuan (1365-1433) was one of many disgruntled military commanders who had 
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lost faith with the loyalist regime in Nanjing.71 With Chen Xuan’s help, Zhu Di’s 
forces crossed the Yangtze. With the help of two defected commanders who 
agreed to open the gates, Zhu Di, Ma He and the rebel army marched through 
Nanjing’s Jinchuan gate on July 17th 1402. By the time Zhu Di had reached the 
Imperial palace, the Jianwen Emperor’s last loyal servants and guards had set 
the Imperial Palace ablaze. A charred corpse was presented to Zhu Di as the 
corpse of his nephew, but the corpse was so badly burned it could not be 
identified. According to the Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty, a work 
written by Chinese historian Xia Xe, the Jianwen Emperor Zhu Yunwen very 
likely died in the conflagration, there were rumors he had escaped, most 
famously as a monk as cited by Leavthes.72  
Despite these rumors Zhu Di ascended to the Dragon Throne on the 17th 
of July as the Yongle (perpetual happiness) Emperor. Zhu Di, being a usurper 
was quick to find ways to give himself legitimacy and prove that The Mandate of 
Heaven had indeed been granted to him. However, the rumors of his nephew’s 
survival haunted him and so he almost immediately started financing searches 
for his possible whereabouts or conclusive evidence of his death.73 Zhu Di’s 
eunuch general Ma He for his part also rose in stature due to invaluable 
generalship during this campaign. Ma He was elevated by Zhu Di to the position 
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of Taijian (Grand Director) of the Directorate of Palace Servants, one of the 
highest-ranking positions a Palace Eunuch could attain. This also allowed Ma He 
the right to wear the red robes of a high-ranking Eunuch of the court, a symbol of 
his new high status. In 1404 on New Year’s Day in commemoration of Ma He’s 
defense of the Zheng Village Dike during the civil war, Zhu Di conferred upon Ma 
He the name of Zheng in honor of his role in this battle.74   
 The civil war of Yongle once again shows the need for legitimacy in the 
politics of China both past and present. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in 
Zhu Di’s favor to grant him legitimacy was the promise of stability. The promise of 
stability is a common way many governments in China either Imperial or the PRC 
have kept their power. In an article written for The Diplomat by Ankit Panda 
argues that it is the promise of stability, rooting out corruption and giving China 
an important place in the world is what keeps the CCP in power in China and not 
only, as conventional wisdom would argue, the massive economic growth that 
has resulted from the legacy of Deng Xiaoping. Panda argues: 
 Where does the CCP’s legitimacy come from then? As Greer notes, 
maybe looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been 
the wrong measure all along—it’s unnecessarily reductive and dismissive 
of the opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would 
attribute the legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting 
corruption, delivering justice to wrong-doers within the country’s power 
apparatus) as well as more diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCP’s 
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role in helping China, as a country and a nation, become wealthy, 
powerful, and respected on the international stage”).75 
President Xi, the current President of the People’s Republic, has been an 
exemplar of this idea. Xi has in recent years launched a tireless anti-corruption 
campaign intended according to government sources to clean up rampant 
corruption in the party leadership. Critics of this policy have noted that many of 
these “corrupt” officials have been at times Xi’s rivals and that the anti-corruption 
campaign has been an excuse for President Xi to remove political opposition.76 
Xi has also not been much of a stranger to the concept of raising China’s 
prestige around the world, hoping to reclaim China’s place in the world by 
focusing hard on foreign relations and diplomacy.  
Zhu Di in an apparent parallel in history also sought to increase China’s prestige 
to its neighbors. In Zheng He’s biography in the Mingshi as cited in Dryer’s work, 
Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty, a similar yearning for 
China to gain prestige under the tenure of Zhu Di is expressed: 
Zheng He a native of Yunnan, is the one whom the world calls the Grand 
Director of the Three Treasures. Originally, he served the Prince of Yan in 
the palace of his princely fief. He followed [when the prince] raised troops, 
accumulated merit [in his service, and] was promoted to Grand Director. 
[Emperor] Chengzu had suspected that Emperor Hui had fled beyond the 
sea and wanted to track him down moreover, he wanted to display his 
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soldiers in strange lands in order to make manifest the wealth and power 
of the Middle Kingdom. (304.2b-4b)77  
Zhu Di recognized not only his need for legitimacy as a ruler justifying a civil war 
but also the need for legitimacy around the world. Using the excuse that he was 
following leads concerning rumors of his nephew’s survival, Zhu Di in reality was 
re-asserting China’s prestigious place in the world and wished to use soft power 
to display the wealth and prestige for China hoping to forge favorable trade 
agreements with China’s neighbors. In the modern day, President Xi’s foreign 
policy which hopes to show that China is a wealthy and advanced nation is 
motivated by enticing foreign investment to come to China and take part in 
China’s new booming economy is a clear parallel to these events. In both ruler’s 
cases a theme of “reclaiming lost glory” and showing of the prestige and wealth 
of China in order to attract “investment” whether 14th century style tribute trade 
policies or the economic policy of the PRC remains a constant theme in China’s 
search for legitimacy. 
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Soft Power and the Search for Legitimacy: 
The First Voyage and the Birth of the Treasure Fleet 
 
   In autumn of 1405, the fleet of 317 brightly painted  
   junks with a total crew of more than 27,000 men was  
   ready to depart from Nanjing. As the ships assembled 
   in formation in the center of the Yangzi, the sculpted  
   “eyes” on the majestic bows looked anxiously   
   downstream toward the open sea. The destination of  
   the treasure ships was Calicut-the powerful city state  
   in Kerala on the west coast of India that had a market  
   for spices and rare woods that attracted traders  
   throughout the Indian Ocean. Here in this isolated  
   coastal region west of the Ghat range, grew   
   cardamom, cinnamon, ginger, turmeric, and precious  
   pepper, worth its weight in gold. After the flooding of  
   the ancient Indian harbor of Muziris in 1341, Calicut  
   had emerged as the most important port not only in  
   India, but in all of south Asia 
       -Louise Levathes  
       on the voyage to  
       Calicut by the  
       Treasure Fleet78 
 
While Zhu Di now had full and absolute power as emperor, he was still in a 
very tenuous position. First of all, Zhu Di and the entire empire were painfully 
aware that he was a usurper. While this was nothing new in the history of China, 
indeed the concept of The Mandate of Heaven, an ideal similar to the European 
“Divine Right of Kings” seemed to support it. The Mandate of Heaven was a 
concept started in the Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–256 BC) that justified a ruler’s 
divine right of rule and the right of rebellion against an unjust ruler who would 
have lost the mandate in the eyes of the divine. The tricky part in this case was 
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that the loss of the Mandate of Heaven usually applied to one dynasty 
overthrowing another, rather than a usurpation of the same dynasty, although 
Zhu Di was hardly alone in being the usurper of the same dynasty. Nevertheless, 
the possible survival of Zhu Yunwen the Jianwen Emperor disturbed and worried 
Zhu Di greatly. Not only were there rumors that he had escaped disguised as a 
monk, but there were other rumors that Zhu Yunwen had escaped overseas, 
plotting his return to China.79 Regardless of whether this was true or not, Zhu Di 
was in desperate need to see his rule as legitimate and what better way to gain 
legitimacy then having it acknowledged by rulers of China’s neighbors?  
In 1403, still new on the throne, Zhu Di ordered the construction of the 
Treasure Fleet, a vast armada of war and trade ships that would sail around the 
Indian Ocean and collect tribute and acknowledgement of the Ming Dynasty’s 
superiority from China’s neighbors. The military usage of this fleet and the threat 
of force in a hard power sense could not be denied, but Zhu Di’s plans tended to 
be of a more diplomatic soft power tone. These ships would display the vast 
wealth and power of the Ming and its new emperor, showing the benefits of token 
submission under the tribute trade system. The rumors of the Jianwen’s survival 
overseas indeed may have been a motivation for these journeys although 
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according to Yang Wei, that was very unlikely as the cost of launching seven 
voyages because of a mere rumor would not have been very feasible.80  
According to the Mingshi, the official history of the Ming, the treasure ships were 
447 by 183 feet in their size.81  According to Sally K. Church in her scholarly 
article “Zheng He: An Investigation into the Plausibility of 450-foot Treasure 
Ships” the actual sizes of these ships in Longjiang were probably closer to 200-
250 ft. in length. Church bases her argument of the findings of Professor Xin 
Yuan’ou, a shipbuilding engineering professor at Shanghai Jiaotang University.82 
Church writes: 
At a conference entitled "Venture Toward the Seas" held in Taipei in 
September 2001, Xin Yuan'ou, shipbuilding engineer and professor of the 
history of science at Shanghai Jiaotong University, presented a paper 
entitled "Guanyu Zheng He baochuan chidu de jishu fenshi” (A Technical 
Analysis of the Size of Zheng He’s Ships.) In this paper, he argued that 
Zheng He's ships could not have been as large as recorded in the official 
Ming history (Ming shi). According to that work, the ships constructed for 
Zheng He's maritime expeditions were 44 zhang 3t long and 18 zhang 
wide, equivalent to 447 ft. by 183 ft. (138.4 m by 56 m).3 A ship this size 
would have been roughly 1.4 times the size of an American football field,4 
and approximately the same size as the USS Minnesota (456 ft. long by 
78 ft. 10 in wide), a steel battleship launched in 1905 and later used in the 
First World War. In arguing against this size, Xin was motivated in part by 
an immediate, practical concern. Preparations were being made for the 
600th anniversary of Zheng He's first expedition in 2005, and proposals 
were being put forward for the construction of replicas of Zheng He's 
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ships. Xin was concerned that any such replica be of a realistic size so as 
to be economical, seaworthy and safe.83 
Despite the controversy regarding the size of the Treasure Fleet itself, the 
ships and their vast numbers, this was indeed an impressive fleet. The Treasure 
Fleet was no merchant fleet either, it was a full armada and the military nature of 
this fleet, whatever soft power intentions the emperor may have had cannot be 
denied. The fleet represented a massive show of force against China’s 
neighbors, but still had the intention of trade, although this was in the context of 
the tribute trade system, which relied on an understanding that any nation trading 
with China acknowledged the emperor as their overlord. It is hard to determine 
whether or not this was a course of soft power or hard power. On the one hand, 
the tribute trade system, is coercive, on the other there is a degree of charm 
involved in the tribute trade process as well. This example shows that often times 
hard and soft power work together and not in isolation of each other. By having a 
token acknowledgement of supremacy, the Ming Dynasty could have control over 
China’s neighbors without having to use an all-out military invasion. This often 
worked for the rulers of China’s neighbors as well, since they realized this was at 
best only a de jure surrendering of their sovereignty, a rather small price to pay to 
participate in the sharing of China’s vast wealth.  
Shortly after coming to the throne, Zhu Di had repudiated his father’s 
decree that had limited trade between China and foreign nations. The first 
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emperor of the Ming had been advised by his Confucian scholar-officials that 
agriculture alone was the basis for Chinese wealth. Zhu Di on the other hand, 
saw the advantage of opening up trade with China’s neighbors, decreeing, “Now 
all within the four seas are one family! Let there be mutual trade at the frontier 
barriers in order to supply the country’s needs and to encourage distant people to 
come!”84 In the previous thirty years the trade of the Indian Ocean had become 
nearly nothing, so it became obvious that Zhu Di wished to open up this vast 
trade route and with Calicut, a city state in the West Indian region of Kerala. This 
would be the first Chinese international fleet operating in the Indian Ocean.85 The 
cutting of trade in southeast Asia as well had been devastating in Indonesia and 
Malaysia.86 
As cited by Levathes, there was definitely a prevailing appetite within 
southeast Asia and India to resume the mutually beneficial trade relationship that 
had been ended by the first emperor of the Ming, on advice from his Confucian 
officials. In autumn 1405, after over a year of planning and construction Zheng 
He’s grand armada sailed out of Longjiang towards the state of Champa 
(Vietnam). While in Champa, Zheng He traded in Ming porcelain and silks. In 
exchange, the people of Champa traded with aloe wood, rhinoceros horn and 
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elephant ivory, all of which was regarded as tribute to the Yongle Emperor. 
Moving on from Champa, the armada made its way to the island of Java. The 
Chinese and Javanese had endured difficult relations in their past, culminating in 
the 1377 execution of several Chinese envoys, (sent by China in order to force 
the recognition of the state Palembang, a rival of the Javanese) by Javanese 
King Hayam Wuruk. This was of course an affront to the Dragon Throne, and 
trade as a result had dwindled to nothing and Zheng He was determined to 
reverse this. Fei Xin (1385-136), who served as one of Zheng He’s lieutenants in 
his work The Overall Survey of the Star Raft gives a well detailed description of 
Java and its many trade items during the treasure fleet’s visit:   
The port in the mouth of the river where one lands and leaves [this 
country] is called hsin-t’sun. The inhabitants live all round. They plait 
kayang leaves to cover their houses. The shop-houses run side by side, 
forming a market, where they buy and sell [the things] which have been 
gathered together. This country is rich and prolific. Pearls, gold and silver, 
yakut stones and cat’s-eyes, blue, red and other kinds of [precious] 
stones, mother-of-pearl, carnelians, nutmegs, long peppers, gardenia 
flowers, putchuck and [even] salt-there is nothing which they don’t have. 
This certainty is so because [the country] is situated in a place where all 
trade comes through.87    
On his way to Java and Sumatra, Zheng He had avoided the state of 
Palembang, which out of all these city states was the wealthiest of them all. Their 
wealth came as a result of a war between the Javanese city states who had 
claimed Palembang as their own and had installed a Javanese controlled puppet 
government in the city. The inhabitants of Palembang had thrown out the 
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Javanese but during this time of upheaval, the notorious Chinese pirate Chen 
Zuyi had taken control of the city and made Palembang a stronghold of piracy 
and lawlessness, similar to the “Pirate Republic” of Nassau in the early 18th 
century during British rule in the Bahamas.  On his return to China, Zheng He 
would deal with Chen Zuyi but the time was not quite right for a full military 
engagement, especially when Zheng He was trying to repair relations with the 
Javanese, thus showing that at least for now, soft power diplomacy would win the 
day.88  
We can see through this narrative that the Chinese already had a large 
and thriving community in Java and indeed dominated a large part of the trade 
there, which would have made Zheng He’s job considerably easier. After 
spending some time in Java and Sumatra trading, the fleet moved on to the 
kingdom of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where unlike what happened in Java, Zheng He 
met with a much different reception than he did in Java, which was rather positive 
compared to that of Ceylon. Zheng He noted that the ruler of Ceylon, as cited by 
Dryer and Levathes, had treated him and the emperor’s emissaries badly and 
had proved “arrogant and disrespectful and wanted to harm Zheng He”.89  Zheng 
He decided it would be best to leave Ceylon for the time being but made note of 
Ceylon’s military defenses and vast wealth in precious gemstones. According to 
Ma Huan, a Chinese Muslim scholar who participated in the voyages and 
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contemporary of both Zheng He and Fei Xin, Zheng He and the fleet made haste 
to their original destination of Calicut which the Chinese regarded as “The Great 
Country of the Western Ocean” showing the amount of prestige and admiration 
the Chinese put on this west Indian city state. Ma Huan described the people 
there as being “honest and trustworthy.”90 According to Levathes, Zheng He 
stayed in Calicut from December 1406 to April 1407. The unusual extended 
duration of this trade mission was due to the rituals and bargaining that was 
standard of an official trade mission sent by the emperor. Zheng He’s experience 
in Calicut was peaceful and he knew that by following a soft power policy he 
could gain a favorable trade relationship in Calicut which was one of the busiest 
ports in all of Asia.  From this port flowed goods from all over Asia, Europe and 
the Middle East. He also took great care to show respect to the Zamurin which 
was the title of the ruler of Calicut.  According to Ma Huan the bargaining stage in 
these trade missions could take a month if done quickly and two to three months 
if slow. He gives a description of the lengthy process: 
 If a treasure-ship goes there, it is left entirely to the two men to 
superintend the buying and selling; the king sends a chief and a Che-ti 
Wei-no-chito examine the account books in the official bureau; a broker 
comes and joins them; [and] a high officer who commands the ships 
discusses the choice of a certain date for fixing prices. When the day 
arrives, they first of all take the silk embroideries and the open-work silks, 
and other such goods which have been brought there, and discuss the 
price of them one by one; [and] when [the price] has been fixed, they write 
out an agreement stating the amount of the price; [this agreement] is 
retained by these persons. The chief and the Che-ti, with his excellency 
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the eunuch, all join hands together, and the broker then says ‘In such and 
such a moon on such and such a day, we have all joined hands and 
sealed our agreement with a hand-clasp; whether [the price] be dear or 
cheap, we will never repudiate it or change it. After that, the Che-ti and the 
men of wealth then come bringing precious stones, pearls, corals, and 
other such things, so that they may be examined and the price discussed; 
[this] cannot be settled in a day; [if done] quickly, [it takes] one moon; [if 
done] slowly, [it takes] two or three moons.’91 
 Since Zheng He understood the need and benefits of diplomacy to gain 
recognition of Zhu Di’s legitimacy, Zheng He likely spent a lot of time negotiating 
with the Zamurin and gaining recognition of Zhu Di’s sovereignty under the 
tribute trade system, but this is still speculation. Regardless, in April the fleet 
began its return journey to China. Coming along with Zheng He were 
ambassadors from Calicut, Java and Sumatra who were to be taken to the 
imperial court and submit themselves to Zhu Di, a time-honored ritual in Imperial 
China, where emissaries would prostrate themselves before the emperor in 
submission, and in return the emperor would reward them with rich gifts and treat 
them as guests of extreme honor. But there was one further amount of business 
that had to be taken care of: the pirate Chen Zuyi. Here Zheng He abandoned his 
soft power policy and turned the wrath of the Ming Navy onto Chen Zuyi. Zheng 
He utterly destroyed the pirates and burned their hideout in Palembang, both 
freeing the people of Palembang from Chen Zuyi’s rule and capturing alive the 
pirate. Chen Zuyi was bound in chains and was to be taken with Zheng He to 
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Nanjing to face execution for his crimes.92 Fei Xin also gives a firsthand account 
on the capture of the infamous pirate: 
In the third year of Yung-lo (1405) when Emperor Tai-tsung Wen huang-ti 
(Zhu Di) of our present dynasty ordered the principal envoy, the Grand 
Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take supreme command of a fleet and to 
precede to all the foreign countries, the pirate Chen Tsu-I and his 
followers met in the country of Srivijaya where they plundered foreign 
merchants and even attacked our ships. [But] they became victims of a 
secret plan on the part of our principal envoy, and like brutes caught in a 
net, they were exterminated, their leaders being captured alive and sent 
as prisoners to the imperial palace. After this the seas were restored to 
imperial peace and order.93    
In the summer of 1407, the fleet had returned to China and Zheng He 
returned to a very pleased emperor, who while distraught that no word had been 
heard about his predecessor Zhu Yunwen, was still very pleased that the 
legitimacy of his rule had been recognized by many rulers of southeast Asia and 
India. Overall, the first expedition had shown that Zheng He had a great grasp of 
knowledge on both soft power and hard power. He re-established trade 
relationships using the awe and majesty of the Treasure Fleet, relationships that 
were in great deterioration for over thirty years. He also made quick work of a 
notorious Chinese pirate that was affecting trade relationships all around the area 
and had quickly brought him to heel. Ceylon had proved to be problematic in 
establishing relations but they could be dealt with in the future as Zheng He 
would later prove. 
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The journeys to Java and Calicut have had lasting impacts on the relations 
between China, India and Java today. A crucial part of China’s soft power is 
using its past to establish that China’s relations were peaceful and prosperous 
with its neighbors for centuries, especially when it comes to Zheng He, who has 
served as a useful bit of propaganda in the last few decades when dealing with 
relations with China’s neighbors. In May 2005, the Nanjing Museum and many 
numerous cities in China, Java and India celebrated Zheng He’s sexcentenary, 
celebrating 600 years since the first voyage of the admiral. The China Heritage 
Quarterly gives a brief summarization of the celebrations: 
This tribute to Zheng He, master mariner of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), 
is merely one frisson in the flurry of activities organized for the 
sexcentenary. Stamped with patriotism, most events are designed to 
appeal to Chinese who hail from the various hometowns and localities in 
China associated with Zheng He, or who now live in the areas of 
Southeast and South Asia, as well as the Middle East and even East 
Africa, once visited by Zheng He's fleets. Although Zheng He came to be 
deified and included in local Chinese pantheons in Tian Hou temples, he 
was in fact a Muslim, a fact not overlooked in the present celebrations.94 
 Beijing has found a great propaganda spokesman in the form of the Ming 
admiral. The PRC has recently been using Zheng He in its relations with the 
Javanese and India as a way to promote the “peaceful co-existence” between 
nations that have had long standing relations with China. However, there have 
been some pitfalls in the relationship between the PRC and Java. In Tuban a part 
of East Java, a 30.4-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu a famous Chinese general of 
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the Three Kingdoms Era (220-280 BC) who was later deified was unveiled in 
Tuban sparking massive controversy with a fundamentalist minority of Tuban’s 
Muslim population. In the Straits Times the events and controversy are 
summarized:   
Indonesia has urged officials to stand up to mob pressure after Muslim 
and nationalist protesters called for a 30m-tall statue of a Chinese deity 
erected in a temple complex in an East Java town to be torn down. The 
brightly painted statue of Guan Yu, a general who is worshipped by some 
Chinese people, was inaugurated last month in a temple complex in the 
fishing town of Tuban, and is claimed to be South-east Asia's tallest 
representation of the deity. The statue in Tuban, about 100km west of the 
city of Surabaya, has been partially covered up after the protests, 
provoking both praise and ridicule on social media in the world's most 
populous Muslim- majority country Teten Masduki, chief of staff to 
President Joko Widodo, told reporters: "If they ask for the statue to be torn 
down, the authorities cannot bow to such pressure. “Protesters 
demonstrated this week outside Surabaya's Parliament against the statue, 
some wearing paramilitary-style outfits and waving placards that read 
"Demolish it" and "We are not worshippers of idols”. Allowing a depiction 
of a foreign general was "a symbol of treason to this nation", an unnamed 
protester said in a video of the rally on news portal Kompas.com. Officials 
of the Kwan Sing Bio Temple in Tuban declined to comment, but the 
media have quoted residents as saying the statue was good for tourism.95   
While China’s perception of its soft power is a perception that celebrates 
peaceful exploration and relations, that perception may not always be shared 
with the nations China is attempting to woo. In the example shown in East Java 
concerning the Guan Yu statue, what China may see as sharing its culture, some 
Javanese natives may see China’s perception of its own soft power as being a 
kind of cultural imperialism. There is also a perception by an extreme religious 
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minority that the statue serves as an insult to the Muslim population’s religious 
beliefs tinged with Indonesian nationalism clashing with Chinese nationalism. 
When it comes to Zheng He, there is perhaps a bit of irony in this point of view 
seeing that Zheng He was born to a Muslim father and there is considerable 
evidence he may have shared his father’s beliefs at least on a cultural level. The 
overall point that is being established here however is that China’s own 
perceptions of its history and soft power may at many times clash with what other 
nations and peoples consider Chinese soft (and hard) to be. Quite likely in the 
case of the Guan Yu statue, religious belief may be used as an excuse and the 
real problem lies with nationalism as implied in the article.  
 This distrustfulness of China’s motivations has also been the source of 
contention when it comes to national territory as well. The Senkaku/Diayou 
islands dispute between China, Japan and Korea has shown that China is willing 
to forego soft power diplomacy when it comes to territorial integrity. From the 
forward to a white paper published by the PRC State Council in 2012, we can 
see how seriously China considers territorial integrity to be to its foreign policy: 
Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the 
Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in all historical, 
geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty 
over Diaoyu Dao. Japan’s occupation of Diaoyu Dao during the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895 is illegal and invalid. After World War II, Diaoyu 
Dao was returned to China in accordance with such international legal 
documents as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No 
matter what unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, it will not 
change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. For quite some time, 
Japan has repeatedly stirred up troubles on the issue of Diaoyu Dao. On 
September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced the 
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"purchase" of Diaoyu Dao and its  affiliated Nanxiao Dao and Beixiao Dao 
and the implementation of the so-called "nationalization". This is a move 
that grossly violates China's territorial sovereignty and seriously tramples 
on historical facts and international jurisprudence. 
China is firmly opposed to Japan's violation of China's sovereignty over 
Diaoyu Dao in whatever form and has taken resolute measures to curb 
any such act. China's position on the issue of Diaoyu Dao is clear-cut and 
consistent. China's will to defend national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity is firm and its resolve to uphold the outcomes of the World Anti-
Fascist War will not be shaken by any force.96  
 Notice the terms “inseparable” and “inherent territory” in the language of 
this white paper. These concepts lend credence to the idea that the past 
humiliations in losing territory to the European powers in the nineteenth-century 
shape China’s national and foreign policy. The idea of China being “inseparable” 
has long been a road-block in finalizing territorial borders between China and her 
neighbors. Therefore, the concerns of nationalists in Indonesia doesn’t 
necessarily come out of nowhere or out of just pure nationalism and jingoism. 
There is a perceived fear of losing territory and cultural influence though both 
traditional and cultural imperialism. Either from the aspect of territory as can be 
seen in the Senkaku island dispute or through cultural imperialism as seen 
through the incident involving the Guan Yu statue. As China’s soft power 
increases, there will be indeed blowback towards what is seen as China 
encroaching on the culture of others, which can even fuel conspiracy theories 
such as one popular one amongst certain nationalists in Indonesia, claiming that 
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the government is secretly in control of the entire Indonesian government and 
that these soft power efforts are examples of China imposing its culture on an 
unwilling population, threatening cultural sovereignty.97 
The United States Congressional Research Service published a white 
paper in December 2015 summarizing a lot of these issues of sovereignty and 
territory. Titled “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone Disputes 
Involving China” the white paper asserts that China using the so-called “nine-
dash line”, a vaguely located line of demarcation that the PRC asserts are its 
territorial waters. The white paper asserts that China is using a ““salami-slicing” 
strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a 
casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor.” in the words of 
the report.98 If China is indeed being more aggressive in its territorial ambitions, 
this may give credence to the “sharp power” theory in that while China is using 
soft power to increase its territorial sovereignty, it is still using elements of 
coercion and flexing of military muscle to achieve that end.  
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Second and Third Voyages: China’s Power Increases  
and the Civil War of Ceylon 
 
The second voyage of the treasure ships was considerably smaller than 
that of the first. The reasoning for this return voyage to Calicut was to give formal 
imperial recognition to Calicut’s new king Mana Vikraan. On the way to Calicut, 
the Treasure Fleet also stopped in Java to settle some old scores with the 
Javanese. As previously mentioned in Zhu Di’s grandfather’s day, several envoys 
had been executed by the Javanese and rather recently from 1401-1406 there 
was a civil war between the two kings of Java, (whom the Ming referred to as the 
west and east kings respectively). The west king had killed 170 Chinese 
diplomatic staff during the war and Zheng He and his fleet were dispatched to 
Java to show the emperor’s displeasure and demand recompense.99 It is 
interesting to note, however, that there is not much mention of this event during 
Zheng He’s first voyage to Java during the first expedition, which turned out to be 
largely peaceful. Nevertheless, the large armada had cowed the Javanese into 
submission and Zhu Di demanded that the Javanese send ambassadors to 
Nanjing to apologize and pay retribution for their acts. The Javanese and Ming 
agreed to 60,000 ounces of gold. Zhu Di also told them to reflect on the “situation 
in Vietnam” which Zhu Di had recently begun a conquest of.100 
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The fleet’s sequence of stops likely followed this pattern: The fleet would 
leave from Nanjing to Liangjiang to Changle and then would have sailed to Siam 
(Thailand) and then Java; from Java the fleet would have sailed to Malacca then 
Sumatra and then finally Calicut.101 Barbara Peterson in her scholarly article “The 
Ming Voyages of Cheng-Ho (Zheng He)” writes a very succinct description of the 
second voyage: 
The second voyage was planned in 1407, setting sail in 1408, 
sailing into Calicut when Cheng Ho generously dispersed gifts to 
the king, carrying out “the formal investiture of the king of Calicut”, 
and erecting a commemorative pavilion, then returned by way of 
Siam and Java. The blessing or investiture given by the Chinese 
fleet commander representing the emperor in China set an 
important precedent, and contributed again that China was the 
Middle Kingdom and that foreign regions were vassal or tributary 
states. Further, while in Java, Cheng Ho and the Chinese fleet was 
called upon to settle a local power struggle, which he did again 
exerting the pre-eminence of China, “strengthening the idea that 
China as the Middle Kingdom had the power to arbitrate disputes 
involving its tributary states. Upon returning to Nanking (which had 
served as capital until 1420 when it moved to Peking), Cheng Ho 
built a temple to honor Tien Hou (Queen of Heaven).102 
According to Peterson, Zheng He during his second voyage seemed to be 
practicing hard power politics when it came to Java, but in the case of Calicut, a 
softer diplomatic (but still forcefully imperialist) form of diplomacy was practiced 
by Zheng He. Although by Nye’s definition of soft power, this would be closer to a 
hard power action due to the coercive nature of the tribute trade system. The first 
two journeys also showed a rising interest in the Ming government to reassert 
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itself as the “bigger brother” of China’s neighbors and extract tribute from its de 
jure vassal states under the tribute trade system. As mentioned earlier, this is the 
most apparent and historically recognizable method of Chinese soft power, 
gaining political power and influence through nominal “submissions” by various 
rulers increased China’s prestige but also made it so that China could build 
mutually beneficial trade relationships with their neighbors. However, the fact that 
Zheng He personally intervened in Java’s political affairs (and as we will see in 
Ceylon’s during the third voyage) shows that Zheng He was pursuing a 
simultaneous hard power policy as well if it was deemed necessary. In Zheng 
He’s defense, the situation in Java was a lot more important and “nearby” to 
Chinese trade interests so it was necessary to have more direct action when 
dealing with the Javanese. Furthermore, the past and present incidents of 
Chinese diplomats being slaughtered was an insult that was too great to ignore. 
In either case, Zhu Di had clearly shown that he was interested in the affairs of 
China’s neighbors, and that Ming China was at least, under Zhu Di, moving away 
from its agrarian based economy supported by the Confucians, and getting 
closer to the eunuch supported foreign trade policy. 
In 1409, Zhu Di gave the order for a third expedition to Calicut. Calicut 
however, was not the most important destination of this third expedition. Ceylon 
had been aggressive towards China and especially towards Zheng He during the 
first expedition had been disrespected by Alagakkonara, the king of Ceylon. 
Furthermore, Ceylon had been performing raids against China’s new trade 
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partners and Zhu Di felt that now was a good time to begin a show of force. As 
recorded in the Tailong Shilu, a primary source of the time period when Zheng 
He reached Ceylon and came ashore, the forces of the king attacked them after 
demanding the Chinese surrender their gold and silver. Dryer cites this passage 
from the Tailong Shilu in full: 
Palace official Zheng He and the others, who had gone to the barbarian 
countries of the Western Ocean, returned and presented as captives the 
King of Ceylon, Alagkkonora, together with his family and dependents. 
Zheng, He and the others, in the course of their first embassy to the 
barbarians had arrived at Ceylon, and Alagakkotona had been rude and 
disrespectful and intended to kill Zheng He. Zheng He realized this and 
left. Moreover, Alagakkonora was not on friendly terms with the 
neighboring countries, and he had often intercepted and plundered their 
embassies en route to and from China. Since the other barbarians all had 
suffered from this, when Zheng He returned they once more treated 
Ceylon with contempt. Because of this provocation, Alagakkonora lured 
Zheng He into the interior of the country and sent his son Nayanar to 
demand gold, silver, and other precious goods. If these goods were not 
turned over, then 50,000 barbarian troops were to rise from concealment 
and plunder Zheng He’s ships. Moreover, trees had been felled to block 
the narrow passages and cut off Zheng He’s path of retreat, so that the 
separate Chinese contingents could not reinforce one another. 
When Zheng He and the others realized they were in danger of becoming 
separated from the fleet, they pressed their troops to returned to the ships 
quickly. When they reached the roadblocks, Zheng He said to his 
subordinates, “The main body of the bandits has already come out, so the 
interior of the country must be empty. Moreover, they are saying we are 
only an invading army that is isolated and afraid and incapable of doing 
anything. But if we go forth and attack them, then contrary to their 
expectations we may gain their objective.” Then he secretly ordered 
messengers to go by other unblocked roads back to the Chinese ships, to 
order their petty officers and soldiers to hold out to the death with all their 
strength. Meanwhile he personally led over two thousand troops under his 
immediate command by indirect routes. They assaulted the earthen walls 
of the capital by surprise and broke through, capturing Algakkonora and 
his family, dependents and principal chieftains. The barbarian army then 
returned and surrounded the city. Zheng He engaged them in battle 
several times and heavily defeated them. 
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Afterward, when Zheng He returned, the assembled Ming ministers 
requested that Alagakkonora and other captives be executed. But the 
emperor pitied them as ignorant people who were without knowledge of 
the Mandate of Heaven; he treated them leniently and released them, 
giving them food and clothing, and ordering the Ministry of Rites to advise 
on selecting a worthy one from Alagakkonara’s family to be set up as king, 
in order to continue the sacrifices of the kingdom of Ceylon.103 
This narrative of Zheng He’s capture of Alagakkonora does confirm that at 
least from the Chinese point of view, that Zheng He was not the initial aggressor 
and makes Zheng He justified in his breaking of soft power policy in order to 
avenge past and present wrongs upon Ceylon. However, there are some 
inaccuracies in the report that may have inflated Alagakkonora’s importance in 
Ceylon. To begin with, there was no unified “Kingdom of Ceylon” at this time. The 
island was divided into three warring states that were participating in the civil war 
in which Alagakkonora was a participant, furthermore the rulers of the cities of 
Gampola and Kotte, his opponents, had a greater legitimate claim to the throne 
of Ceylon. According to the Singhalese version of events, Alagakkonora 
suspected that Zheng He was attempting to steal the island’s holy relic the 
“sacred tooth of Buddha” and was also resisting a conquering army sent to 
subjugate his kingdom.104 Barbara Peterson on the other hand seems to regard 
the Singhalese as being the initial aggressor, perhaps due to a desire to plunder 
Zheng He’s ships because of the massive bounty of wealth they were carrying, 
but also conceding the possibility that like the Singhalese version of the story, 
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they were resisting a foreign invasion.105  Fei Xin gives firsthand account of 
Alagakkonora’s capture: 
[But] their king, Alagakkonara was stubbornly ungrateful and formed a plot 
 to injure the [imperial] fleet. [Therefore] our principal envoy, the Grand 
 Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others secretly planned [to strike first]: they drew 
 up troops unobserved, and with three or four brief orders, they caused the 
 whole body to hasten forward, [with each man] keeping a gag over [his] 
 mouth. During the middle of the night, at one sound from a signal gun, 
 they made a furious onslaught with ardent courage and captured the king 
 alive. In the ninth year of Yung-lo (1411) he was taken [to China] and 
 presented below the imperial palace. He asked for clemency, and being 
 pardoned, he was allowed to return to his country. [Since then] the “four 
 barbarians” are all respectful.106   
Regardless of whichever faction started the hostilities, both Ming and 
Singhalese sources agree that Alagakkonora was taken captive and deposed by 
Zheng He and Zhu Di. Zhu Di’s mercy in sparing his life was a tactical choice; it 
both showed the “benevolence” of Zhu Di and also allowed him to hand pick a 
member of Alagakkonora’s family as a puppet ruler. This was a standard practice 
of the Chinese of the time. Unlike the later Europeans who often took a hard 
power approach of directly conquering or at least bringing local nobility to heel, 
the Chinese were more likely to install puppet rulers who were friendly but still 
nominally independent of Chinese rule, despite their oaths of allegiance. In this 
way, Zhu Di and Zheng He employed a cunning method of soft power; they were 
able to maintain China’s prestige in the “submission” of the countries, while 
having knowledge that they would not be able to enforce it de facto, making the 
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submission of these rulers cause the nation in question to “lose face”. The 
extremely profitable trade relations and wealth they gained in trading with China 
certainly helped. 
 
The Importance of Face 
 The capture of Alagakkonora also has parallels in Chinese perceptions of 
their soft power. One of the concepts is of honor and “saving face” which was 
one of the motivations for Zheng He to attack and capture Alagakkonora due to 
the “disrespect” he had shown the emissaries of the dragon throne by attacking 
the fleet. In this case soft power had to be forgotten for a small time but it wasn’t 
completely abandoned in the event. Once Zheng He had brought Alagakkonora 
before the emperor he was ceremoniously “pardoned” for his offense and was 
either allowed to return to Ceylon or was exiled, depending on the sources. In 
either case, Zheng He and Zhu Di were able to cause a change in government 
and put a puppet ruler that was more controllable by the Ming Dynasty on the 
throne of Ceylon. The action against Alagakkonora is perhaps one of the most 
cited examples of opponents of the theory that Zheng He was a peaceful 
explorer, such as Geoff Wade tend to use an example. At the very least it is 
unsurprising that a military fleet engaged in hard power politics. Even in the lens 
of soft power policy, it is plain to see that by creating a puppet ruler that the 
Chinese concept and perception of soft power may be very different from the 
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western concept, which agrees with Kurlantzick’s theory that in perceptions of 
soft power, Beijing is more like a lion than a mouse.     
This concept of “saving face” is perhaps one of the most crucial parts of 
Chinese culture westerners often have trouble understanding. All cultures have 
concepts regarding proper etiquette and honor especially the perceived personal 
honor of a person in society’s eye. There are however, vastly complex unique 
traits to the Chinese concept of “face” that have been a part of Chinese culture 
for millennia. The concept of face in China has also evolved and has hardly 
stayed the same, often reflecting the point of view of the current society. In The 
New York Times, journalist Tom Doctoroff gives this description of the 
importance of face in Chinese culture to give western readers a better 
understanding of the importance of “face” in Chinese culture: 
“Face — a cliché, but it’s so true — is the currency of advancement,” he 
said. “It’s like a social bank account. You spend it and you save it and you 
invest. And when you take away somebody’s face you take away 
someone’s fundamental sense of security.” You make someone lose face 
if you make them feel that they’ve given a wrong or silly answer” in a 
meeting, Mr. Doctoroff said. “You need to take whatever people are 
saying, whether it’s a creative idea or a strategy idea, and you need to find 
that kernel of wisdom in there. Usually there is something that is relevant. 
And they need to build on that. “If you end up with a Charlie Brown 
situation, with the entire class ha-ha-ing, that’s a disaster, and people will 
loathe you for it.” 
 In the same article, Saul Gitlin gives an explanation as to why when 
comes to westerners, face can be doubly important to the Chinese: 
“Because of China’s history of exploitation by foreign countries who 
colonized China or raided China for business purposes, particularly in the 
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business sphere, Chinese do not want to be seen culturally as having 
been ‘had’ by Western businesspeople,” he said. 
“That may sound fairly intuitive, but it is related to the very recent 200-year 
history in China, up through the middle part of last century, when Western 
businesspeople clearly had the upper hand commercially and politically in 
China,” he explained. Today, there is a fierce concern that China must 
“never go back to that inferior position during that dynastic and imperial 
period, when China was exploited by imperialist Western powers.”107 
 As explained above, Zheng He’s motivations of saving face against 
Alagakkonora is connected to a sense of both pride and shame. Zheng He under 
no circumstances could allow an insult to the emperor slide, especially when 
Alagakkonora was trying to raid the treasures Zheng He was bringing back to his 
master i.e. the emperor’s personal property. In this understanding of face, we can 
see why Zheng He had chosen the hard power option at first rather than the soft 
power option. In modern times, the “century of humiliation” has been a more 
recent cultural component in the concept of face as Saul Gatlin explained. Part of 
China’s perception of its own power is not only to reclaim its rightful place in 
history, but to never again be weak enough to be exploited by outsiders.  
 “Face” itself in Chinese culture also has two different “kinds” or definitions. 
The first is a more ancient concept known as Mianzi “status, shame and position” 
and Lian which is related to societal expectations. Aris Teon, a journalist writing 
for the China Journal gives an explanation of these two concepts in a way that’s 
easier for westerners to understand: 
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However, the first difficulty in defining the Chinese concept of “face” is that 
the Chinese language uses two different words: lian (臉/脸) and mianzi (面
子). Each of them has a distinct, though somewhat overlapping 
connotation. According to Hsien Chin Hu, mianzi is the older word, dating 
back to ancient literature. Lian, on the other hand, is a more recent word 
whose earliest reference can be found during the Yuan Dynasty (1277-
1367) Broadly speaking, lian means “sense of shame in relation to social 
standards of morality and behavior”, while mianzi means “status, prestige, 
social position”.  A person may have mianzi and yet have no lian. For 
example, a corrupt official who disregards social and moral standards has 
no lian; however, if he has status and prestige, he has mianzi, despite 
having achieved his success by immoral means.108 
 This understanding of face will have to be better understood by diplomats 
and businesspeople dealing with China in the near future. The concept of face, 
shame and rectifying these problems are a crucial component of China’s own 
understanding of power either in its harder form or the softer one. As 
Alagakkonora realized too late, an insult to an emissary of the emperor is not one 
to be taken lightly, as in today insulting the mianzi of a Chinese CEO could very 
well cause an agreement between two companies to fail for example.  
There are similar issues of “face” in western societies as well. It would be 
disingenuous to suggest that there is no concept of “face” when it comes to 
social standards and morals and behavior in western countries. National pride in 
many cases has been a motivator for foreign policy with the United States. For 
example, the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, there is a persuasive argument that the 
United States was trying to save “face” due to a bad reputation in military 
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success following the Vietnam War. The main difference between saving face in 
East Asian societies and that of western ones is how societies are built on the 
expectations of face. This concept in East Asian and especially Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean society is built upon and strengthened by philosophies 
such as Confucianism that gives concepts of filial piety and obedience to the civil 
order a unique east Asian view of the concept of face. In Imperial China, 
fatherhood was considered the paramount top of the social pyramid and this is 
enforced by filial piety. Concepts of “face” and honor are deeply tied to the 
Confucian mindset of just rule and filial piety. In the realm of politics, it is no 
wonder that “face” is so important in Chinese foreign policy. To lose ones “face” 
is to shame the greater “family” of the nation. While personal honor and pride are 
significant parts of western society, the aspect of filial piety gives the Chinese 
concept of face a deeper and far more personal meaning. While cultural 
determination should be avoided as well as giving such “absolutes”, from 
sociological point of view it is worth noting that they are unique concepts of face 
in different cultures that can differ but also complement one another in different 
ways.            
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The Qilin and The Riches of the Middle East and Africa:  
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Voyages 
 
In 1414 Zheng He’s men encountered an African 
giraffe in Bengal, where it had been sent as a gift from 
Kenya. The Bengali king agreed to send the animal 
on to Beijing, where the Yongle Emperor first refused 
to greet it, but in 1415, when a second giraffe arrived, 
the emperor agreed to participate in a lavish 
welcoming ceremony. The giraffe reminded the 
Chinese of a mythical, auspicious unicorn-like animal, 
the qinlin. 
         -Isabel Hilton 
          in “The Open 
          Empire”109 
The most famous of Zheng He’s voyages were the three voyages that 
brought his fleet to the Persian Gulf and Africa. These voyages were the ones 
where Zheng He famously brought a giraffe, an unknown creature at the time 
that was associated with the legendary creature known as the Qinlin. On 18 
December 1412, after a year and a half of staying in China, Zheng He was 
ordered by Zhu Di to embark on a fourth voyage. Zhu Di was still campaigning in 
the north in Mongolia and busy establishing Beijing as a second imperial capital 
when the fleet departed in the autumn of 1413. The fleet followed the usual 
pattern of sailing to Champa, Java, Sumatra, Ceylon and Calicut but this time 
Zheng He would sail farther west. Zheng He after likely visiting the islands of the 
Maldives and Laccadives, made out for his final destination of Hormuz, and 
island city in the Persian Gulf famed for its riches. Hormuz was a massive 
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shipping port that handled trade from all over the Middle East and India and was 
often a first stop for trade goods making their way to China The choice of Hormuz 
was made both to establish a naval presence in the Persian Gulf in an effort to 
show of the wealth and power of Ming China and in an effort to encourage trade 
with distant nations.   
On Zheng He’s return voyage back to China, he once again took part in a 
military intervention, this time in Semudera. Sekandar, a rebel had started a 
rebellion against the legitimate ruler, a young prince by the name of Zain al-
Abidin. Semudera was captured by Zheng He in a brief land engagement in 
Sumatra. This conflict arose when Sekandar had attempted to seize the throne 
for himself, claiming to be the legitimate son of the former king and thus the 
young prince’s half-brother who was considered by the Ming ruler to be 
legitimate. When Zheng He arrived, he showered Zain al-Abidin with gifts and 
praise, thus confirming that the Ming saw Zain as the legitimate ruler. Sekander 
was enraged that he was not chosen to receive these luxurious gifts and led ten 
thousand soldiers against Zheng He.110  In the following battle Zheng He was 
victorious against Sekander’s more numerous, but less disciplined force and 
Sekander as well as his family were captured. On the return voyage to Nanjing, 
Sekander was transported with Zheng He’s men to the capital where at an 
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unknown time later was publicly executed in the presence of the court. Fei Xin 
gives a detailed first-hand description of these events: 
 In the eleventh year of Yung-lo (1413), a false king, Sekander, robbed and 
 usurped this country. The [legitimate] king sent an envoy to the Imperial 
 Court to explain his case and seek relief. The emperor ordered the 
 principal envoy, the Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take 
 command of government troops, to destroy [the usurpers], and to seize 
 the false king alive. In the thirteenth year of Yung-lo (1415) he was taken 
 [to China] and presented below the imperial palace and all the foreigners 
 were relegated to a state of submission.111   
This intervention would be the last of Zheng He’s major military 
interventions and would signal an end to his “hard power” stance during these 
voyages. As with Chen Zuyi and Alagakkonora, Zheng He had interfered militarily 
to establish Ming supremacy and in Chinese tradition, put a friendlier ruler on the 
throne (or in this case re-establishing one of Zhu Di’s vassals as a ruler). The 
fourth voyage also proved that Zheng He was willing to explore more distant 
lands.  Zheng He had not gone beyond Calicut in the first three voyages so the 
fourth had major significance in that Zheng He was willing to truly become an 
explorer rather than simply the commander of an armada keeping order.  
The most important event of the fourth voyage came in the form of tribute 
while Zheng He was in Bengal. A gift from Bengal’s ruler was transported with 
Zheng He as a gift to the emperor: a giraffe. To the Chinese, this creature was 
identified as the mythic qilin (known to the Japanese as a Kirin, which serves as 
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the mascot and name for Kirin Beer).112 The giraffe had never been seen before 
in China and had caused a great sensation when presented to the Ming court on 
20 September 1414. The Qilin as a mythical creature was purported to only 
appear in times of great peace and tranquility, and is considered to be included 
as one of the four sacred animals of China, including the dragon, phoenix and 
the tortoise.113 Zheng He’s Lieutenant, Yang Min, considered the giraffe brought 
on to the Treasure Fleet to indeed be this mythic creature and saw it as an 
auspicious sign of Zhu Di’s reign. Yang Min was sent as part of a detached fleet 
to travel to China personally to present the giraffe to the emperor’s court while 
Zheng He stayed in Hormuz to trade. Zhu Di was pleased by this rich and exotic 
gift Such a rare and exotic creature from Africa, a creature at that time 
completely unknown to the Chinese, displays the wonder and adventure of the 
treasure voyages and in a mythical sense, displayed the favor that heaven had 
granted on Zhu Di’s reign. A second giraffe would be brought to the court in 1415 
and this time Zhu Di decided not to show his traditional humility and formally 
welcomed the qilin as an auspicious sign of his divine reign.114    
In 1416, Zhu Di had returned to Nanjing and was greeted by the 
ambassadors of seventeen countries which had accompanied Zheng He during 
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the fourth voyage.115 He had been spending more and more time at his other 
capital Beijing (formally Beiping) but decided to spend the year 1416 in the old 
capital of his father. The ambassadors were received with great fanfare and upon 
their oaths of submission the emperor by tradition in the tribute trade system, 
lavished them with expensive and exotic gifts, showing the emperor’s favor. By 
autumn 1416, Zhu Di ordered Zheng He to undertake a fifth voyage to return 
these ambassadors home. The fleet departed visiting the usual destinations: 
Champa, Pahang, Java, Palembang, Sumatra with the fleet then making its way 
to Semudera, then to Ceylon and finally making port in Zheng He’s usual base in 
Calicut. After leaving Calicut (during the voyages Zheng He likely dropped off the 
numerous ambassadors on the way) Zheng He once again made the journey to 
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to trade in precious rubies and other gemstones, 
pearls and of course famed Persian carpets.116 Zheng He himself in his Changle 
Inscription of 1431 as cited by Dryer, describes the journey to Hormuz and the 
numerous gifts he received: 
In the fifteenth year of Yongle (1417) we went in command of the fleet to 
the Western Regions, whose country of Hormuz presented lions (shizi), 
leopard (jinqianbao), and large Arabian horses (daxima), [while 
the]country of Aden {Adan) presented qilin, whose foreign name is zulafa, 
along with the long-horned maha animal (oryx), the country of Mogadishu 
sent zebras (huafulu)as well as lions, the country of Brava (Bulawa) 
presented thousand-li  camels (luotuo) as well as ostriches (tuoji), and the 
countries of Java and Calicut both presented miligao animals. There were 
none who did not vie to present gems hidden in the mountains or 
submerged in the ocean, or pearls buried in the sand or cast upon the 
                                                          
115 Dryer, Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty, 82. 
116 Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, 165-72 
94 
 
shore, and each sent as on, paternal uncle, or younger brother of the king, 
bearing a memorial of submission written on gold leaf, to court with the 
tribute.117  
Zheng He’s voyages to Africa, all those centuries ago, created lasting and 
positive consequences and opportunities for China that continue to the present 
day. Never before had the Chinese sailed so far, and Africa to this day remains a 
primary trading interest of the PRC. By 1421, Zhu Di was already campaigning in 
Mongolia when, three years after the end of the fifth voyage he once again was 
visited by ambassadors of numerous countries. On 3 of March 1421, Zhu Di 
requested that these ambassadors, after lavishing the usual gifts upon them, 
were once again ordered to be returned home by the treasure fleet. The fleet set 
sail in spring of 1421, beginning the shortest of the treasure voyages which is 
also the voyage of which there is very little confirmable details. According to 
Levathes, this voyage along with the mission of returning the ambassadors was a 
voyage of pure exploration rather than one of trade and military intervention.118 
The length of the journey and its dates have been of some considerable debate 
among scholars. As cited by Dryer, there is mention from Gong Zhen a 
contemporary and secretary of Zheng He, that Zheng He was present in China in 
November of 1421 which would not have given Zheng He the required time to 
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have visited all the places he was purported to visit.119 Dryer ultimately concludes 
that this interpretation is hard to confirm writing; 
J.J.L Duyvndek argued that Zheng He was still in China on 10 November 
1421, citing Gong Zhen’s Xinyang Fanguo Zhi for an imperial edict of that 
date instructing Zheng He and three other leading eunuchs had received 
orders to conduct the barbarian leaders home. Even though Zheng He 
could have departed shortly afterward, the voyage would have then have 
taken place entirely in 1422, and that would not allow enough time for 
Zheng He to personally visit all of the countries he allegedly traveled to on 
the sixth voyage. Under this interpretation, he assigned squadron 
commanders to finish the business of this voyage, and it is explicitly stated 
for this voyage that the fleet was divided into squadrons.120 
If Dryer’s interpretation was right, it would seem Zheng He may not have 
visited all of these places on his journey but he may well have visited a good 
number of them while returning to China. Regardless, the sixth journey remained 
much smaller and less impactful than the other five treasure journey             
        Zheng He’s journey to Africa has a very apparent parallel in the 
history of China in recent decades. One of the largest exercises in China’s soft 
power has been its diplomatic and cultural influence (or in some interpretations 
cultural imperialism) over Africa. As the United States begins to pull back from a 
lot of international commitments in the last decade, especially in a much sharper 
turn in the last year during the first year of the Trump administration.121Beijing, 
following the steps of Zheng He has re-shifted a large portion of its foreign policy 
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in China. A lot of this motivation has been a desire for Africa’s vast resources 
while at the same time increasing Beijing’s soft power in Africa, often through 
cultural exchange, sharing of wealth business contracts and in recent years even 
join-military exercises.122 However the relationship with African nations may not 
be as equal as perceived. Recalling the historical tribute trade system that the 
Ming Dynasty practiced in Zheng He’s time, there may be in implication from 
China that nation’s in Africa have a junior partner status. Writing for Fortune Mark 
Esposito and Terence Tse summarizes this new relationship: 
But despite the substantial investments, most of the them have been 
routinely cast as detrimental to Africa’s overall competitiveness. The 
projects are dependent on deals made at the highest political levels. They 
lack competitive and transparent bidding processes, and most of the work 
force employed at these ventures has been Chinese. Promises of job 
creation have not been fulfilled. Further, when Africans are hired, local 
rules and regulations are often flouted, leading at times to poor safety. For 
instance, at Chinese-run mines in Zambia’s copper belt, employees must 
work for two years before they get safety helmets. Ventilation below 
ground is poor, and deadly accidents occur almost on a daily basis. More 
frequently, jobs are lost to Chinese employees, who are ferried in project 
by project. For example, the growing Chinese presence in South Africa 
may have cost the country 75,000 jobs from 2000 to 2011. In Nigeria, the 
influx of low-priced Chinese textile goods has caused 80% of Nigerian 
companies in this industry to close. Africans’ impression of Chinese firms 
could also be shaped by illegal practices carried out by them. For 
example, by law, mining on small plots of 25 acres or less is restricted to 
Ghanaian nationals. However, many Chinese continue to explore for gold 
in conjunction with local landowners, even though regulations have made 
it clear that such practice is illegal. The result: Many Africans see 
themselves to be exploited by the newcomers.123  
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There is perhaps, a sense of historical irony here. Since China has lost 
face historically and was forced into a series of unequal treaties in the aftermath 
of the Opium Wars and the Boxer Uprising, it would seem that the reverse is 
happening in the case of China and Africa. While many countries like Kenya 
have eagerly accepted Beijing’s economic development, Africa has also been 
exploited by foreign powers and it is understandable that many would see their 
relationship with China as one-sided. Beijing however for its part, has been quick 
to deny any exploitation. There is also some truth to China’s defense in not 
following in the footsteps of European colonialism. In the Harvard Political 
Review, Elizabeth Manero gives some justification to China’s actions in Africa in 
regard to accusations of neo-colonialism: 
Despite criticisms of colonialism, this relationship has provided Africa with 
significant benefits. China, for its part, has gone out of its away to deny 
claims of colonial abuses. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, insisted in a 
2015 tour of Kenya, that “[China] absolutely will not take the old path of 
Western colonists, and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa’s ecological 
environment and long-term interests.” Indeed, this relationship is not as 
black and white as it may first seem. Dirk Willem de Vilde, a Senior 
Research Fellow and head of International Economic Development at the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), told the HPR that “on all the 
infrastructure indicators, African countries are way behind compared to 
other countries. There is a huge infrastructure gap that is holding back 
development in many African countries at the moment.” 
In an attempt to rectify this, numerous infrastructure programs funded by 
Chinese developmental assistance have created much needed roads, 
bridges, railways, schools, and hospitals that are beginning to bridge this 
gap. Chinese doctors played an important role in addressing the Ebola 
outbreak in 2015, and, despite criticisms of exploitative labor treatment, 
the Chinese saved mines that had been deteriorating under previous 
investors, which expanded facilities, rescued jobs, and created thousands 
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of new ones. Beyond this, there has been significant investment in 
services and manufacturing as well.124 
As for Beijing’s own arguments for its efforts in Africa, a white paper published by 
the PRC state council in 2010 lays out clearly what Beijing’s views on its efforts 
in Africa are: 
During their years of development, China and Africa give full play to the 
complementary advantages in each other's resources and economic 
structures, abiding by the principles of equality, effectiveness, mutual 
benefit and reciprocity, and mutual development, and keep enhancing 
economic and trade cooperation to achieve mutual benefit and progress. 
Practice proves that China-Africa economic and trade cooperation serves 
the common interests of the two sides, helps Africa to reach the UN 
Millennium Development Goals, and boosts common prosperity and 
progress for China and Africa.125 
From Beijing’s point of view, Beijing is merely cooperating in a mutual trade 
partnership and denies any accusations of colonialism in Africa. Of course, 
accusations of actual traditional colonialism are hard to prove and, in most cases, 
would be a gross exaggeration. In the case of Africa, a continent that like China, 
has felt the sting of colonialism in its past, it is perhaps very understandable why 
some African nations would be weary and suspicious of both Washington and 
Beijing’s diplomacy in the area. It is clear that Beijing’s relationship to Africa can’t 
be so easily put into black and white categories as Esponito claims Africa on the 
other hand, can hardly be considered an equal partner in terms of the power 
dynamic between the two countries. China’s government may be helping out 
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Africa on an economic basis, but there is no guarantee that Beijing will keep the 
relationship equal. Now with the PRC military operating in numerous African 
countries, we can now see a brand-new fleet journeying to Africa much like the 
Grand Eunuch himself. China scholars and political scientists would do well to 
focus their attention on Beijing’s relationship to Africa and the upcoming future 
decades will tell if the PRC has learned from its experiences also as a previously 
exploited nation or if the PRC will become a neo-colonial force. 
 
The Death of Zhu Di and the Final Voyage 
On August 12, 1424, a serious blow to Zheng He’s fortunes and that of the 
eunuchs occurred: Zhu Di, the Yongle Emperor “grew ill and died. Zhu Di was on 
the way to Beijing to start a new campaign in Mongolia when he died and for the 
eunuchs, losing their benefactor was a serious blow. The new Emperor Zhu 
Gaochi was enthroned in September of 1424. According to the Renzong Shilu 
the annals of the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Gaochi (1378-1425) 
restored the disgraced Confucian ministers and released from captivity all the 
scholars he had imprisoned and the Confucians once again controlled the 
court.126 One of the scholars released, Xia Yuanji, was reinstated as finance 
minister for the new Emperor and persuaded Zhu Gaochi to end the treasure 
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voyages, according to the Renzong Shilu.127 Zhu Gaochi’s main interest was 
decreasing the tax burden on his subjects and promoting the more isolationist 
stances of the founder of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhong, his grandfather. These 
policies would fit in more with the plans of reverting back to the agricultural 
economy of Zhu Gaochi’s grandfather, and which had largely been promoted by 
the Confucian officials since the reign of the first Ming Emperor.  
Zheng He however, was not as seriously affected by these changes in 
policy, unlike his eunuch colleagues. Zhu Gaochi had given Zheng He the role of 
commander of Nanjing’s military defenses, a very prestigious position in the Ming 
hierarchy. This relaxing life in his twilight years was not to last forever, on May 
29, 1425, Zhu Gaochi succumbed to an illness he had been suffering from for 
several months and died, leaving his son Zhu Zhanji (1399-1435) as his 
successor. Zhu Zhanji assumed the throne upon his father’s death in 1425 and 
took the Dragon Throne under the reign name of Xuande. Zhu Zhanji’s 
personality could be described as a mix of his grandfather and father, favoring a 
balance between the eunuchs and Confucians in terms of influence in the court. 
Once the greatest and staunchest opponents of the Treasure Fleet, Xia Yuanji 
died in 1430 and Zhu Zhanji started showing interest in making a seventh and 
final voyage for the Treasure Fleet, which had remained unused for quite some 
time. It was clear by 1430, the tribute trade between China and its neighbors had 
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been decreasing the international prestige of the Ming Dynasty. To combat this 
image, Zhu Zhanji had ordered a new expedition to begin a brand new soft power 
campaign of regaining the recognition from other nations that China had lost. 
Levathes records that on the 29th of June 1430, Zhu Zhanji had issued an edict 
naming Zheng He the commander of a new fleet to improve the deteriorating 
relations China was experiencing with the nations of southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean.128   
This new Treasure Fleet would be the largest of the assembled fleets of 
the treasure voyages, over 100 ships with 27,500 men in total for the entire 
expedition.129 The fleet also had a secondary mission objective of solving a 
diplomatic crisis between the king of Siam and Malacca, with Zheng He given a 
written letter from the emperor demanding the king of Siam cease all aggression 
towards Malacca. Once again, the main destination for the fleet was Calicut and 
this would be the final voyage of Zheng He where either in Calicut or on his 
return journey he would die in 1433. When the fleet set sail, Zheng He now in his 
sixties, wished to document all of his accomplishments for future explorers and 
commissioned a stone tablet in Changle, which detailed all of his 
accomplishments, and remains one of the most important primary sources 
regarding Zheng He’s life.  
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On 19 of January 1431, the fleet set out from China beginning the last of 
the great treasure voyages. The fleet stayed in China proper for a few months, 
gathering supplies and did not fully depart until 1432, a year later. The fleet in 
this final journey visited Java, Palembang, Malacca, Semudera, Ceylon and 
finally arrived in Calicut in December 1432. Here Zheng He remained while 
smaller squadrons were sent to the Middle East and Persia under the command 
of Hong Bao, one of the eunuchs accompanying Zheng He. The detached fleets 
were said to have traded for Arab medical texts and medicine which the Chinese 
had begun to take a keen interest in and the Arabs were renowned for at this 
time for having made great successes in the field of medicine. These and other 
precious trade items such as aloe were traded in exchange for the famed Ming 
porcelain, Jade and other items from China which the Middle Eastern nations 
were hungry for.  
Zheng He, however, back in Calicut was facing increasingly ailing health 
at his age of sixty-two.  As cited by Levathes, Ma Huan was sent by Zheng He as 
an emissary to Mecca and gave a description of the Muslim holy city while 
there130  According to Levathes,  Zheng He’s health waned and he  likely died in 
1432 on the return Journey and was buried at sea.131 Barbara Peterson argues 
that Zheng He may have died a bit earlier while he was still in Calicut.132 
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Regardless, with Zheng He’s death the support for funding of such extravagant 
projects ceased as the Confucians gained more power, and considered such 
journeys to be an extravagant waste. While trade would continue between China 
and foreign nations for some time, this was the end of the treasure voyages and 
Ming naval superiority would crumble in later decades. The legacy of Zheng He 
would live on for some time and in the late 20th and early 21st century, official 
Chinese views have changed from him from being considered an example of 
early Ming waste and extravagance on the part of the eunuchs, to being 
rehabilitated historically as China’s Magellan or Columbus.  It did take a long time 
however for Zheng He to be recognized and rehabilitated as noted by Yang Wei, 
who also notes that the Confucian scholar officials had burned Zheng He’s logs 
to discourage any future expeditions.133 
 
Soft Power and the Legacy of Zheng He 
While a more thorough examination of Zheng He and the Confucius 
Institute’s motivations will be examined in Chapter 5, it will be important to end 
this narrative on Zheng He’s life briefly with the impact his legacy had on 
Beijing’s present day soft power policies. While his contemporaries in the 15th 
Century sought to suppress knowledge of Zheng He and his adventures, 
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scholars in the PRC and in western nations have begun to take a keen interest in 
his actions. Zheng He indeed had a very hard power and militaristic nature to his 
treasure voyages, but was the military nature of the fleet the primary motivation 
for Zheng He’s travels? The three major hard power interventions of the fleet 
were in Palembang, Ceylon and Semedura. These do stand out as stark contrast 
to the accepted narrative today popular amongst PRC scholars which usually 
contend that Zheng He’s voyages were of a peaceful soft power nature. There is 
a lot of evidence however to support the point of view of most scholars of this 
subject, that view being these were mostly peaceful soft power missions with 
trade and recognition of Chinese suzerainty as its main goals. With the exception 
of the three examples above and the pirate suppression campaign of the first 
journey, Zheng He and his men engaged in relatively little fighting for a giant war 
armada and certainly spent more time trading than fighting. The nature of the 
tribute trade system, with foreign rulers making token gestures of submission, 
while in reality not losing any of their power de facto fits in with Chinese policy at 
the time which was not very expansionist, preferring to have client states and 
puppet rulers as opposed to the colonial ambitions of European powers. China’s 
soft power during the Ming indeed increased with nations stretching from 
southeast Asia all the way to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula recognizing 
Chinese influence and the power of the Ming emperors.  
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Zheng He’s legacy also has an important part to play in the PRC’s modern 
day soft power policies. As explained by James L. Holmes, the PRC’s new 
interest in developing sea power. Holmes writes: 
How China’s leadership uses the Ming legacy says much about what it 
hopes to accomplish at sea in coming years. Economic development 
drives this quest for sea power. Chinese industry’s demand for reliable 
seaborne shipments of fuel and other commodities has beckoned Beijing’s 
attentions and energies to the waters plied by Zheng’s fleet six centuries 
ago. Assuring free passage throughout the sea lines of communication 
linking the Persian Gulf region and the Horn of Africa with Chinese 
seaports has been a matter of surpassing importance. Indeed, Chinese 
leaders have come to believe the survival of communist rule depends on 
economic development and the comforts it brings a potentially restive 
populace.134 
Zheng He has therefore become a symbol of a new China, eager to 
increase its soft power and trade amongst the nations of the world. After the 
“century of humiliation” in the 19th century the PRC has had reason to look to its 
past as Beijing re-asserts its “rightful place” on the world stage. Zheng He serves 
as a convenient symbol for Beijing to rally around, showing that China was a sea 
power long before their European counterparts and if it were not for the 
interference of government officials in the Ming Dynasty, Ming China may have 
become a Maritime Empire in its own right. As China re-asserts itself on the 
world stage, Zheng He may be the beacon that the PRC needs from its own 
history to light the way into a multi-polar world and serve as a symbol of China’s 
proud maritime history often forgotten until recently. Zheng He may have lost his 
influence in the years after his life but today he remains a strong and iconic figure 
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in Chinese history and as a symbol of the Ming Dynasty’s early soft power efforts 
in the Indian Ocean and beyond. 
There is also an importance in tying Ming glory to China’s soft power 
which Zheng He’s story is a crucial part of. Ming glory also has a relation to the 
concept of Han chauvinism or ethnocentrism in favor of the Han people. As 
mentioned earlier in regard to the first Ming ruler Zhu Yuanzhang, the first 
emperor was lionized as a “vanquisher of alien culture.”135 The racial component 
of the 1911 revolution against the Manchu rulers of the Qing Dynasty was a 
useful rallying cry for the mostly Han revolutionaries. Zheng He’s story can also 
be used in similar ways to that of Zhu Yuanzhang. Under the context of the 
tribute trade system, Zheng He was seen by his contemporaries as fulfilling 
China’s role as the “Middle Kingdom” and proving the superiority of Ming 
(therefore Han) culture to the “barbarian” nations. This was often accomplished 
through the giving of gifts to foreign envoys and using displays of power such as 
the treasure fleet to show off the Ming Dynasty’s power to its vassal states. Such 
displays are used in Chinese soft power projection today as journalist Lorand C. 
Laskai has observed. The expensive and dazzling displays during the 2008 
summer Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai expo show that the concept of glory 
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and using that concept to impress foreign visitors is a crucial part of Chinese soft 
power.136       
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITIUTE: SOFT POWER IN THE  
CLASSROOM 
 
 
 The Confucius Institute is a non-profit educational organization that is 
overseen by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Education. The 
Confucius Institute promotes Chinese language and cultural exchange and 
focuses primarily on students in universities. Along with my argument made in 
the previous chapters regarding historical use of Chinese soft power in the 
person Zheng He, I also want to propose an additional argument: that the 
Confucius Institute is the vehicle for one of the most effective uses of soft power 
used by the PRC today.  The Confucius Institute claims to be solely a nonprofit 
educational organization free from government interference.137 However there 
has been some considerable controversy regarding just how much control the 
PRC government actually has over it. Serious complaints have been leveled that 
the Confucius Institute stifles academic freedom.138  
The Confucius Institute was founded in 2004 under the Office of the 
Chinese Language International. It originally opened in 2004 in Seoul, South 
Korea.139  and as of 2015 there were 450 Confucius Institutes operating in 120 
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countries. In the United States there are approximately 100 Confucius Institutes 
as well as 650 so-called “Confucius Classrooms” that usually operate in K-12 
schools.140 Judging from the size and reach of The Confucius Institute it can be 
said that this organization has enjoyed a significant amount of success. The 
Confucius Institute has been compared to Goethe Institute in Germany, Alliance 
Francaise in France and Italy’s Societa Dante Alighieri who are also teaching 
institutions that have a focus on language and culture. The criticisms of the 
Confucius Institute however, come from complaints regarding the integrity of 
academic freedom. These accusations often stem from the fact that the 
Confucius Institute operates not only in foreign universities, but their teaching 
material is also supplied by Hanban, the Office of the Chinese Language 
International who are sitting members of the policy making committee of the CCP 
or Politburo.141  The main complaint about these teaching materials is that they 
do not challenge the PRC’s view of the “One-China” policy. Additionally, it is 
considered by some critics such as Marshall Sahlins at the University of Chicago 
to be part and parcel of the PRC’s soft power policies.  
The soft power capabilities of the Confucius Institute are indeed 
formidable. While there has been some considerable backlash in universities in 
the US, Europe and Australia, the Confucius Institute has had much more 
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success in pursuing its soft power aims in developing nations in Africa. The PRC 
itself has sunk a lot of money into its Africa policy and the spread of Chinese 
language proficiency in countries such as Kenya shows that the Confucius 
Institute has been very successful in teaching Mandarin and Chinese culture in 
these countries. The Confucius Institute has had less success in Australia in 
spite of Australia being a huge part of China’s soft power aims, and especially in 
light of its geographic proximity. It is also true that there is no shortage of 
criticism against an organization that is seen by its critics as a tool of the PRC 
state apparatus.  
So, is the Confucius Institute merely a teaching and cultural exchange 
organization as Hanban claims?  Or is it a soft power method used by the PRC to 
spread influence in foreign countries to promote a view of China that’s favorable 
to the PRC’s views, being one of the many components of China’s “charm 
offensive”? If the latter is true, would this also be an example of the PRC using a 
type of soft power which Joseph Nye has defined as co-optive power? Co-optive 
power as defined by Nye is a soft power method that uses the attractiveness of 
one’s culture as a method for a country to accomplish its goals.142 There is 
certainly evidence that the PRC has used co-optive power before, especially in 
its efforts of building infrastructure in Africa. Conversely, is there evidence that 
the Confucius Institute is what it claims to be? Is the criticism used against it 
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merely a symptom of rival nations in the west, especially the United States, using 
a backlash against Chinese influence due to fears of being overtaken by China’s 
rising influence in the world? What about worries that the Confucius Institute is a 
threat to academic freedom in the Universities it’s embedded in? 
 In order to understand these questions, it would be useful first to take a 
look at how the Confucius Institute has wielded its soft power by examining its 
efforts and activities throughout the world. 
             
Confucius Institute: Policies, Goals, Academic Freedom and the 
Wielding of Co-optive Soft Power 
     
The teaching component of the local 
Confucius Institute is often 
complemented by academic programs 
such as guest lectures and scholarly 
conferences on China. Considering that 
the political constraints in effect on 
public discussions of certain topics in 
China are usually followed in Confucius 
Institutes-no talking of Taiwan 
independence, the status of Taiwan, the 
fourth of June 1989 at Tiananmen 
Square, Falun Gong, universal human 
rights, etc.-these academics are largely 
consistent with the “cultural activities” of 
CIs, insofar as they likewise present a 
picture of a peaceful, harmonious, and 
attractive People’s Republic.  
       -Marshall Sahlins in “Academic  
       Malware”143 
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According to Hanban’s official website, the official purpose of the 
Confucius Institute is described thusly: “Hanban/Confucius Institute 
Headquarters, as a public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of 
Education, is committed to providing Chinese language and cultural teaching 
resources and services worldwide. It goes all out in meeting the demands of 
foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of multiculturalism 
and the building of a harmonious world.”144 In this context it would seem that at 
least officially, the Confucius Institute is modeling itself on similar language and 
cultural exchange institutions like Alliance Francaise. Cultural exchanges in the 
context of the Confucian Institute policy would be events like classes on making 
dumplings and cultural festivals that are used as opportunities to teach about 
Chinese culture such as the Chinese New Year. These so called 
“culturetainments” as titled by Lionel M. Jensen have had a big impact on 
promoting Chinese culture that falls in line with the image of China that Beijing 
wants to project.145 According to Sahlins, however, there is one worrisome 
aspect of this: the plans of the Confucius Institute must be submitted to Beijing 
for approval and the Confucius Institute that doesn’t do so is liable to be taken to 
court for sponsoring an event that Beijing has not approved.146 So while The 
Confucius Institute claims to be doing its service in the name of vague “Foreign 
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Chinese Learners”, Beijing clearly has the final say on what these interests will 
be. This point however, has been contested by the Confucius Institute itself. 
Directors of the Confucius Institute deny that they take orders from Beijing and 
that Hanban has in no way had its policies shaped by the PRC’s politburo 
according to the directors of the Confucius Institute.147 
Another component of the Confucius Institute and arguably its most 
important and successful, is its language program. Designed to teach foreign 
students to speak Mandarin and learn to write in simplified Chinese characters. 
There have been significant measures of success in these efforts in African 
nations, for example in Kenya there is an increasingly large number of Mandarin 
speakers arising in the student population and Mandarin is starting to overtake 
English as the primary spoken foreign language in Kenya and is now part of the 
nation’s school curriculum.148  In Cambodia, over 100 teachers of the Mandarin 
language have been sent to Cambodia with Cambodia’s government requesting 
more teachers due to increased demand as Chinese language proficiency 
increases in the nation.149 These are just two of many examples that show that 
Mandarin language instruction has been very successful not only in western 
universities, but in developing nations as well, especially in nations that the PRC 
may have a geopolitical interest in. 
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On the part of the Confucius Institute, there is a considerable effort to 
promote scholarships in Chinese language learning for foreign students in China.  
The State Council of the PRC published the recruitment procedures of the 
Confucius Institute in 2014, which shows that as part of Confucius Institute 
policy, non-Chinese citizens are given the opportunity to study in China, paid for 
by the Confucius Institute. These are the recruitment procedures and eligibility 
criteria published in this paper: 
For the purpose of supporting the development of Confucius Institutes, 
facilitating international promotion of Chinese language and dissemination 
of Chinese culture, as well as cultivating qualified Chinese-language 
teachers and excellent Chinese-language learners, Confucius Institute 
Headquarters/Hanban (hereinafter referred to as Hanban) launches a 
“Confucius Institute Scholarship” program to sponsor foreign students, 
scholars and Chinese language teachers to study Chinese in relevant 
universities of China (hereinafter referred to as “Host Institutes”). 
Category of Scholarship and Eligibility Criteria 
The scholarship of 2014 is divided into 5 categories: 
1. Scholarship for Students of Master’s Degree in Teaching Chinese to 
Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL), 
2. Scholarship for Students of One-Academic-Year + MTCSOL, 
3. Scholarship for Students of Bachelor’s Degree in Teaching Chinese to 
Speakers of Other Languages (BTCSOL), 
4. Scholarship for One-Academic-Year Students, 
5. Scholarship for One-Semester Students. 
Applicants shall be non-Chinese citizens in good health, aged between 16 
and 35 (Chinese language teachers in post shall be aged below 45, and 
applicants for BTCSOL scholarship should be aged below 20).150 
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The Confucius Institute reaching out to students of the Chinese language 
serves China’s soft power interests in two ways. Primarily it allows the Confucius 
Institute to have a pool of potential recruits into its organization. Students who 
were given a scholarship by the Confucius Institute may find themselves 
interested in continuing their association with the Confucius Institute in the form 
of employment. This gives China considerable soft power as its point of view on 
the nuances of the Chinese language will be the dominant one in the minds of 
these students. A secondary advantage is that China will appear to be a 
benevolent power interested in sharing its culture to the world which helps the 
PRC’s worldwide legitimacy be respected. This fits neatly into the PRC’s efforts 
to charm the world through soft power and gain legitimacy through the 
international community.         
So, do these goals and policies of the Confucius Institute represent the 
wielding of co-opitive soft power as defined by Nye? Nye separates hard and soft 
power through the definitions of command power and co-opitive power, or 
coercion and charm, respectively. In his definition Nye writes, 
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the 
ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The 
distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the 
behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power - the 
ability to change what others do - can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-
optive power - the ability to shape what others want - can rest on the 
attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the 
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agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express 
some preferences because they seem too unrealistic.151   
Does the Confucius Institute fit Nye’s definition of soft power then? 
Certainty, the PRC government and the Confucius Institute’s efforts in Africa and 
South-East Asia have had a remarkable amount of success using a “charm 
offensive” to make Chinese culture and language appealing to students and 
educators alike. The wielding of soft power in western universities has also had 
noteworthy and significant successes. At the University of Massachusetts 
Boston, the Confucius Institute that is associated with the University held 
celebrations for the Chinese New Year (Year of the Rooster) in 2017 on February 
8th. Over 400 students and faculty attended.152 Such an enormous turn-out 
promoting cultural activities gives credence to the idea that the Confucius 
Institute is a useful tool in promoting an image of China that is peaceful and 
welcoming, and one that also strictly follows the Chinese Communist Party’s view 
of how China should appear to the world. A lot of the focus on what constitutes 
as “Chinese culture” as promoted by the Confucius Institute are topics that could 
be considered “safe” in the eyes of the PRC government. Examples such as 
Chinese New Year celebrations, cooking classes and teaching state approved 
forms of Chinese writing, such as simplified characters (as opposed to the more 
complex traditional characters as Taiwan uses) are an easy way for China to 
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promote itself abroad while not interfering with the PRC’s orthodoxy at home. A 
common criticism of the Confucius Institute is its avoidance of topics that would 
be considered ideologically “dangerous”.  
A common saying is knowledge is power, therefore the suppression of 
certain kinds of information can lead to increased power to those who wish to 
control a narrative. As described in college professor and Confucius Institute 
critic Marshall Sahlin’s Academic Malware, Liu Yunshan minister of Propaganda 
and first ranked Politburo member, wrote a speech on September 7, 2010 as 
reported in The People’s Daily saying: “Make sure that all cultural backgrounds, 
cultural products, and cultural activities reflect and conform to the socialist core 
values and requirements.”153 The accusations of suppression of academic 
freedom in the universities of such countries as the United States and Australia 
come from these kind of directions from the PRC government.  
 The Confucius Institute uses co-optive soft power to present a sanitized 
image of the People’s Republic of China that conforms to views as expressed by 
Liu. Therefore, topics such as the occupation of Tibet, the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident and the legal status of Taiwan are subjects that are forbidden by 
the Confucius Institute. Problems that arise from this approach come from 
western universities whose efforts to promote academic freedom can collide with 
this policy. For example, if Taiwanese students were studying in an American 
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university and espoused views on Taiwanese independence in his or her 
academic work, they might end up butting heads with their university Confucius 
Institute or in some cases professors who are either Confucius Institute members 
or associated with them or in some cases, simply sympathetic.  
An example of a situation like what was described above occurred in 2009. 
According to Sahlins, Bloomberg reported that a scheduled visit of the Dalai 
Lama was cancelled at North Carolina State University. Writing on the subject, 
Sahlins reports: 
A scheduled 2009 visit of the Dalai Lama was cancelled by the interim 
Chancellor of North Carolina State University, Jim Woodward, ostensibly 
because there had been insufficient time to prepare for such an august 
guest. The director of the NC State Confucius Institute, Bailian Li, a 
forestry professor, got involved after the cancellation, he said, as a 
warning for the future-telling the provost that a visit by the Dalai Lama 
could disrupt “some strong relationships we were developing with 
China.154 
This is a clear case where academic freedom can easily be challenged. All of 
the students of the University were denied their chance to hear a university guest 
make a speech, and who was subsequently no-platformed by those who did not 
wish the Dalai Lama to come to campus. The ominous “warning” which could be 
seen as a threat by Dr. Bailian Li, shows evidence that not only is the Confucius 
Institute willing to enforce its political views on its employees, but is also willing to 
use soft power in the form of protest against speakers and policies it does not 
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agree with. There is also a coercive hard power element in these forms of 
protests. The Institute threatening its continued relationship with the university, 
especially with the implied threat of withholding funds is similar to sanctions 
which under Nye’s definition of power leans towards the harder side of the power 
spectrum.155   
 This is certainly not the only case where a Confucius Institute has used its 
influence in an American university to protest academic policies they have 
objections to. As reported by Bloomberg on November 2, 2011, The Confucius 
Institute gave an offer to Stanford University of $4 million to help host a 
Confucius Institute at Stanford. There was only one caveat: No talking about 
issues such as Tibet. Stanford, however, refused citing academic freedom and 
the Confucius Institute decided to back down according to Daniel Golden. 
Stanford in this case, managed to preserve its commitment to academic freedom. 
But the fact that the Confucius Institute was bold enough to ask Stanford to 
violate its commitment to academic freedom shows a trend that the Confucius 
Institute is willing to assert its position the universities they are associated with 
strongly. There is a legitimate fear that these efforts are compromising the 
academic principles of the university system.           
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The Backlash Against the Confucius Institutes and 
The Hegemony of Academic Narratives 
 
“Universities should cease their involvement in 
Confucius Institutes unless the agreement 
between the University and Hanban is 
renegotiated so that (1)  the university has 
unilateral control over all academic matters, 
including recruitment of teachers, 
determination of the curriculum, and choice of 
texts; (2) the university affords Confucius 
Institute teachers the same academic freedom 
rights…that it affords all other faculty in the 
university; and (3) the university-Hanban 
agreement is made available to all members of 
the university community.”156 
         -Statement by the  
         American   
         Association of  
         University   
         Professors, June  
         2014157  
Predictably, the backlash against the Confucius Institute, especially when 
it is concerned with matters of academic freedom has been loud and clear. The 
most famous example would be in April 2014, when the University of Chicago 
disassociated itself with its Confucius Institute and refused to renew its contract. 
Dr. Marshall Sahlins who has led the charge in criticism against the Confucius 
Institute is a tenured professor there. He reveals in Academic Malware how 
worrisome and underhanded the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the 
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University of Chicago was. According to Sahlins, the Asian Studies faculty was 
not even aware of the opening of the Confucius Institute on campus until some 
faculty members read a newspaper article announcing it.158 Sahlins claims that 
an expat professor Dali Lang was the impetus for getting the Confucius Institute 
established. Sahlins claims the Council of the Faculty Senate was not allowed to 
vote on the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago 
in 2009 nor on its renewal in 2014.159  Also in 2014, a petition signed by 110 
senior faculty members was also blocked by the board of directors, although this 
petition eventually became vital in convincing the University to cut its ties with the 
Confucius Institute in 2014.160 The University of Chicago after these events 
became sort of a rallying symbol in 2014 for universities to heavily criticize the 
establishment of the Confucius Institute in American universities.  
While the Confucius Institute has been portraying itself as a legitimate 
cultural exchange and teaching organization, there is considerable evidence of 
events such as at the University of Chicago that not all universities are willing to 
accept this definition. Indeed, a lot of universities in the United States including 
such prestigious names as UC Berkley, Cornell, Harvard and UC San Diego 
have refused to host the Confucius Institute on their campuses.161 The soft power 
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aims of the Confucius Institute have not gone unnoticed by critics who also point 
out the irony of using the philosopher Confucius’s name, pointing out that 
Confucius was reviled historically during Mao’s regime. Back in 2009, an article 
in The Economist stated the irony of using Confucius’s name, stating,  
China's decision to rely on Confucius as the standard-bearer of its 
soft-power projection is an admission that communism lacks pulling 
power. Long gone are the days when Chairman Mao was idolized 
by radicals (and even respected by some mainstream academics) 
on American university campuses. Mao vilified Confucius as a 
symbol of the backward conservatism of pre-communist China. 
Now the philosopher, who lived in the 6th century BC, has been 
recast as a promoter of peace and harmony: just the way President 
Hu Jintao wants to be seen. Li Changchun, a party boss, described 
the Confucius Institutes as “an important part of China's overseas 
propaganda set-up.162 
As described in this article in The Economist, there is a certain irony in 
using Confucius’s name to promote a government that once despised him as 
being a symbol of “feudal” oppression in the Marxist understanding of the word. 
Of even more interest, is Li Changchun’s admission that the Confucius Institute is 
a part of the PRC’s soft power efforts and shows that its very intentions are soft 
power oriented, and more importantly not afraid of throwing its weight around. Of 
course, the irony of using the name of Confucius can be explained logically from 
a soft power standpoint. Confucius is a name that has a lot of recognition in the 
west. It also gives Hanban the image of an educational organization by 
promoting one of the biggest advocates of education in China’s history. Name 
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brand recognition, coupled with a famous proponent of education who is well 
known worldwide as one of the greatest philosophers in history, Hanban has 
given itself the perfect mascot. It would be hard after all, to promote a cultural 
educational organization called the “Mao Institute” or “Deng Xiaoping Institute” in 
North America and opting for a more familiar name such as the ancient sage is 
understandable from a business point of view. 
The Taiwan Academy is perceived to be Taiwan’s answer to the 
Confucius Institute and also as Taiwan copying the PRC’s soft power strategy. 
According to the Taiwan Academy’s website, the aims of the Taiwan academy 
are: Establishing a Taiwan Academy digital information integration platform to 
serve the global internet users, promoting Mandarin Chinese instruction and 
traditional Chinese characters, invigorating the research of Taiwan Studies and 
Sinology and disseminating the results, managing scholarship programs 
introducing Taiwan’s diverse and exquisite culture to the world and finally. 
Establishing worldwide agencies and resource centers.163 The most important of 
these points would be introducing Taiwan as a separate and unique culture. This 
is a threat to Beijing’s perception of its own sovereignty as part of the “One China 
Policy” and in terms of saving face, constitutes a threat to the PRC’s Maizan or 
its social position. Several professors have had their academic freedom 
threatened in western universities for teaching a view of Tawian that promotes 
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the small island nation as a separate political and cultural entity. In Australia, as 
reported by The Australian there has been a recent example of a lecturer being 
forced to apologize for teaching this point of view: 
A University of Newcastle academic has been targeted by Chinese 
international students over teaching material which reportedly suggested 
Taiwan and Hong Kong were separate countries. The incident comes just 
days after a University of Sydney IT lecturer was been forced to issue a 
public apology after international students were outraged by his use of a 
map showing Chinese claimed territory as part of India. Now, High 
Commissioner of India to Australia Dr. Ajay M. Gondane has come 
forward to urge universities to protect the right to freedom of expression in 
the wake of the map incident. The reported incident at the University of 
Newcastle is the fourth prominent case since May where academic staff or 
Australian universities have been targeted and their actions or teaching 
material attacked on Chinese social media. Earlier this month, an 
Australian National University lecturer said he had made a “poor decision” 
after translating a warning about cheating into Mandarin.164  
A university lecturer being forced to apologize after exercising an 
academic right to teach material without political restraint is an interesting 
example to use, especially in this case due to the influence that both the PRC’s 
social media and the international students from China had. This is not very 
surprising considering the important relationship the PRC and Australia have. 
Chinese international students are a huge tuition component of Australian 
universities. This has caused some serious issues regarding Chinese nationalism 
clashing with academic freedom. Many of these students are full-paid tuition 
students of these respective universities, this gives said students a large amount 
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of sway over University policy. Australian universities coming from a sense of 
self-preservation are quick to side with student demands in cases such as these. 
If these students protest and raise enough of a fuss, its better in the eyes of 
many university administrations to bow to pressure and acquiesce to these 
demands. Students in this case are certainly using a mix of soft power and hard 
power in this instance. The students use charm and persuasion in the form of 
protest to make themselves heard. If that fails, the coercive nature of these 
protests may give them what they want as a hard power strategy. The position of 
the universities is understandable, since tuition income for the university itself is 
threatened and many Australian universities don’t have the luxury of alienating 
parts of the student body, lest international students boycott the school which can 
threaten the entire budget. The New York Times reported   on the rise of this 
phenomena: 
MELBOURNE, Australia — It was a routine quiz in a university business 
class in Australia, but the answer to one of the questions was a surprise: 
Chinese officials are truthful only when careless or drunk. Gao Song, a 
student from China at Monash University in Melbourne, was so upset that 
he condemned it online. His post created a stir back in China, where it 
was quoted in the local news media. The Chinese Consulate in Melbourne 
contacted him requesting regular updates. Global Times, an influential 
state-run newspaper in China, asked him to write articles about the 
incident. Under pressure, the university judged the question to be 
inappropriate, and it suspended the professor. “As China is becoming 
more and more powerful, we have strong backing even when we’re 
overseas,” said Mr. Gao, 24. “When others find faults with China, we can 
stand up to them and tell them we Chinese are great. “Like their 
counterparts in the United States, Australia’s universities have opened 
their doors to well-heeled Chinese students as a source of much-needed 
tuition revenue. But as the number of Chinese students has grown, so has 
the willingness of some like Mr. Gao to speak out against what they see 
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as slights against China, and to push back at offending classes and 
instructors.165  
This phenomena in itself is an example of soft power, especially in China’s 
perception of its own soft power. The PRC is more than aware of the influence it 
can have on social media. The PRC is also more than aware of the importance 
that is placed on the relationship between the two nations. It also gives the PRC 
an aura of plausible deniability, the PRC could claim after all that this just the 
view of the students and not the government and that any pressure exerted from 
China itself is wrapped in the veneer of protecting the academic rights of its 
citizens abroad. The clash between nationalism and academic freedom also 
shows the amount of power nationalism has in shaping the discourse between 
students and professors. A view of China that is promoted by the PRC has a lot 
of problematic issues if they were being regarded by a lecturer of Taiwanese 
descent for example. Should said lecturer’s rights to teach his or her class the 
way the teacher wants to be considered less important than that of a student 
from Beijing or Shanghai objecting to this point of view? The threat to academic 
freedom is something that if ignored can have serious consequences for a 
university’s integrity down the road and should not be ignored.            
The Taiwan Academy claims not to either compete or cooperate with 
Hanban, the promotion of traditional Chinese characters in language instruction 
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shows a very visible challenge against the Confucius Institute.166  There is also 
some controversy in regard to what Taiwanese culture actually is. Although 
Chinese culture is dominant in Taiwan, there are many different cultural 
influences on Taiwan as well, including that of Japan, Korea and even traces of 
Spanish and Dutch culture from colonial times, as explained by Philip Yang, head 
of Taiwan’s Government Information Office.167 Given the Taiwan Academy’s goal 
to promote Chinese culture as Taiwan’s main culture (giving itself legitimacy as a 
“Chinese” nation as opposed to the PRC’s One-China policy) and its promotion 
of traditional writing styles as opposed to those favored by Beijing, the Taiwan 
Academy has indeed shown as a competitor to Hanban. 
From these clear examples it is certain that there is plenty of ample 
evidence that the Confucius Institute is being utilized in China’s soft power policy. 
The Confucius Institute does not deny that they are a soft power organization; 
they just disagree on what their critics accuse their motives of being. While 
Hanban may argue that their methods are a peaceful way to promote both 
Chinese language and culture in a bid to improve China’s image in the world 
favorably, (This is actually the exact definition of soft power according to Nye.)168 
the critics of the Confucius Institute have a different point of view. The point of 
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view of the Confucius Institute also supports this study’s argument of soft power 
being a tool of Chinese diplomacy in the past and on into the future, but with a 
different and much more aggressive motive: the promotion of Beijing’s view of 
what China should be. This is what is at the heart of the argument that the 
Confucius Institute presents a threat to academic freedom which the following 
subsection shall now focus on to give a greater understanding of what many 
universities fear is the curtailing of very basic academic freedom, as well it will be 
examining the discriminatory hiring practices of the Confucius Institutes.  
 
Academic Freedom and Discriminatory Hiring Practices 
   The first day in class the teacher asked all the   
   students with obvious Asian heritage to say where  
   their families were from. When my daughter said, her  
   mother was from Taiwan, the teacher said, “Taiwan is 
   part of China.” Months later, during    
   some free minutes in class, my daughter was looking  
   at a map, which showed Taiwan and    
   all of the South China Sea  as belonging   
   to China (naturally since all of the teaching   
   materials come from China). The teacher   
   approached, bent down, and     
   whispered into her ear: “Taiwan is a part of   
   China. 
      -Testimony of a Tennessee man  
      whose daughter attended a  
      Confucius Classroom169 
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Academic Freedom is a concept that defines itself as being the freedom of 
inquiry by university faculty members. Ideally, this gives a professor the freedom 
to teach whatever content he or she wishes in their chosen discipline without the 
fear of being censored by the university for their beliefs, and without fear of any 
political or academic forces threatening their job, repression or censorship of 
their work and in extreme cases the threat of imprisonment. In American and 
European universities as well as in Australia, academic freedom has been lauded 
as one of the greatest virtues of the university system. This allows professors to 
publish their research and findings in a free setting and allows the flow of 
accurate information to go unhindered. By far, the greatest threat the critics of the 
Confucius Institute claim against the organization is that they threaten this 
cherished right that many professors feel is at the core of the philosophy of the 
university system.170 
The argument in favor of this criticism is that there are numerous 
examples of the Confucius Institute repressing information with examples such 
as the legal status of Taiwan, the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and Falun 
Gong. The above quoted example about the Tennessee man and his daughter in 
the Confucius classroom also shows a bullying nature when it comes to subjects 
the PRC may find controversial. The United States is not the only country being 
subjected to this kind of bullying. In June 2014, Sinologist Isabel Hilton wrote that 
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there have been many attempts by Chinese officials to condition academic life in 
British educational institutions. Hilton claims that events such as the Dalai Lama 
visiting are often protested by Chinese officials who, according to Hilton, threaten 
to discourage Chinese students from enrolling in British universities in 
response.171 Sahlins references another example used by Hilton in his book 
Academic Malware where Hilton describes some worrisome censorship in a book 
she contributed to. Hilton claims: 
I contributed to a short book for 6th formers (12th graders) on China, 
without knowing that it was sponsored by a CI. The chapter was to the 
length requested, and it was not until I saw a copy at the launch event that 
I discovered that an entire passage about the work and subsequent arrest 
of the Lake Tai campaigner Wu Lihong had been excised. I wish I could 
believe it was just a coincidence.172  
This passage shows an allegation that not only do the Confucius Institutes 
bully and censor students, but that respected professors also have had 
problematic dealings with the Confucius Institute. It shows a trend that Hanban 
not only has shown evidence that it tightly controls its teaching materials but has 
a stake in controlling information about China as a whole, and will use its clout to 
get its way when it finds material that the PRC finds objectionable. While the 
Confucius Institute claims to follow all the laws and academic rules of its host 
universities, it has shown it is not beneath using underhanded tricks as well as 
exerting enormous pressure on the board of directors of many universities to get 
its way. This usually comes in the form of threatening to discourage students 
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from attending universities as we have seen in the UK or in many cases in the 
US, putting unofficial but heavy pressure on school officials.       
It would seem that Hanban has found a very clever, effective, and heavy-
handed strategy in using the threat of discouraging students from enrolling or the 
threat of cutting their funding to Asia Studies programs. It is likely to be troubling 
to professors who may feel that the very institutions they work for are being 
undermined and seriously influenced by Hanban. Withholding funding is an 
extremely effective bargaining chip, and so many professors are fearful, 
especially those in Asian studies departments, that their academic freedom may 
be undermined by university administrators not wanting to “rock the boat.”  When 
academic freedom is restricted there can also be the threat that the quality of 
work is being compromised in academic research. A university at its core is a 
place where all academically sound ideas and concepts can be researched and 
tested. If another nation’s government has enough pull behind the scenes (also 
giving it the ability of plausible deniability) then the actual flow of viable research 
can arguably be diluted if not completely stopped. The American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP) put out a statement on its website in October 2014 
warning American universities to re-think their connections to the Confucius 
Institute. The warning read: 
Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are 
allowed to ignore academic freedom. “Their academic activities are under 
the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a 
member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of 
China. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature 
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nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims 
and practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American 
universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the 
recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and 
in the restriction of debate.173 
While a good number of these points outlined in this statement show a 
clear and present threat to academic freedom, one of the most worrisome 
practices noted here is the practice of discriminatory hiring. This is what is meant 
by “the recruitment and control of academic staff” as mentioned in the statement 
above.  One of the most infamous cases of discriminatory hiring happened in 
Canada at McMaster University in 2012 involving the case of a former CI teacher 
by the name of Sonia Zhao. Ms. Zhao complained that the Confucius Institute 
had discriminated against her due to her religious beliefs, namely because she 
was a member of Falun Gong who have long been suppressed in the PRC. As 
reported in The Globe and Mail the Confucius Institute does not allow its 
teachers to join “illegal organizations like Falun Gong.”174 The discriminatory 
hiring as practiced by Hanban, was the main catalyst that caused McMaster 
University not to renew its contract with the Confucius Institute similar to the 
events at the University of Chicago. These events underline a problematic 
situation where by following Hanban’s hiring practices, universities are breaking 
their own countries’ anti-discrimination laws.  In much the same way, the 
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Confucius Institute has posed a threat to academic freedom when professors at 
American and Canadian universities are forced to undergo an “ideological purity 
test” in violation of American and Canadian anti-discrimination laws. It is also not 
above some Hanban-approved teachers to manipulate the students in their 
classes to become involved in protests and demonstrations. According to 
Sahlins, the academic director at Waterloo University by the name of Yan Li, 
used her students to protest coverage of a Tibetan uprising in 2008.175   
Yan Li was formally employed as a reporter for the Chinese news agency, 
Xinhua, and had considerable connections to the CCP. Sahlins recounts that Yan 
Li rallied Confucius Institute students to protest what Yan Li described as “local 
sympathy for Tibetan separatists.”176  Yan Li was ultimately successful in her 
protest causing the local TV station to apologize for perceived biased coverage 
as reported in the Epoch Times.177 The amount of support Yan Li was able to 
rally shows that the Confucius Institute has an iron-fisted grasp on the realities 
and tactics of soft power. By using the powerful symbolism of student protest as 
well as using perceptions of media bias, The Confucius Institute has shown that it 
can use soft power to achieve its aims, even in a foreign country.  
This is of course, ironically denying the media organization being 
protested   its right to a free press. There is also an argument to be made that 
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using students to protest in favor of Beijing’s policy in a Canadian university is an 
abuse of power from an authority figure. While there is no direct evidence that 
Yan Li threatened to punish any of her students if they did not participate in the 
protest, it is still a professor using her position of considerable power to influence 
and manipulate her students to bully a media organization into complying with a 
policy from a foreign country. And this does not consider what might have 
happened to any of her students who might have disagreed with the professor 
being silenced and having their own academic freedom violated, not to mention 
the right of a free press. Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is not that Yan Li 
committed these actions, which was her right under the same academic freedom 
she threatened, but that her soft power tactics worked.  
 
Ceding Power: The Future of Chinese Soft Power 
With the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States 
many academics have been worried about some threats to the field of academia. 
Not only has President Trump threatened to de-fund universities such as Berkley 
in 2017 in response to massive student protests, but Trump’s withdrawal from 
international commitments has left a void that Beijing is more than happy to fill.178 
Despite the nationalist rhetoric of the Trump administration has espoused, Trump 
has been more than willing to be conciliatory to China in many respects. This 
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isolationist view towards politics can be dangerous to many academic institutions 
especially concerning the Confucius Institute. Under the previous Obama 
Administration, academics could at least count on a strong and assertive US 
government to protect academic freedom, but as the Trump Administration turns 
a blind eye to Chinese soft power, university faculty can’t count on a strong 
advocate for their rights concerning academic freedom on the international stage. 
As Fareed Zakaria of the Washington Post reports: 
The first major act of the Trump administration was to pull the United 
States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a treaty that would have 
opened up long-closed economies such as Japan and Vietnam, but also 
would have created a bloc that could stand up to China’s increasing 
domination of trade in Asia. The TPP was, in Singaporean Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong’s words, “a litmus test” of U.S. credibility in Asia. With 
Washington’s withdrawal, even staunchly pro-American allies such as 
Australia are hedging their bets. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull has raised the possibility of China joining the TPP, essentially 
turning a group that was meant to be a deterrent against China into one 
more arm of Chinese influence. The United States’ global role has always 
meant being at the cutting edge in science, education and culture. Here 
again, Washington is scaling back while Beijing is ramping up. In Trump’s 
proposed budget, the National Institutes of Health, NASA and the national 
laboratories face crippling cuts, as do many exchange programs that have 
brought generations of young leaders to be trained in the United States 
and exposed to American values. Beijing, meanwhile, has continued to 
expand “Confucius Institutes” around the world and now offers 20,000 
scholarships for foreign students to go to China. Its funding for big science 
rises every year. The world’s largest telescope is in China, not the United 
States.179  
With Trump ceding power, the void that is being filled by China is very 
good news for the Confucius Institute. If academic freedom becomes less of an 
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issue, the Confucius Institute may be able to wield influence over universities in 
the United States much like they have in Australia. One only needs to look at the 
appeasement shown in Australia towards the Confucius Institute to get a possible 
preview of what might happen to American universities under an administration 
disinterested in the battlefield of soft power politics. This new-found cynicism can 
not only threaten academic freedom but also threaten perceptions on the 
efficiency of democracy, a tactic that has covertly been a large part of PRC 
policy.180  
 As soft power is ceded to Beijing, Washington will inevitably find itself in a 
diminished position. Trade treaties that Trump has threatened to withdraw from 
for example will give Beijing a void to fill in trade and soft power influence. 
Furthermore, confidence in Washington itself will be shaken by even the most 
pro-American allies may find themselves finding the PRC a more attractive 
partner to deal with than the United States. Another thing to consider is the 
Trump Administration’s antagonistic attitude towards the UN, which Trump has 
threatened to decrease US funding to. China would gain enormous credibility and 
soft power overseas and could become the most senior member of the Security 
Council under these circumstances within less than a decade.181     
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The Confucius Institute inarguably demonstrates its highly skilled use of 
soft power, as well as its eagerness and lack of moral constraint by western 
standards to employ “harder” versions of coercive power to achieve its aims. 
Public persons such as Xu Lin and Yan Li have no reluctance whatsoever in 
coercing and even bullying opposition and in that resolve, have found the means 
to gain a cultural victory for Beijing by using grassroots level protest against 
ideas that Beijing finds subversive, and in this practice, paradoxically also 
enjoying the legal protections of free speech to its logical conclusive advantage.  
The Confucius Institute has played a considerable role in the “charm 
offensive” that has been Beijing’s soft power initiative for over two decades. 
Joshua Kurlantzick identifies this in Charm Offensive as being a critical part of 
Chinese diplomacy. According to Kurlantzick the promotion of cultural studies 
and language by Beijing is a crucial part of the PRC’s public diplomacy.182 
Kurlantzick quotes Hu Youqing, a deputy to The National People’s Congress as 
saying, “Promoting the use of Chinese language will contribute to spreading 
Chinese culture and increasing China’s global influence. It can help build up our 
national strength and should be taken as a way to increase our country’s soft 
power.”183 Hu’s statement can be seen as a part of Hanban’s goals as a whole, 
and the Confucius Institute serves as a kind of “front-line fighter” in China’s 
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“charm offensive”. It is an intelligent and effective strategy because it applies the 
principle of infiltration and stealth, in the Confucius Institute’s dealings. 
The evidence is conclusive that the Confucius Institute uses grassroots 
activism as well as pressure against university faculty and administration to 
achieve its goals. The Confucius Institute is able to achieve this while presenting 
itself as a legitimate teaching exchange program. This allows the Confucius 
Institute plausible deniability, that is to say concealing its intentions, despite its 
overt ties to Beijing and the PRC’s politburo. From the standpoint of preserving 
academic freedom, it is encouraging to see that some universities in North 
America have begun questioning their ties to Hanban and the Confucius Institute, 
but that does not mean that universities in other parts of the world have that 
luxury. In African nations like Kenya for instance, there is sizable reliance on 
Beijing for aid development which many of these nations depend on. Therefore, it 
may not be prudent in their case, to antagonize Beijing. In the case of North 
America, Europe and Australia however, it is not so easy. As Nye points out, soft-
power is very hard to wield as it exists outside total government control and relies 
on charm and also because it can sometimes take years for its effects to be 
realized.184 Western universities so far have shown to be both resistant to the 
coercive power of the Confucius Institute such as in the famous case of the 
University of Chicago, but also susceptible in many cases to Hanban’s pressure 
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such as was seen in North Carolina State University’s cancellation of a speech 
by the Dalai Llama. Certainly, one thing is for sure: Hanban both recognizes and 
utilizes a form of power that has been used all around the world and in China 
since at least the Ming Dynasty, that being the power of charm and shaping a 
narrative, which the Confucius Institute has a monopoly on when it comes to the 
field of sinology.                   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
               CONFUCIANISM AND SOFT POWER: POLITICS    
 AND FOREIGN POLICY IN MING AND MODERN CHINA 
 
 
   “Can Confucianism enrich modern Chinese foreign  
   policy? This would have been an unthinkable and  
   certainly ‘counterrevolutionary’ question in the   
   revolutionary era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), who  
   took eradicating ‘feudal dregs’ such as Confucianism  
   as one of the main missions of his continuous   
   revolution. Yet for contemporary China it is no longer  
   an idle or quixotic question. Reform-era (1978–  
   present) Chinese leaders from Jiang Zemin onwards  
   have occasionally invoked Confucian concepts in  
   foreign policy statements. With President Xi Jinping,  
   however, a significant shift has occurred: President Xi 
   has made the use of ancient Chinese classics,   
   including Confucian texts, one of the hallmarks of his  
   political discourse.”185 
         -Feng Zhang, in  
         “Confucian Foreign  
         Policy Traditions in  
         Chinese History” 
The practice of soft power in China has a long and detailed history. As 
observed previously, in the historical sense in the person of Zheng He and 
observed in the modern sense with the example of the Confucius Institute, there 
are examples that can easily be seen by researchers and students alike that can 
be easily accessed.  What concepts and philosophies form the basis of foreign 
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policy in both the Ming era and the modern PRC? Confucianism has played a 
large role in the historical narrative of Chinese history as well as that of the 
eunuch officials in the courts of many Chinese dynasties. During the tenure of 
Chairman Mao Zedong however, Confucianism was officially looked down upon 
by the government of the PRC, seeing it as a relic of China’s “feudal” past 
according to Mao.186 However, Confucius has begun to have a bit of a 
rehabilitation with China’s leadership, especially in recent times under Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping. With the example of the Confucius Institute, which is a 
government sponsored program, we can see that at the very least, the current 
government in the PRC recognizes the value of the Confucius name, especially 
when marketing to an international audience.  
It is important to also consider that Confucius is hardly the only figure in 
how soft power has developed through Chinese history. In Chapter Two, the 
Ming Dynasty eunuchs were discussed in length in terms of foreign policy, and it 
was the Confucian scholar officials who gave them their greatest opposition. 
Another figure in historical Chinese philosophy, Mencius (385-302 BC) wrote 
extensively on the virtues of “just rule” and emphasizes the importance of being 
good to the common people. This is in clear contrast to Confucius who himself 
wrote extensively on the virtues of rulers and generally held the ruling upper 
classes in high regard. Where Mencius and Confucius find some common 
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ground, however, is in the rejection of profit. Perhaps in this rejection of profit we 
can also see the historical origins of how the merchant class in many East Asian 
societies, especially in China and Japan were treated as a far lower class in the 
traditional class systems of both nations, often being regarded as “parasitic” in 
nature. This also goes to explain the opposition the eunuch officials faced in Ming 
China from their Confucian rivals in regard to the treasure voyages. These 
voyages would have been seen by the Confucian officials as wasteful and 
against the better interests of the state as profit was considered a vice rather 
than a virtue in the minds of the Confucian scholar officials.187  
It will also be important in this chapter to look at the foreign policy of the 
PRC under Mao and his successors and the vilification of Confucianism under 
Mao and the rehabilitation of Confucius by his successors, especially within the 
last few decades as Beijing has begun its rise in the world and study of the 
classics have become an integral part of China’s soft power policy. The 
Confucius Institute also bears a name that would have shocked Chairman Mao 
greatly. But before China’s historical and modern soft power policies can be 
discussed, it will be prudent to give some historical background information on 
Confucius and his life. Also, the roles eunuchs played in the Ming Dynasty will be 
important to examine as well as modern day efforts to rehabilitate the 
conceptualization of Confucius. 
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Confucius and Soft Power 
    The Master Said: “To Learn and then, in its  
    due season put what you have learned into  
    practice- isn’t that still a great pleasure? And to 
    have a friend visit from somewhere far away- 
    isn’t that still a great joy? When you are   
    ignorant by the world like this, and bear no  
    resentment-isn’t that the greater nobility?188 
        -Confucius,   
        The Analects  
        (1.1)189                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Confucius (551-479 BC), known in China as Kongzi (Grand Master Kong) 
was born in 551 BC in the state of Lu which was a vassal state of China’s 
Zhou Dynasty (1050-771 BC). Losing his father at an early age and then his 
mother when Confucius was 23, left the young man truly alone in the world.190 
After finishing his basic education, Confucius began his early writings and 
teachings, gaining a small number of followers. His reputation as a teacher 
and philosopher had begun to gain him considerable recognition and the 
government of Lu expressed an interest in having him serve in a political 
career. By 501, Confucius was appointed governor of a small town in Lu. 
Eventually Confucius would rise to the position of Minister of Crime.  He 
served with distinction and high position in the state of Lu until he ran afoul of 
a viscount by the name of Ji Huan whose policies forced Confucius into self-
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exile in 497 BC.  This was a result of Confucius’s policy of trying to centralize 
the government of Lu failed. After spending several years wandering the 
numerous city states, Confucius was able to return home when he was 68 
years old. During this time period, he taught 77 disciples and wrote down his 
teachings in several texts known as The Five Classics. 
 The goal of Confucius was for his students and mankind to awaken and 
achieve their humanity (Ren).  If there is one overall ethic that Confucius 
considered the most important out of all his philosophies it would be the 
pursuit of study and education. With the emphasis on study, it is little wonder 
that the teaching and cultural organization the Confucius Institute borrows his 
name. Likewise, throughout the history of Imperial China, in order to become 
a scholar official of the state, a state examination system focusing on 
mastering the Five Classics was started during the Tang Dynasty (618-907). 
By the time the Ming Dynasty came to power, the first emperor of the Ming, 
Zhu Yuanzhang had re-established the Imperial Examination system, 
essentially giving China a state-run Confucian school system as well. 
Concerning the establishment of the Ming school system, Theodore de Barry 
writes: 
 When it came to schooling however, the plebian autocrat Taizu left no 
 doubt  that he conceived of it as training and indoctrination-not at all the 
 voluntaristic process of learning for one’s self that Zhu Xi had 
 advocated. He provided Ming China with a universal, state-funded 
 Confucian school system down to the county level. A college in the capital, 
 and the schools in each of some thousand prefectural and county seats 
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 throughout China, served a student body of some 25,000 licentiates 
 (shengyuan).191 
These schools while different and stricter than some of the academies of 
the past, still offered a way for Ming subjects to obtain their degrees and enter 
the civil service, with a Jinshi degree from passing the court exam, these few 
students could even enter the court as high-ranking officials. These 
academies were also notoriously strict concerning the rules and regulations 
governing their students. By order of the emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, a series of 
incredibly strict rules were applied for those studying for their examinations. 
The following is a few excerpts from The Ming Shilu’s The Horizontal Stele192 
showing the rather authoritarian nature of Zhu Yuanzhang’s state school 
system: 
1. Students are forbidden to present legal suits before the officials, unless 
the case involves them personally and in some major way. 
2. Students are forbidden to exceed their station and recklessly discuss 
political or military affairs. 
3. The Way of teaching requires that students revere and respect their 
teachers. Students must listen with sincere minds to their teacher’s 
explanations. They are forbidden to act arrogantly and argue.193     
This clear authoritarian bent on the rules of the Confucian Academies 
established by Zhu Yuanzhang is reflected in his autocratic nature. His 
attempt to extend this to the Confucian academies is therefore rather 
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unsurprising. Perhaps there is an interesting parallel between these 
authoritarian Confucian public schools and the Confucius Institute. For 
example, followers of the religion Falun Gong are forbidden to serve as 
Confucius Institute instructors. The PRC state has often accused religions 
that break away from the orthodoxy of the state to be individualistic and 
therefore destroying social harmony between the state and the people. 
McMaster University in Canada ended its association with the Confucius 
Institute for example, due to these strict and discriminatory hiring practices.194 
Much like Zhu Yuanzhang’s authoritarian state schools, there is a strict 
implied obedience to the state and that not being obedient causes social 
disharmony through excessive individualism. Consider these quotes from the 
Confucian Analects in regard to the wrongness of individualism and the 
virtues of being deferential to authority for the greater good of humanity:  
The Master said: “In youth, respect your parents when home and your 
elders when away. Think carefully before you speak, and stand by your 
words. Love the whole expanse of things, and make an intimate of 
Humanity. Then, if you have any energy left, begin cultivating yourself. 
                            (The Analects: 1.6)195  
Adept Ch’in asked of Adept Kung: “Whenever the Master visits a 
country, he learns all about its government. Does he have to search out 
this information, or is it just given to him? Adept Kung replied: “Congenial, 
good-natured, reverent, frugal, deferential-that’s how he learns so much. 
Its altogether different from the way others inquire, don’t you think? 
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                                      (The Analects: 1.10)196   
When Lord Meng Yi asked about honoring parents, the master said: 
“Never disobey.” Later when Fan Chi’ih was driving his carriage, the 
Master said: “Meng asked me about honoring parents, and I said never 
disobey. “What do you mean by that?” asked Fan Ch’ih. “In life, serve 
them according to ritual,” replied the Master. “In death, bury them 
according to Ritual. And the, make offering to them according to Ritual.”197  
                                         (The Analects: 2.5)198 
The filial piety promoted in Confucianism were applied to society as a 
whole and not just one’s parents, with the emperor (or in modern times the 
state) being the “father” and his subjects the children. When it comes to Falun 
Gong and the Confucius Institute’s discrimination against them, the Confucian 
aspect of social harmony explains the hostility towards “dissenting” groups as 
they violate the very social harmony that Confucius and the state espouse in 
their outlook on life. It is therefore, easy to understand why the first Ming 
emperor had such harsh policies when it came to education and the parallels 
to this harshness in the modern day have become evident.      
The traditional Confucian Ming curriculum was extremely difficult for 
prospective students when it came for them to finish their Confucian 
education and take the Imperial Examination. These examinations 
traditionally had been performed by the writing of several long three-legged 
essays on the Five Classics, with commentary by Zhu Xi.199 However, the 
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early Ming Dynasty may not have had as complex examinations as its 
predecessors owing to the fact that much more attention was focused more 
on the other famous Confucian Texts, the Four Books, which were 
considerably easier to understand.200 In the 18th century Qing historian Qian 
Daxin (1728-1804) pointed out that even in the Yuan Dynasty the Five 
Classics were still expected by the Chinese to be understood and applied in 
their essays.201 Qian Daxin theorized that this was conceived as a concession 
to non-Han Chinese during Zhu Yuanzhang’s time. In any case, it is certain 
that China, stretching back to the Sui and Tang Dynasties had an unrivaled 
system of education in the world at the time, and under the Ming Dynasty 
Neo-Confucianism flourished. 
By the time of Zheng He’s voyages, the rivalry between the Confucian 
Scholar officials had developed a decades long rivalry with eunuch palace 
officials, which Zheng He got caught up in as well, leading to the end of his 
voyages and his near-erasure from history due to the machinations of his 
Confucian rivals.202  Going back to the teachings of Confucians, these officials 
educated either by private tutors or by the Confucian state schools would 
have applied the teachings of Confucius in all aspects of their duties, 
including that of foreign policy. Concerning the scholar officials’ opposition to 
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the treasure voyages, this can be partially explained on the Confucian 
principle that stated profit was something not to be sought and could be 
considered an unvirtuous aspect in a person. It was fine in Confucius’s mind 
to gain wealth properly by following “The Way” but not at a cost of one’s 
“humaneness.” Confucius himself devoted several sayings on the subject of 
profit and also the proper way to gain wealth. Confucius also devoted sayings 
on the practice of frugality which he saw as a virtue. These selections come 
from David Hinton’s translation of The Analects: 
The Master said: “Wealth and position-that’s what people want. But if 
you enjoy wealth and position without following The Way, you’ll never 
dwell at ease.  Poverty and obscurity-that’s what people despise. And 
if you endure poverty and obscurity without following the Way, you’ll 
never get free. “If you ignore Humanity, how will you gain praise and 
renown? The noble-minded don’t forget Humanity for a single moment, 
not even in the crush of confusion and desperation. (Analects 4.5)203 
The Master said: “If profit guides your actions, there will be no end of 
resentment.” (The Analects 4.12)204 
The Master said: “How noble Yen Hui is! To live in a meager lane with 
nothing but some rice in a split bamboo bowl and some water in a 
gourd cup-no one else bear such misery. But it doesn’t Hui. His joy 
never wavers. O, how noble Hui is!” (Analects 6.10)205 
The Master said: “The noble-minded are clear about Duty. Little people 
are clear about profit.” (Analects 4.16)206 
Confucius considered distractions to duty such as profit to lead to unwise 
governance. He also promoted aestheticism in his students and praised 
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governance that showed proper respect to duty and humaneness, instead of 
simply profit and gain.  The treasure voyages were indeed profit motivated, as 
Ming China was also hungry to reestablish the formally lucrative trade empire 
China once had in the Indian Ocean which was temporarily stopped by Zhu 
Yuanzhang and was re-established by Zhu Di with Zheng He as his agent. 
The treasure voyages’ desire for profit was not the only thing wrong with them 
from a Confucian point of view. Confucius also disapproved of foreign wars 
and entanglements that weren’t defensive in nature. Confucius considered 
good and humane governance to be the primary concern of the state rather 
than that of war. From The Analects, Confucius writes:  
Duke Ling of Wei, asked Confucius about tactics, and Confucius said “I’ve 
learned something about the conduct of worship and sacrifice. But for the 
conduct of war-that is something I’ve never studied.” (Analects 15.1)207 
The Master treated three things with the greatest care: fasting, war and 
sickness.   (Analects 7.13)208 
Confucius as we can see saw war outside of defensive measures as 
wasteful of the state’s resources, and it would be better for members of a 
nation to honor their parents, perform the necessary rituals for daily life and 
give good and just governance to discover their humaneness. Very likely, the 
Confucian scholar officials of Zheng He’s time saw his voyages as a waste of 
expenditure, but also as Zheng He getting involved in foreign conflicts which 
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is discouraged in Confucianism.209 This is an important point to understand 
when trying to study the conflict between the scholar officials and the 
eunuchs: foreign wars and their support or opposition as controlled by court 
factions who used philosophy as policy. Even foreign travel in itself from the 
Confucian point of view could be seen as “rude” and “debasing” according to 
Levathes who recounts Confucius’s justification for isolationism: 
Once feeling underappreciated in his native Shandong in northern China, 
Confucius announced to his disciples that he was going to live with the 
“wild tribes.” “How could you do such a thing” one follower asked. “They 
are rude.” He replied that as the superior man among them, he would 
tame their rudeness. But, aside from this boast, as his writings make clear, 
Confucius thought foreign travel interfered with important familial 
obligations and believed trade was inherently mean and debasing.”210  
What then was Confucius’ and the Ming Confucian’s view of correct 
foreign policy? The Confucian point of view tended to look inward at China 
itself. There was a distrust of mercantile pursuits, and foreign travel was 
generally frowned upon, with the Confucian view being that these were 
wasteful pursuits and worse of all interfered with filial piety, which was above 
all the highest priority in a “humane” person’s world view according to 
Confucius.211 Shin-shan Henry Tsai, author of The Eunuchs in the Ming 
Dynasty gives an excellent summary of what Confucians saw as the just and 
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moral way of diplomacy and foreign relations as it regards the tribute trade 
system: 
The tributary system is the Chinese version of imperialism, not by 
territorial conquest or economic exploitation but control of ideas and 
cultural domination. The Confucian concept of diplomacy differed from its 
European counterpart, which stressed legal equality of nations and the 
sanctity of state sovereignty. In international relations Confucian family 
morality was applied as a guide for the preservation of harmony. As such, 
China the superior “Middle Kingdom” was not equal to her peripheral 
states, who were considered younger brothers or children in the family of 
nations. China produced the dominant civilization from which the 
peripheral states derived much of their culture. States around China were 
civilized only to the extent that they accepted Chinese ideas, customs, and 
institutions and agreed to use the Chinese lunar calendar to date their 
official documents. Such an ideology also engendered a chauvinistic 
concept that China was a world in itself, not a nation among nations and 
that no other human authority was equal in the Son of Heaven in China. 
As a consequence, there was no need for treaties as agreements of any 
kind at the foundation of the tributary system. The core of the system was 
the periodic exchange of visits of state, envoys and the requirement of the 
lesser states to recognize China’s cultural superiority and political 
suzerainty. 212  
The tribute trade system worked in a Confucian mindset because it 
allowed officials to be closer to home, and instead demanded that other 
nations come to China to pay their respects to their overlord the Emperor of 
China. While the Confucian’s promoted the tribute trade system as a way to 
preserve the teachings of Confucius in proper governance, with China being 
seen as the center of the world there was perhaps a small tinge of irony in 
this arrangement. The irony is that while the Confucians had helped create 
and build up the tribute trade system, only for the eunuchs to use the tribute 
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trade in the Ming Dynasty to justify the voyages of Zheng He. After all, was 
China not the Middle Kingdom? Should China not then send envoys and 
powerful military ships to gain acknowledgement of China’s suzerainty? It is 
very apparent then why the Confucians would have considered Zheng He an 
enemy. He was a threat not only to their power but also to their outlook on 
life. It is easy to see why that at the end of the Zheng He’s life, the Confucians 
took such pains to minimize his role in history, and portray his journeys as 
useless expenditures.213 
 
Eunuchs of the Court: Historical Scapegoats and 
Ming Foreign Policy 
 
The eunuch ministers and officials of the Ming Dynasty stand out as a 
clear contrast to the Confucian ministers. The eunuchs had a very clear 
understanding about the importance of soft power and its role in politics. 
While the eunuchs weren’t a group with a common philosophy like the 
Confucians, many eunuchs saw the advantage of foreign commerce and 
trade as opposed to the Confucians, who saw agrarian principles as the best 
economic method for China. The Confucians held the pro-agrarian view 
mostly due to Confucius’s belief that the welfare of the people was considered 
more important than the profit and advantage of the state.214 The eunuchs 
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themselves were organized into twelve directorates, four offices and eight 
bureaus in the final organization of the eunuch bureaucracy.215 They were 
required to wear a special uniform that denoted their rank and position. For 
example, as Professor Tsai explains, the eunuchs of the fourth rank were 
required to wear red robes while eunuchs of the fifth rank and below were 
required to wear blue robes instead.216        
While many eunuch officials seem to have thought ahead in terms of 
economic prosperity, this focus on profit, often cast them as the villains of the 
era. The view of the miserly scheming eunuch is still a powerful trope in 
literature and film in China, even in modern times. There are exceptions such 
as Zheng He, but the historical view of eunuchs until the twentieth century 
had been a rather dim one, not to mention it did not help that many of their 
rivals the Confucians, were the record keepers. Professor Shin-shan Henry 
Tsai in the opening of his book The Eunuchs of the Ming Dynasty gives some 
elaboration on the subject: 
Constantly locked into an adversary position against the eunuchs, these 
highbrow bureaucrat- scholars had a tendency to portray their arch rivals 
as rapacious, wicked and unscrupulous. They attributed all the evil to the 
despised and hateful eunuchs when in fact the cause of the ills of the 
society was the very imperial institution that the Chinese intelligentsia 
gleefully served. The two groups collided, interacted and conflicted 
throughout the Ming period and for nearly 250 years vied with one another 
for control of the imperial apparatus.  Corresponding to such idealism and 
rivalry was the timidity and lack of revolutionary tradition of the Chinese 
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intelligentsia. Consequently, Chinese historians rarely openly and 
persistently criticized the autocratic political system and the tyranny 
spawned from it. Instead, they singled out the eunuchs as the scapegoats 
and refused to treat this lowbrow group as a social and political 
complex.217 
 Professor Tsai introduces a pretty compelling argument that the common 
negative view of the eunuchs throughout Chinese history was made by their 
rivals the Confucians in an effort to discredit them and place all the woes of the 
imperial administration on the shoulders of the eunuchs, while failing to criticize 
the very system that was causing the suffering to the common people. The 
eunuchs indeed had an unfair reputation as schemers and connivers, negative 
traits that were put on them due to the jealousies of their rivals. Jealousy was not 
the only motivation or the hatred against the eunuchs by the Confucians 
however. As previously noted, the pursuit of profit had been condemned by the 
Confucians ever since the time period of Confucius himself and the eunuchs 
would have been seen as “parasitic” to their rivals. The distrust of eunuchs has a 
long historical origin, but a lot of its origins in the Ming Dynasty can be traced 
back to Zhu Yuanzhang the founder of the Ming Dynasty. Professor Tsai 
summarizes Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude towards the eunuchs in this passage, 
citing a historical decree from the Emperor: 
When Zhu Yuanzhang (known as Emperor Hongwu) founded the Ming 
Dynasty in 1368, he was keenly aware of the potentially pernicious 
eunuch problems and decided to limit the number of court eunuchs to 
fewer than 100. Even though he was later to increase the number of place 
servants to more than 400, he reportedly also decreed that no eunuch be 
permitted to learn books or to give advice on political matters. Even the 
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few eunuchs with whom Hongwu might chat were kept dutifully awed and 
were never allowed to discuss politics. In 1384, he had the following 
inscription engraved on an iron tablet in front of the palace: “Eunuchs are 
forbidden to interfere in government affairs. Those who attempt to do so 
will be subjected to capital punishment.” Shortly before his death he 
ordered that the eunuchs should no longer be allowed to wear the uniform 
of government officials and that their rank should not exceed the fourth 
grade. Officials of all departments were forbidden to communicate with 
eunuchs by written documents.218   
Zhu Yuanzhang clearly intended to limit the power of the eunuchs in favor of the 
learned scholar officials. However, according to Professor Robert B. Crawford in 
his 1961 scholarly journal article Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty, Zhu 
Yuanzhang also did not trust the scholar officials much either and allowed the 
eunuchs to exist as a power balance, despite the Emperor’s distrust of them.219 
Despite Zhu Yuanzhang’s dislike for the eunuchs by the time Zhu Di came to 
power in 1402, the position of the eunuchs was greatly enhanced in contrast to 
Zhu Di’s father’s policy. Dr. Tsai suggests that one of the reasons that eunuchs 
like Zheng He were so trusted and put into high position was because of the 
Confucian officials’ tendency to remain loyal to the former Jianwen emperor 
whom Zhu Di had deposed.220 It was under Zhu Di that the eunuchs were for the 
first time given posts outside of the palace and were given a higher diversity of 
positions such as Zheng He’s military career.221 The eunuchs serving in the 
military became one of the positions open to them in the time of Zhu Di’s reign 
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and it was thanks to him so many such as Zheng He were able to excel in the 
military. Professor Tsai recounts how even after Zhu Di’s death the eunuch’s 
found plenty of new opportunity in the military: 
Then in the first moon of 1425, the Admiral Zheng He was named 
shoubei, or the grand commandant of Nanjing: and one month later the 
eunuch Wang An, a Sinicized Jurchen native, was appointed grand 
defender of Gansu, hence the beginning of the eunuch Zhenshou system. 
During the late summer of 1426 two more court eunuchs, Huang Rang 
and Chen Jin, were dispatched to the important Grand Canal city of 
Huaian to suppress a rebellion staged by Prince Gao Xu of Han. In short, 
only two years since the death of Emperor Yongle, the eunuchs had 
become increasingly visible in the management of Ming military affairs.222  
The new opportunities given by Zhu Di during and carried on as policy after his 
death allowed the eunuchs to gain power outside the palace. Even after their fall 
from grace after Zhu Di’s death they managed to be far more powerful and useful 
to the Ming Dynasty then they had during the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang. Another 
gain that the eunuchs were able to achieve, at least during Zhu Di’s time, was the 
eunuchs getting involved in foreign policy, which should be noted was a capital 
offense during Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign.      
In the field of foreign policy in Zhu Di’s time, the conflict between the two 
groups intensified to a huge level and the treasure voyages of Zheng He was the 
perfect catalyst. The treasure voyages re-ignited the debate about the value of 
soft power foreign policy in the service of the Ming Dynasty. The Confucians who 
believed the treasure voyages as being a wasteful burden on the people of 
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China, motivated by profit and the eunuchs who believed that the treasure 
voyages would bring glory and recognition to the emperor’s regime once again 
clashed. The eunuchs, being part of the opposition who helped Zhu Di come to 
power, recognized that the nations of the Indian Ocean as well as China’s 
neighbors could bring legitimacy to a usurper’s regime. This would also fit into 
Nye’s idea of attractiveness and exporting one’s culture, which was a key 
component of the tribute trade system.223 The eunuchs also did not agree with 
the way Zhu Yuanzhang and his Confucian advisers had decided on an agrarian 
economic system in China in order to conform to Confucian ideals, which had an 
unfortunate effect on the Ming economy during the beginning of Zhu Di’s reign. 
This was another motivation for the treasure voyages. The eunuchs were also 
supporters of Zhu Di’s expansionist beliefs and Hilton gives credence to the 
assertion that out of all the motivations for the treasure voyages, Zhu Di was 
probably motivated the most by hoping to surpass his father’s achievements and 
re-opening the Indian Ocean sea trade was the greatest way to enhance his 
prestige.224 Regardless of Zhu Di’s reasons, the already trusted eunuchs had 
much to gain by going along with the emperor’s plans and the profit from the 
numerous trade relations being developed would be an excellent motivator. After 
all, wars cost money and Zhu Di proved to be a very expansionistic emperor.   
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Using charm is an aspect of soft power that Nye has mentioned and 
earlier I connected it to the tribute trade system in this paper. Attractiveness to 
culture as mentioned before, was a deeply embedded part of the tribute trade 
system, while the Confucian advisers saw the tribute trade system as part of the 
family system of filial piety. The eunuchs saw the spread of China’s culture 
almost as an early modern advertising campaign for countries to engage in trade 
with the Ming Dynasty and bring it prestige. For example, the large number of 
foreign ambassadors that would come to visit Zhu Di was significant in improving 
China’s image. These emissaries were so important to the emperor’s image that 
Zhu Di’s grandson Zhu Zhanji the Xuande Emperor, lamented the lack of so 
many grand emissaries coming to the court to pay tribute. This was one of the 
motivations that allowed Zhu Zhanji to authorize Zheng He to go on his final 
voyage.225 Even under the Xuande Emperor who did not fully embrace soft 
power and the treasure voyages, there was a sense that international recognition 
and reaching out to foreign nations had some merit even if they could on 
occasion conflict with the Confucian view of the tribute trade system which 
demanded that other nations come to China instead to display their filial loyalty to 
their “elder brother.”.  
 The eunuch members of the court play a part in Ming political history that 
has been sadly misrepresented by their rivals, a trend that only started seeing a 
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reversal in the twentieth century. The eunuchs by supporting the creation of the 
Ming armada and support for Zhu Di’s expansionistic policies may have created 
a very different China than the one encountered by the British in the 19th century 
during the Opium Wars. Had the Ming kept their advanced navy, by the time of 
the Qing Dynasty would China have had the technological prowess to avoid the 
“century of humiliation”? Perhaps if Zheng He’s legacy had been successful; 
Ming China would have been the great colonial power of latter centuries. 
Fortunately, thanks to scholars such as Professor Tsai, the eunuchs of Imperial 
China are getting a far fairer representation in history and they are slowly being 
portrayed as being competent advisers, military leaders and political force in their 
own right.  
Looking at the experiences of the eunuchs, one must wonder if there are 
any parallels in modern Chinese history with scapegoats being used to further a 
political cause. In modern Chinese history there is a parallel between the 
treatment of the eunuchs as scapegoats and the treatment and demonizing of 
academics and teachers during the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976. Much 
like the eunuch’s there was an “othering” of teachers who were accused by the 
CCP and more specifically The Red Guards, student-led revolutionaries who 
were infamous for their violent “struggle sessions.” Like the eunuchs the 
academics were seen through their teachings as a violation of the social 
orthodoxy, in the case of the teachers being accused of being against the 
socialistic tenants of Marxism, despite many of these teachers being ardent 
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Marxists themselves. Chen Qiang who was a student at these time period shares 
his experiences: 
I have always been a very direct speaker. When the Cultural Revolution 
was starting, I spoke out about what I was seeing. The day after I said 
something, a big-character poster appeared on campus overnight: “Save 
the reactionary speechmaker Chen Qigang.” I was so young. I didn’t 
understand what was going on. Yesterday we were all classmates. How 
come today all of my classmates are my enemies? Everyone started to 
ignore me. I didn’t understand. How could people be like this? Even my 
older sister, who was also at my school, came to find me and asked, 
“What’s wrong with you?” You saw in one night who your real friends 
were. The next day I only had two friends left. One of them is now my wife. 
At the time, no one really knew who was for or against the revolution. It 
was completely out of control. The students brought elderly people into the 
school and beat them. They beat their teachers and principals. There was 
nothing in the way of law. There was a student who was two or three 
years older than me. He beat two elderly people to death with his bare 
hands. No one has talked about this even until this day. We all know who 
did it but that’s the way it is. No one has ever looked into it. These 
occurrences were too common.226 
 The violent reaction against academics and students who did not toe-the line like 
Chen Qiang were ostracized and if unfortunately, even killed. Revisiting the 
conflict between the court eunuchs and the Confucian scholar officials, there are 
similar motivations to suppress perceived “dissidents” and blame the state of the 
country on them. For the eunuchs they were blamed for the economic woes of 
the later Ming and were used as scapegoats. For these teachers, similar 
economic and social consequences were being put upon them, with both 
eunuchs and academics being blamed for bringing misfortune on the country and 
accused of “scheming”. The caricature of the scheming eunuch and the 
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scheming “counterrevolutionary” would also serve in both cases to further vilify 
them. Perhaps the most striking similarity would be the call for the destruction 
and criticism of their works. Zhen He’s story was almost lost to history due to the 
burning of his log books and countless books, political pamphlets and ideas 
written to paper were similarly burned by the Red Guards. Reactionary 
repression against perceived threats to the state seems to be a common theme 
in the history of many countries and China is no exception, nor is there any 
exception in the use of censorship and violence to enforce a state orthodoxy. 
Even today with the Confucius Institute there is a longing to enforce strict 
orthodoxy and obedience to the state and any teachers with views contrary to 
this would be considered problematic. While China seeks to find legitimacy as a 
global power, anything that can possibly threaten the social harmony would be 
seen as detrimental to that goal.      
  
 
The Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: Modern Day Foreign 
Policy and Soft Power 
 
The foreign policy of today’s modern-day PRC is complex and times often 
contradictory, but it has in recent decades fully embraced the theory of soft 
power in international relations. There has been a long and rocky road from the 
era of Mao Zedong to the era of Xi Jinping in the context of the embrace of soft 
power but in recent years it has given rise to China’s standing in the world. It was 
the work of Deng Xiaoping, (1904-1997) Mao’s successor who had worked hard 
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to reform the Chinese economy and could be considered the “founder” of the 
more market friendly People’s Republic that is better known today. The embrace 
of soft power however, has been a slow process that could be traced to the end 
of Deng Xiaoping’s time and encouraged by his successors. The peaceful 
transfer of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997 and the growth of Chinese 
markets in the early twenty-first century have propelled Chinese economic power 
to amazing heights and China is able to contend with even heavyweights such as 
the United States in terms of economic power. Despite Mao Zedong’s support of 
“righteous struggles” around the world such as the Khmer Rouge in the 1970’s in 
Cambodia, the PRC of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have taken a 
“non-interventionist” stance on world affairs. This approach had its genesis even 
during Mao’s time in the 1950’s by China’s agreement with India’s “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (known in India as the Panchsheel Treaty) 
on the 29th of April 1954. The treaty stipulates:    
• Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. 
• Mutual non-aggression. 
• Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 
• Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
• Peaceful co-existence.227    
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The principles that China claims to follow in the Panchsheel Treaty give a 
good look to how China conducts itself in foreign affairs. China will often vote 
against interventionist measures in the UN and currently makes the claim that 
China “will not seek hegemony” as Xi Jinping claimed in 2015 during 
commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's 
War of Resistance against Japanese aggression, according to Xinhua.228 China’s 
efforts in Africa and Southeast Asia in recent years have been based on creating 
mutual co-operation and in Africa’s case have given China access to resources 
and new allies in China’s effort to create a multipolar world in opposition to the 
hegemony of the United States. In this case, China has been very successful in 
offering an alternative form of diplomacy in developing countries offering mutual 
cooperation and benefit by helping developed countries reach new levels of 
development and giving a helping hand to resource extraction (which allows 
China to gain access to resources without resorting to hard power methods). The 
embrace of soft power as a whole, however, has only been seen since Mao’s 
death, indeed the foreign policy of the modern-day PRC may have been met with 
hostility from Mao if he could have been able see it today. Joshua Kurlantzick 
writes in Charm Offensive how the PRC in Mao’s time rejected some soft power 
principles (The Panscheel Treaty notwithstanding): 
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Back in 1949 Beijing also believed it might wield power in the world, 
but not soft power. Triumphing over both the Japanese invaders 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s seemingly superior nationalist forces, Mao 
Tse-tung’s communists thought themselves invincible when they 
established the People’s Republic of China on October 1st 1949. 
After all, the communists had ended the “century of humiliation” for 
China that started with the Opium Wars in the 1840’s and 1860’s 
when Britain and other European powers had crushed China’s 
military and begun a process of national disintegration that 
precipitated the end of the Chinese empire.229  
 Mao’s PRC had strictly followed the “export the revolution abroad” and the 
concept of soft power would have been seen as a “weak” method of wielding 
power abroad, when the Maoist principle was to participate in what Mao deemed 
“liberation movements” in Asia. During the 1950’s, The Great Leap Forward, Mao 
attempted to industrialize the PRC in order to keep up with its enemies and also 
to bring a more modern age into China by remaking society in one generation.230 
One of the more famous actions taken during this time was ordering the creation 
of collectives with the government taking full control of the industrial and 
agricultural sectors of the country, by following the Marxist principle of “seizing 
the means of production.” During the Great Leap Forward, ordinary citizens were 
also expected to collect and melt down possessions of theirs made out of iron in 
order to increase iron production in the country, however due to poor backyard 
furnaces and the materials the iron was smelted from, a very weak form of “pig 
iron” that was nearly useless was produced. After the failure of the Great Leap 
Forward and the blow it gave to Mao’s reputation, the Cultural Revolution was 
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announced with the infamous Red Guard inflicting violence on the population and 
destroying any of the old traditional pillars of society which Mao would have 
considered to be “feudal”. These included such traditions as Confucianism and 
Taoism and other traditional Chinese religions, beliefs, as well as the traditional 
arts and educational institutions.231 During this time period in the foreign policy 
scene, the PRC supported revolutions in Burma and were an early backer of the 
Khmer Rouge. The PRC also cultivated a working relationship with the Soviet 
Union at first but the Sino-Soviet split starting in the 1960’s complicated the 
relationship and led to China and the United States to open relations with each 
other starting with Nixon’s famous visit in 1972.  
Mao died in 1976, which allowed the once disgraced Deng Xiaoping to 
start his return to power. Kurlanztick describes how Deng’s rise to power allowed 
the political changes necessary for China to embrace soft power and create the 
foundation for the modern day economic power that the PRC is today: 
After Mao’s death, Deng returned to power. A savvy political infighter, 
Deng carefully cultivated top members of the Communist Party, and then 
used his backers within the regime to outmaneuver the Chairman’s 
appointed heir, Hua Guofeng. By the early 1980’s Hua conceded that he 
had lost the support of the Party, and Deng essentially took control of 
China, appointing his reform-minded protégés to top positions. And since 
Deng’s restoration, twenty-five years of unparalleled economic growth has 
changed China enormously. The drastic changes in China itself have set 
the stage for China to exert soft power over the world.”232 
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Deng Xiaoping’s rise had given birth to what Kurlantzick termed the 
“charm offensive.” The modern-day PRC to whom Deng can be considered a 
kind of “father” owes its existence to Deng’s reforms and the “charm offensive” 
which has been so important in the administrations of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping is 
thanks to his reforms. The new charm offensive of the twenty first century has 
followed a lot of Joseph’s Nye’s principles of soft power attraction. According to 
Nye, soft power heavily relies on others by finding agreements that aren’t signed 
with threats and payments and instead uses the attractiveness of one’s culture to 
gain cooperation.233 Beijing has learned that lesson well, and in recent decades 
even softened its opinion on traditional Chinese customs and thoughts, like 
Confucianism, in order to present an attractive face to the world. By following the 
principle of attractiveness, the PRC has presented itself to the world as a rapidly 
modernizing nation open to investment and a rising powerhouse in Asia. Beijing 
has also presented itself in its foreign policy as a non-interventionist country on 
the one hand that wishes peace on its neighbors and economic cooperation, but 
also a militarily powerful one that is the top and strongest power in Asia and is 
not to be trifled with. While soft power efforts are a core part of China’s 
diplomacy, the PRC is not afraid to flex its muscles either, with recent events 
such as the South China Sea dispute showing that the PRC is despite its soft 
power stance, not a pacifist country.  
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The PRC State Council issued a white paper in 2015 which shows the 
sharper side of the power spectrum concerning the PRC. What can be learned 
from this paper is that while China flexes its military muscles around its 
neighbors, China still is adamant that this new-found power will not be used for 
hegemonic purposes: 
The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a 
critical stage of reform and development. In their endeavor to realize the 
Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire 
to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue 
development and share prosperity. China’s destiny is vitally interrelated 
with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and stable world would 
provide China with opportunities, while China's peaceful development also 
offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow 
the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of 
peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose 
hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek 
hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force 
in maintaining world peace.234 
Beijing’s foreign policy is very sensitive to clarify its non-hegemonic status. 
This gives China an opportunity to claim non-interventionalist policy as part of its 
diplomacy, but still use its military to protect the “indivisible” nature of China, 
especially regarding fishing rights and territory in the South China Sea, and most 
famously the legal status of Taiwan. The PRC in the future will have to clearly 
decide whether gaining soft power legitimacy in the eyes of the world versus 
maintaining the policy of an inseparable China backed with military force is more 
preferable to China’s legitimacy. These two ideas, self-contradictory at times may 
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cause a crisis of large proportions in the future. If China feels the status quo is 
threatened with Taiwan for example, China may suspend the charm offensive 
and find that a coercive option is preferable.            
The current president of China, Xi Jinping, has also shown an interest in 
reviving Confucianism in the PRC. In the shadow of the Cultural Revolution, 
Confucius was an almost villainized figure in the Chinese world in Mao’s time 
with the exception of Taiwan where a lot of traditional Chinese culture has been 
kept intact due to Taiwan not being affected by the Cultural Revolution on the 
mainland. The “Criticize Confucius” campaign was a large and integral part of the 
Cultural Revolution, so it may be strange seeing the PRC’s leader break with the 
orthodoxy of Mao, yet now several generations removed, and with the Gang of 
Four and the far more orthodox members of the CCP either dead or elderly, there 
has been no easier time than the last decade for China to re-discover its 
traditional culture. This has been a boon for cultural relations and has helped the 
Confucius Institute quite a bit, not only allowing the organization being permitted 
to be named after what Mao would consider a “feudal relic” but also being able to 
present a culture for China to the world that is not only familiar and traditional, but 
one that does not conflict too much with the CCP’s views of what China should 
be either.  
Xi Jinping in his famous anti-corruption campaign has also promoted 
Confucian values as a way to fight corruption. In this section from an article 
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written in TIME Magazine, Xi Jinping is shown to have used Confucius as a 
model for his anti-graft campaign: 
Xi seems to be taking this effort to a whole new level. He appears to be 
employing Confucius as part of a broader program to remake the 
Communist Party and realign the power structure within it. For instance, Xi 
apparently believes a dose of Confucian morality will aid stamping out 
official graft. Over the past year, Xi has launched an aggressive campaign 
against government corruption, likely engineered to both eliminate political 
enemies and clean up an out-of-control bureaucracy that had lost the trust 
of the populace. A high-level Communist Party conference in October 
pledged to strengthen the independence of the judicial system to improve 
rule of law. Confucius is part of Xi’s reform team. For 2,000 years, 
Confucius’s doctrine laid down the code of ethics for proper behavior in 
China — the way of the gentleman — and now Xi seems to be trying to 
recreate those Confucian standards through persistent exhortation.235 
This new embrace of traditional values has worked very well in the foreign 
affairs of China. However, China, while appearing soft on some foreign affairs 
has still projected strength and might showing that they are not a country to be 
pushed around as it was in the nineteenth century when China was at the 
complete mercy of the Western colonial powers during the Opium Wars and the 
Boxer Uprising of the early twentieth century. With the Confucius Institute 
teaching around the world and President Xi using the Sage’s advice to spread 
Chinese ideals around the world and use Confucius as a moral example against 
corruption in China’s government, the ancient Sage has gotten a new lease on 
life in the post-Mao PRC. How ironic it is that the PRC has greatly profited from 
the sage who considered profit to be one of the greatest vice’s humanity can 
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commit. In any case, the old Chinese way of foreign policy and politics has 
merged with the new China and together has presented to the world a country 
that remembers its past and is willing to use that past to further its goals in the 
world, but is also a nation that looks forward and is unwilling to ever submit to the 
West in a humiliating fashion such as in the nineteenth century.  
The need for a cohesive social order in the PRC seems to be the priority 
of the Beijing over that of following a strict communist ideal. Evan Osnos a 
reporter at the New Yorker in his article Confucius Comes Home explains how 
the shift of focus from Marxist ideals to the traditional ideals of Confucius came 
about. Osnos writes: 
It would have been anathema to Chairman Mao, but his heirs have 
 changed their view on revolution. In the eighties, when China set itself in 
 pursuit of prosperity, the Party studied how Confucian values had helped 
 to stabilize other countries in East Asia. Generations of Chinese thinkers 
 had dreamed of finding the optimal recipe for “national studies”—the 
 mixture of philosophy and history that might insulate China from the 
 pressures of Westernization. After the democracy demonstrations at 
 Tiananmen Square in 1989 ended in a violent crackdown, leaders 
 needed an indigenous ideology that might restore the Party’s moral 
 credibility. Top Communists gave speeches at meetings devoted to 
 Confucianism, and state television launched a series about traditional 
 culture intended, it said, “to boost the people’s self-confidence, self-
 respect, and patriotic thought.” In 2002, the Party officially stopped calling 
 itself a “revolutionary party” and adopted the term “Party in Power.” The 
 Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, declared, “Unity and stability are really more 
 important than anything else.” In February, 2005, the Party chief, Hu 
 Jintao, quoted Confucius’ observation that “harmony is something to be 
 cherished.”236 
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The complicated task of having to maintain a one party communist state 
and embracing traditional Confucian values that were once seen as reactionary, 
will be a difficult task for the PRC to balance in the future. The PRC will have to 
choose between coercion or charm to achieve these ends as well. Will it take the 
soft power approach and appeal to a traditionalist cultural and moral system or 
will it use force and coercion to enforce a strict party orthodoxy in the future? 
More likely, Beijing will follow the pragmatic approach of paying lip service to 
Communist ideals and use traditional culture to achieve social harmony so that 
both systems work within one another.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COUNTER THESIS: ZHENG HE THE IMPERIALIST AND 
DEFENSE OF THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE 
 
    The Ming Eunuch Zheng He who commanded  
    fleets that voyaged to Southeast Asia and the  
    Indian Ocean in the early fifteenth century, is  
    today depicted as an “ambassador of   
    friendship” between China and other nations.  
    The present article suggests a revisionist view  
    of the man and his voyages. By examining  
    these “voyages to the western ocean” as  
    simply an element of expansion from the Yong- 
    le Emperor (r.1403-1424), linked to his   
    invasions of Dai Viet and Yunnan we see these 
    “voyages of friendship” as aggressive attempts  
    to create a “Pax Ming” in the Asian maritime  
    realm, with Melaka, Palembang, and   
    Samudera as key elements. We also observe  
    the Ming efforts to dominate the trade routes  
    linking the Middle East and East Asia. The  
    paper concludes with a discussion of the  
    characteristics of colonialism and imperialism  
    and suggests the voyages constituted a   
    maritime proto-colonialism. 
        -Geoff Wade, in the  
        Abstract to The  
        Zheng He voyages:  
        A Reassessment237 
 
    Thus, it is no surprise to find that much of the  
    criticism has come from predominantly English- 
    language speaking countries Whilst both Japan 
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    and India have been concerned about the  
    general influence of Chinese soft power, most  
    of the fiercest resistance to the CI’s has come  
    from the USA, Canada, The UK and Australia.  
    No doubt people are concerned about what  
    they say they are concerned about: political  
    espionage and Falun Gong. Yet evidence for  
    such interference is scant. Whilst CI organizers 
    complain of bureaucratic obstacles and ill- 
    equipped staff, given the number of sites  
    involved and opportunities for political   
    interference, it seems that actual cases of  
    wrongdoing do not match the rhetoric of   
    worry.  
         -Michael  
         Barr in  
         “Who’s  
         Afraid of  
         China?”238 
Counter Thesis Questions and Overview 
 Now that the main arguments regarding historical and current day Chinese 
soft power has been discussed, it will be important to take a look at the criticisms 
regarding the points that have been made earlier in this study. The thesis of this 
paper was that there are parallels between Zheng He’s quest for Ming glory and 
the Confucius Institute and that perceptions of hard and soft power are not always 
the same across cultures as well as easily defined. This paper has also made the 
argument that although there are some hard-power elements to the Zheng He 
voyages including military action, the general perception of the voyages as being 
mostly peaceful and diplomatic voyages, with the re-establishment of the tribute 
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trade system that had been in place for centuries as its main goal. However, it 
would be unwise to ignore a rather imperialist nature to the voyages and that must 
be addressed. Regarding modern soft power in China, this paper uses the 
Confucius Institute as an example of soft power being used by the PRC, arguing 
that the CI’s are often used to push an idea of Chinese culture that is acceptable 
by Beijing, and also that they present a threat to academic freedom as many 
academics such as Marshall Sahlins have proposed. But what are the criticisms of 
this point of view? Are the CI’s really an effort to subvert academic freedom in the 
west and teach state propaganda, or can many of the negative incidents 
concerning the Confucius Institute be explained by poorly trained staffed and a 
“fear” of China’s rise as Michael Barr suggests. For example, author Michael Barr 
in Who’s Afraid of China: The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power writes: 
In short, CI’s are physical representations of China’s will to promote its 
culture to the world. They are in effect China’s most comprehensive 
exercise of soft power to date. And they raise numerous issues, none 
more intriguing than this: with over 1 billion native speakers, will the 
spread of Chinese as a second language eventually unseat English as the 
world’s language of choice?239   
Barr raises an interesting point that should be addressed: that of Sinophobia. 
Sinophobia can be described as an irrational fear of China, Chinese culture and 
Chinese people either local or abroad. The element of Sinophobia in the context 
of the arguments regarding the Confucius Institute are in effect the “elephant in 
the room” so to speak regarding the criticism of the Confucius Institute. The fear 
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of Beijing’s rise especially in the United States is nothing new and can be traced 
back to the colonialism during the nineteenth century also known as China’s 
“Century of Humiliation”. In more modern times, there has been vast Sinophobia 
in the United States and other western countries due to the Cold War and this 
form of Sinophobia has often been mixed with anti-communist sentiment as well.  
In this atmosphere of Sinophobia, there can be a serious case of 
underreporting the good that the Confucius Institute does around world. For 
example, as recent as September 7th 2017, The Nation the university newspaper 
of the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Nigeria, announced that sixty four of its 
students have been granted government scholarships from the PRC to study in 
various universities around China, giving these students numerous opportunities 
that they may have been denied if it were not for the Confucius Institute’s 
language programs at their university.240 This story is part of the charm 
component of soft power that China has been attempting to fulfill in resource-rich 
Africa, and the Confucius Institute has played a large role in education in 
numerous secondary schools and universities in African nations. Aside from 
concerns of Sinophobia, there is also the phenomenon of selling fear in many 
publications that offer news about the Confucius Institute. In the modern day with 
the internet dominating much of news reporting in the last few decades, the rise 
of the problem of “clickbait” or articles using sensational and on occasion 
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misleading headlines, can compound the problem of underreporting positive 
stories in favor of negative ones. After all, “Confucius Institute accused of 
espionage and curtailing academic freedom” makes a more sensational headline 
(and more page views) than “The Confucius Institute has spread Chinese 
language proficiently in Africa considerably.” While it is important to look critically 
at the Confucius Institute and what the organizations soft power effort’s 
consequences have been regarding academic freedom and censorship, it would 
also be academically dishonest to ignore the boon the Confucius Institute has 
also been on impoverished nations and bringing opportunities to their citizens. 
Returning to the dangers of propaganda and historical revisionism, it is also 
important to investigate the rather “sanitized” version of Zheng He’s voyages that 
the PRC is eager to present to the world, showing Zheng He as a benevolent and 
kind explorer and adventurer compared to that of his European counterparts.241 
There is a danger of presenting Zheng He as a wholly benevolent figure by the 
government of the PRC that borders on straight revisionism rather than 
presenting Zheng He as a complex figure who used mainly soft, but on occasion 
hard power to achieve his objectives in building a trade empire in the South 
China Sea and Indian Ocean. 
In order to properly provide a counter thesis for this paper’s points, a 
series of questions will be presented that will be used to criticize this study’s main 
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points. They will be divided up into two categories: historical soft power which will 
cover the Treasure Voyages and modern soft power which will cover the 
Confucius Institute. The questions will serve to challenge the thesis of this paper 
and in the final section of this chapter I will attempt to refute them, making the 
arguments in favor of the thesis much more convincing and showing that they 
can hold up under scrutiny. 
Historical soft power counter thesis questions 
•  Zheng He’s voyages in popular culture and imagination in the 21st 
century have been images of a heroic explorer who brought 
Chinese culture to numerous nations in the area of the Indian 
Ocean, Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. In modern times, the 
government of the PRC has often presented Zheng He in this light. 
Is this more a form of propaganda or is some truth in this point of 
view? Was Zheng He engaging in a form of imperialism or were 
these mostly soft power actions with the occasional use of hard 
power? 
•  In regard to the actions of Zheng He in the Civil War in Ceylon, 
could this be seen as a threat to the peaceful narrative of Zheng 
He’s voyages?  
• Is there a connection between the Treasure Voyages and Zhu Di’s 
invasion of Dai Viet? Is there evidence that the Treasure Voyages 
may have been part of a grander empire building strategy by Zhu 
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Di? Could the Treasure voyages been an attempt to refill the state 
treasury through trade to prepare for more aggressive actions 
against Ming China’s neighbors? 
• Are there any modern-day examples of the PRC using the Zheng 
He story to justify acquisition of territory through historical claims? 
Modern Soft Power Questions 
• Could the criticisms against the Confucius Institute be rooted in 
Sinophobia? 
• Are there reasons other than Sinophobia for the lack of positive 
stories of the Confucius Institute’s positive contributions? Could this 
be a problem with so-called “clickbait” articles? 
• Do the accusations of violating academic freedom have any 
validity? Is there any hard evidence of this occurring? 
 
Zheng He and Imperialism 
Zheng He as portrayed in the modern-day PRC has within the last few 
decades been seen as a national hero and both a symbol of Ming China’s 
technological prowess and “benevolence” in foreign affairs. The PRC has 
significant motivation to portray Zheng He as a sort of soft power superhero as it 
fits in with Beijing’s policy for the South China Sea and relations with African 
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nations. According to Michael Barr, former Chinese president Hu Jintao at the 
University of Pretoria in South Africa claimed: 
Six hundred years ago, Zheng He, a famed Chinese navigator of the Ming 
Dynasty, headed a large convoy which sailed across the ocean and 
reached the east coast of Africa four times. They brought to the African 
people a message of peace and goodwill, not swords, guns, plunder or 
slavery. For more than one hundred years in China’s modern history, the 
Chinese people were subjected to colonial aggression and oppression by 
foreign powers and went through similar suffering and agony that the 
majority of African countries endured.242 
Barr also adds that not only is Zheng He being used in a soft power 
superhero way in this passage, but also Hu Jintao is bringing up China’s “century 
of humiliation” that had its genesis in the opium wars of the nineteenth-century. 
He also goes on to explain that by using Zheng He in this manner, Hu Jintao was 
indicating that China’s ambitions in the region will not only be peaceful but will 
also be non-aggressive unlike that of the western nations which took advantage 
of Africa during colonialism. This shows that Beijing in recent decades has 
realized the propaganda value that a sanitized Zheng He story can bring, and 
portraying Zheng He as a peaceful explorer who visited Africa for fully peaceful 
purposes gives Beijing a PR campaign that is perfect for portraying the PRC as a 
non-expansionist power that is only interesting in spreading culture and trade 
relationships and who better than Zheng He is there to act as a historical poster 
boy for future policy? 
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Geoff Wade in The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment counters the 
theory that Ming China in this time period was completely peaceful. Indeed, as 
we read in previous chapters, the emperor whom Zheng He served, the Yongle 
Emperor Zhu Di, was one of the most expansionistic in the history of Ming China. 
While Zheng He was sailing in the Indian Ocean, Zhu Di was participating in the 
invasion of the nation of Dai-Viet which is located in modern day Vietnam. In his 
article Wade describes the planning and troop numbers Zhu Di used to invade 
the neighboring country: 
In 1406 in an effort to increase Ming influence and power in Dai Viet (the 
polity known to the Ming as An-An) The Yongle Emperor attempted to 
send a puppet ruler named Chen Tian-ping (Tran Thien Binh) into that 
polity. Tran Thien Binh was killed as he proceeded into the country. This 
killing by the Vietnamese became the immediate pretext for Yong-le to 
launch a huge invasion of the polity, a move obviously well planned before 
the event. He appointed senior generals, sea crossing commanders, 
firearms commanders, rapid-attack commanders, and Cavalry 
commanders. On a day equivalent to July 30th 1406, the boat-borne forces 
set sail from Nanjing. They landed in southern China and joined with other 
forces in the border province of Guang-xi. These forces included 95,000 
troops from the provinces of Zhe-jiang, Jiang-xi, Guang-dong, Guang-xi 
and Hu-guang, a further 10,000 cavalry and various infantry troops from 
other guards, and 30,000 native troops from Guang-xi. An additional 
75,000 cavalry and troops were deployed from Yun-nan, Gui-zhou and Si-
chuan. Guang-xi and Yu-nan provinces had been ordered to supply 
20,000 shi243 of grain to feed the expeditionary army, and Yu-nan was to 
arrange 10,000 troops as reinforcements. The official account tells us that 
in all, some 800,000 troops were mobilized for the Ming for this 
expedition.244   
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Judging from the number of troops involved, (not to mention the sacrificial 
lamb of Tran Thien Binh to serve as casus beli for the invasion) this was a 
planned and coordinated effort on the part of Zhu Di to annex Dai Viet in a 
method that can only be explained as expansionism and Imperialism. As for 
Zheng He himself there were notable events that could be indeed considered 
Imperialism or as Wade puts it, proto-Imperialism such as the conflict with 
Ceylon.245 It is also important to consider that the Treasure Voyages and the 
invasion of Dai Viet were happening at the same time and likely were related one 
another. Judging from the number of troops needed for Zhu Di’s invasion as 
presented by Wade, the Treasure Voyages likely had another purpose besides 
giving Zhu Di legitimacy and re-establishing Chinese hegemony in the Indian 
Ocean, the replenishment of the treasury was likely a huge motivator for the 
voyages. After all, invading a nation with nearly a million troops is a costly 
expenditure on any state’s treasury not to mention he costs the subsequent 
occupation would incur. Zheng He’s fleet would also be valuable as a scouting 
fleet looking for weaknesses in government and military defenses of possible 
future conquests. Even the Imperial tribute trade system itself can be seen as a 
form of Imperialism albeit that of a much softer tone. A client state is still 
subservient to the foreign policy and wishes of its “protector” in many cases. Zhu 
                                                          
245 See Chapter 2 for the full narrative on the conflict between Ceylon and Zheng 
He’s fleet. It suffices to say that this is probably the strongest argument against 
the peaceful narrative of Zheng He’s voyages due to the hard power nature of 
the conflict and is dissimilar to Zheng He’s more common method of collecting 
tribute following the tribute trade system. 
183 
 
Di for his part has plenty of historical evidence that indicates that he had a grand 
expansionist strategy for much of China’s neighbors. Levathes mentions that Zhu 
Di had an increased interest in improving relations with Siam as part of the Ming 
policy of “fragmentation of the barbarians” effetely attempting to divide and 
conquer in way that Caesar in Gaul could have easily recognized.  
It is clear there was a military nature to the treasure fleet that is 
unsurprising due to being a part of a regime under an expansionistic emperor. So 
indeed, there is an argument to be made that legitimizes the first and third of the 
questions concerning Zheng He at the beginning of this section. There is 
evidence as shown by Levathes and Wade that there may have been a 
connection between the Treasure Voyages and Zhu Di’s annexation of Dai Viet 
as well as using Zheng He as a way to use the fleet as a scouting fleet as much 
as a trade armada. Furthermore, in the context of the first question, there does 
indeed seem to be an attempt by Beijing to offer a cleaner version of Zheng He 
as a form of PR spokesman from the distant past. Much of this line of thinking is 
as evidence has shown rooted both in China’s conflict with Imperialistic powers in 
the 19th century, as well as presenting Beijing itself as an alternative trade 
partner than the United States and the European Union. With Zheng He China 
indeed has a sufficient symbol to present an effective form of propaganda in the 
figure of Zheng He. 
Concerning the question regarding the invasion of Ceylon being a proto-
imperialist venture on the part of Zheng He, there is also considerable evidence 
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to support this point of view. As explained in Chapter 2, Zheng He had invaded 
the portion of the kingdom ruled by the usurper Alaggakonora during 
Alaggakonora’s civil war against the legitimate Tamil rulers of Gampola and 
Kotte. During Zheng He’s attack on Alaggakonora’s capital city, Zheng He 
managed to capture the ruler and bring him back to Nanjing to be judged by Zhu 
Di. While from the point of view of many in Ceylon, Alaggakonora may not have 
been a legitimate ruler, many still saw him as a warrior hero who resisted the 
Chinese incursion into Ceylon.  
The kidnapping of Alagakkonora despite his supposed illegitimacy, could 
definitely be seen as aggressive move bordering on Imperialism. While the 
Chinese elected not to directly rule Ceylon, they still interfered in a civil war which 
was not theirs and the next ruler of Alakeswara’s kingdom, legitimate or not, was 
still decided by Zhu Di and not the people of Ceylon. Wade also has a similar 
description for Zheng He’s attack on Ceylon: 
Perhaps the most telling as to the nature of the eunuch-led maritime 
voyages was the military invasion of Sri Lanka,246 the capture of a local 
ruler, and his being carried back to the Ming court in modern Nan-Jing in 
1411. Zheng, He invaded the royal city, captured the king, destroyed his 
military, and carried the king and his family members back to court. Some 
say that the Tooth Relic of the Buddha was taken, but there are no 
contemporary records that support this. As happened in similar scenarios 
in Yun-nan, the Ming appointed a puppet ruler to replace the king, 
presumably to act in ways beneficial to the Ming. The Chinese troops who 
returned from the expedition to Sri Lanka were rewarded in the same 
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manner and equivalent levels to those forces who invaded Dai Viet in 
1406, suggesting similar aims of the forces.247    
Wade and Levathes both seem to argue in favor that the attack on Ceylon 
was an aggressive move. Levathes does however note that on Zheng He’s initial 
arrival, that Alakeswara did attempt to rob Zheng He of the treasure ship’s loads 
of gold and precious materials and that was the catalyst for the battle.248 
However using this as an example to justify a subsequently bloody invasion 
followed by the kidnapping and forced abdication of a state’s ruler seems 
somewhat dubious although admittedly even in modern times a forceful change 
of governance is considered a legitimate consequence of winning a war. The 
heart of the issue of this example is that it does poke a rather large hole in the 
narrative of Beijing’s version of Zheng He that the PRC sells to foreign 
audiences. Even in the Chinese narrative of the event, Zheng He’s actions can 
be seen as aggressive and there were further examples of aggressive hard 
power behavior in Java as well in 1407.249 250 Indeed, the hard power nature of 
some of Zheng He’s action cannot be denied. The real question is however, what 
the general nature of the treasure voyages were. There were elements of both 
traditionally defined Imperialism as described by Wade in regard to Ceylon and 
Java and the pirate suppression campaign of Zheng He’s first journey. However, 
many of the traditionally expansionist actions taken Zhu Di were land based in 
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Vietnam whereas with the exception of Ceylon and Java were committed in the 
context of the Chinese tribute trade system which predated Zhu Di’s reign by 
centuries and was practiced by numerous other dynasties. 
The final question concerning Zheng He’s actions is related more to recent 
events. The South China Sea dispute and the Daimyo/Sentamu Island dispute 
between China, Japan and Korea respectively has taken an interesting turn in 
recent times. In many of the PRC’s disputes regarding overseas territory in 
neighboring sea regions, Zheng He’s journeys have in recent decades been used 
in the South China Sea dispute by Beijing to give historical “precedence” to their 
territorial claims as well as justifying the use of the Chinese Navy to patrol in the 
area. Barr gives a good description and summary of these recent developments 
in the last decade: 
The South China Sea boundaries are an especially problematic issue 
since there are overlapping unilateral claims to sovereignty over an 
assortment of semi-submerged islands. Eight states claim title to these 
South China Sea islands, which are important for several reasons; their 
position in the midst of strategically important commercial and military sea 
lanes, their utility for nearby fishing grounds and, last but not least, their 
supply of mineral resources. The islands are in fact one reason why 
Beijing has pushed the Zheng narrative in Southeast Asia. However, it’s a 
mixed message, for Zheng’s greatest political asset to the Ming was his 
role in re-establishing the tributary system of relations. Whilst Zheng may 
have achieved this through diplomacy and gift-giving, his large and well-
manned armada must have helped awe-would-be enemies into 
agreement. As China would have it, the tributary was premised on 
unequal social relationships, but the relationship was like that between a 
father and son; unequal but benign.251  
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Barr brings up an interesting point that while using the Zheng He story as 
a way to lay claim to uninhabited islands; such claims can prove to be a double-
edged sword to Beijing where the uncomfortable subject of the tribute trade 
system is brought up. While the PRC’s official explanation for the tribute trade 
system may seem outwardly benign, there is still an element of imperialism in it 
as even Barr admits is based on an unequal relationship in terms of trade treaties 
and implied submission. This is an interesting point to criticize and lay claims of 
hypocrisy on the part of the Chinese government, since the root of China’s 
“century of humiliation” was rooted in the unequal trade treaties forced upon 
China by European powers and the United States. Nevertheless, Zheng He’s 
journeys still have given China an effective PR spokesman in Zheng He showing 
a benign man who did not loot and plunder but instead brought trade and 
prosperity to the region, as well as using history for China to lay claim on territory 
in the South China Sea, which not coincidently have strategic military and 
economic value due to their geographic location. 
The BBC reported in 2015 that China has claimed to be the “historical 
owners” of the South China Sea since “ancient times” and the article mentions 
that with the exception of Zheng He’s voyages, that China’s historical claim was 
dubious at best due to China for most of its history having trouble controlling 
China’s own coastlines.252 Furthermore, in 2013 Professor Mohan Malik at The 
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Diplomat reported that a noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring claims that China 
was a relative latecomer in the region as a maritime power historically. Malik 
claims that most of China’s overseas claims can at best be traced back to Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s Nationalist regime and that if there is any people who had a historical 
maritime claim to the region it was Malayo-Polynesian peoples who had traded in 
the era for centuries.253 There is considerable evidence therefore that Beijing’s 
claim on the regions and using Zheng He as an effective form of propaganda 
may not have the strongest amount of evidence to back it up, despite the claims 
of China’s government. Therefore, while Beijing may currently be using Zheng 
He as PR for the time being, this method may prove more problematic to 
Beijing’s ambitions due to the uncomfortable historical questions it brings up 
when Zheng He’s actions are put under scrutiny combined with the relatively 
short time period Ming China held hegemony over the region compared to that of 
other nations and peoples. Going back to the question of whether Zheng He’s 
actions can be considered Imperialism, the hard power nature of several 
incidents in his story cannot be historically denied. The real question is what was 
the nature of Zheng He’s actions in terms of soft and hard power in general: hard 
and soft? In the final section of this chapter I will argue for the former rather than 
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the latter while still recognizing that Zheng He was known to engage in hard 
power politics despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary. 
 
In Defense of the Confucius Institute: Sinophobia 
and Media Bias 
 
The Confucius Institute certainly has not been a stranger to controversy in 
recent years. While it is hard to justify blatant attempts at suppressing academic 
freedom or restricting the hiring of teachers on religious grounds, such as 
adherents to the Falun Gong movement.254 However in this era of “fake news” 
and “clickbait” it is also common for mass-hysteria and xenophobia to also be 
mobilized as a weapon against the Confucius Institute. As reprinted by Michael 
Barr, an article in the Christian Science Monitor uses a combination of both 
sinophobia and mass-hysteria to create a moral panic about the Confucius 
Institute: 
Let us suppose that a cruel, tyrannical and repressive foreign government 
offered to pay for American teens to study its national language in our 
schools. Would you take the deal? Actually, we already have. Starting this 
fall, American high school students will be able to take an Advanced 
Placement (AP) course in “Chinese Language and Culture.” Developing 
the course and exam cost the College Board, which runs the AP Program, 
about [US]$1.4 million. And half that sum was picked up by-you guessed 
it- the People’s Republic of China. That’s right. The same regime that has 
brought us public executions, forced labor camps, and Internet censors 
will soon be funding a language and culture class near you.255 
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The article touches upon to common phobias: both the Sino phobic 
“othering” of China and playing on the moral fear of “corrupting the youth.” If the 
Christian Science Monitor is to be believed, it would seem that Chairman Mao 
never died and is indeed still ruling China. While there are valid fears presented 
in this article, such as being suspicious of a foreign government picking up the 
tab for funding of Chinese language courses, the article for the most part can be 
dismissed as fear mongering. China is presented as a nefarious nation that is 
plotting to corrupt the youth with its communist ideology and “repressive values” 
in a conspiratorial way that plays on the xenophobic tendencies that this article’s 
target audience is aiming for. The title: Beware China’s Role in Us Chinese 
Classes also has some Sino phobic undertones, implying China in itself is 
something to be feared when it comes to influencing education. Michael Barr also 
lists an incident that occurred in the Los Angeles suburb of Hacienda Heights, 
which has an unfortunate history of racial tensions between the white population 
and more recently arrived Chinese immigrants 
By 2008, after decades of Chinese immigration into the region, Asians 
 made up more than a third of the population, the same proportion as the 
 city’s non-Hispanic whites. The area’s ethnic and racial make-up provided 
 a backdrop to the CI dispute as ethnic Chinese comprised the majority of 
 the school board whilst the student body was overwhelmingly Hispanic. 
 Armed with signs that read “America, Not Confucius’ opponents vowed to 
 unseat the four members of the five-person board who voted to accept the 
 Hanan’s offer. One letter to the paper commented, “China already owns 
 and [has] changed most of the shopping centers in Hacienda Heights. Do 
 we really want them to change our minds too?256 
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The Hacienda Heights incident where a mostly Asian school board 
accepted Hanan’s offer also show’s some of the simmering racial tension that 
also lies at the heart of Sino phobic sentiment. For example, if it were the Goethe 
Institute teaching German or the Académie Francoise teaching French in 
Hacienda Heights would have there been as much an outcry by the mostly white 
members of the community? Bobby Faker, one the residents of Hacienda 
Heights was quoted by Jacob Adelman reporting for the San Diego Union-
Tribune as saying ““These children have young brains that are very malleable 
and they can be indoctrinated with things that America would not like.”257 
Franker’s comment mixes both Sino phobic sentiment and Cold War anti-
communist rhetoric against China and the Confucius Institute while also 
subscribing the to the justification of protection of children’s minds, a common 
justification for moral panic. The Confucius Institute in the case of Hacienda 
Heights had no known controversies with the exception of the school board 
granting their funding for a language program that was in dire need of it. 
According to the Los Angeles Times, Norman Hsu, a longtime school board 
member claimed he Heights had personally reviewed all of the teaching materials 
supplied from Hanban and nothing controversial or subversive to PRC interests 
was found. Furthermore, all of the teaching materials were also available for 
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public inspection.258 In the case of Hacienda Heights, there was no hard-
documented evidence of any wrongdoing or subversion the Confucius Institute 
and indeed, it would seem that the Confucius Institute was being used as a 
scapegoat for the Sino phobic beliefs of certain members of the Hacienda 
Heights community. The Hacienda Heights controversy is a very good example 
of Sino phobic sentiment being used as criticism of the Confucius Institute. It is 
clear that it was the racial tensions of the community that had caused the 
controversy and unlike the controversy surrounding the University of Chicago, it 
is clear that the Confucius Institute was the victim in this situation. Therefore, 
there is evidence that Sinophobia or at least Xenophobia is used on occasion to 
criticize the Confucius Institute, even when there are cases that the Confucius 
Institute can be shown to have not done anything unethical. 
Another defense for the Confucius Institute’s position is the issue of media 
bias, namely the phenomenon of fake news and clickbait articles. Clickbait is 
defined by Merriam-Webster as: “something (such as a headline) designed to 
make readers want to click on a hyperlink especially when the link leads to 
content of dubious value or interest.”259 Fake news is a phenomenon where 
newspapers print clearly false or at minimum misleading new stories that wish to 
push a certain agenda, often that of political or cultural points of view. Fake news 
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became a part of popular discussion in the United States during the 2016 
election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, with both the left and the 
rightwing sectors of politics accusing the other of engaging in the practice of fake 
news. When it comes to newspaper pieces that are critical of the Confucius 
Institute, there are cases when clickbait sounding articles have been used in 
ways that might suggest an alternate agenda. For example, Hele C. Dale writing 
for rightwing online newspaper Breitbart wrote an opinion piece on Chinese soft 
power on August 1 2010 titled: Red Alert: China Is Taking Over… With PR. The 
article itself is very short and brings nothing but commonly known information 
such as the statistics on the size of the Confucius Institute and the amount of 
money Beijing has spent on PR efforts.260 The sensational title, which would 
seem more appropriate for a shocking scoop rather than a rather basic list of 
statistics that are commonly known, is intended to generate clicks due to ad 
revenue even though the value of the piece is dubious at best. 
Fake news on the other hand, can be a bit tricky being able to prove, as 
the story itself would normally have to be proven false. Since intent is hard to 
prove and many Fake News stories often use some kernels of truth to give 
credence to a story, one has to dig deep to avoid stories that outright lie or 
misinterpret truth. A common tactic with a fake news stories is to twist the truth 
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often by using a clickbait title and misrepresenting a fact, statistic or interview 
with a person to suit a particular agenda. The Confucius Institute for reasons 
legitimate and illegitimate have made plenty of enemies both inside and outside 
academia and politics and many would have ample reason to slander or discredit 
them. It is therefore important to take a look at who is criticizing the Confucius 
Institute and for what reasons. For example, Marshall Shalin’s may have some 
legitimate criticisms of the Confucius Institute and its practices but that also does 
not mean that he and other critics of the Confucius Institute are free from 
personal bias. News stories such as the Hacienda Heights debacle can be blown 
out of proportion, and the Confucius Institute has proven to be a perfect 
scapegoat for those who may fear and hate China for Sino phobic reasons rather 
than concerns regarding academic bullying 
 
Response to Counter Thesis: An Appeal to the Middle Ground 
Now that the criticisms regarding my position have been established, it 
would be prudent to perhaps find a middle ground between criticism of Zheng He 
and the Confucius Institute. In regard to Zheng He following certain practices that 
in the modern day would be considered Imperialist in modern day definitions of 
the term, it is also important to look at the tribute trade system as a system as a 
system of “soft power” Imperialism rather than the traditional “gunboat diplomacy” 
of 19th century European powers (although admittedly the Ceylon intervention 
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could also be seen as analogous to this concept as well). Modern day Chinese 
diplomacy also has some relation to Ming and Qing China’s soft power tributary 
systems as well. Eric Tea Chow reporting for the New York Times in his article: 
Paying tribute to Beijing: An ancient model for China's new power compares 
modern day Chinese soft power diplomacy to the diplomacy of the Ming tribute 
trade system. Chow defines the tribute trade system by pointing out its three 
cardinal points:  
First, China considered itself the "central heart" of the region; this tributary 
system assured China of its overall security environment. Second, to 
ensure its internal stability and prosperity, China needed a stable 
environment immediately surrounding the Middle Kingdom. Third, the 
Chinese emperor would in principle give more favors to tributary states or 
kingdoms than he received from them; for this generosity, the emperor 
obtained their respect and goodwill.261 
As Chow shows, there is an idea “reciprocity” in the traditional tribute trade 
model. Namely, the Emperor would “reward” his client states by giving gifts and 
favors to its emissaries and better trade deals for acknowledgement of China as 
the center of the world as it was after all in Chinese thought the “Middle 
Kingdom”. While this would seem more like hard power imperialism in the 
modern world, in its time period it could be considered a “softer” approach to 
international diplomacy. It is also important to consider that this relatively 
peaceful form soft power was being developed and implemented during the time 
of Zhu Di, who as we have seen through his invasions of Champa and Dai Viet 
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was no stranger to using hard power means to achieve his goals and with Zheng 
He’s fleet he certainly had the naval power to enforce a hard power stance with 
China’s neighbors. Chow points out in his article that the PRC still follows this 
form of reciprocity and follows the concept “giving more and taking less.” As a 
long-term strategy this would help increase China’s “brand” internationally giving 
the PRC prestige and being seen as “generous” as a country promoting its 
“brand” is an important aspect of Nye’s definition of soft power.262  
This helps shed a bit of light on the “Imperialism” argument put forward by 
Wade. A middle-ground approach to Zheng He’s actions may be the last 
problematic way to approach the subject of Zheng He’s journeys. The conflict 
with Alakeswara for example has two very different narrations from the Ming 
point of view regarding Zheng He’s actions and that of the Singhalese point of 
view. The Ming saw themselves as being exasperated by the constant insult of a 
“rouge state” and took military action to save face and honor the emperor. The 
Singhalese point of view from records of the time period portray Alakeswara as a 
national hero who fought and was defeated defending the honor of his 
kingdom.263 Both narratives may have bits of truth in it but both have their biases 
as well as both of these narratives are meant to defend the national honor of 
China and Ceylon. A non-problematic position to take on Zheng He’s position is 
somewhere between the praises of Levathes and Dryer and the condemnations 
                                                          
262 Nye, Soft Power, 90. 
263 Levathes, When China Rules the Seas, 116. 
197 
 
of Wade: That Zheng He was a product of his time and compared to later 
explorers he practiced soft power diplomacy far more often than that of hard 
power, but that does not mean he did not take hard power stance when 
necessary. However, it is also important not to buy into the narrative of a wholly 
peaceful Zheng He as promoted by the PRC. Zheng He may not have been an 
“imperialist” by the traditional definition, but the military nature of his explorations 
cannot be ignored either, despite them being closer to soft power ventures than 
military operations.   
When it comes to the controversy surrounding the Confucius Institute 
there are a lot of examples to show that the Confucius Institute has a more 
dubious legitimacy. While indeed there have been situations where the Confucius 
Institute has been a victim of discrimination due to racial tensions in Hacienda 
Heights, there is a bit of irony and hypocrisy on the part of the Confucius Institute 
to claim discrimination when the organization itself has been known to use 
discriminatory hiring practices itself. One of the leading reasons for Marshall 
Shalins and the American Association of University Professor’s criticism of the 
Confucius Institute was the University of Chicago being complicit in the 
Confucius Institute’s discriminatory hiring practices. Sahlins gives evidence of 
this: 
Claims by officials of the Confucius Institute and the Center for East Asian 
Studies that the University of Chicago fully controls the hiring process of 
CI teachers from China turn out to be misleading. According to the 
Chicago faculty member in charge of engaging the Chinese teachers, 
Hanban recommends the candidate-whose eligibility is thereby limited by 
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PRC laws and custom: no Falun Gong, human rights advocates, etc.-and 
no teachers recommended by Hanban have been rejected by the 
university.264 
Sahlins comments that this is proof that the University of Chicago before 
the cancellation of the contract with the Confucius Institute, was complicit in the 
PRC’s discriminatory hiring despite rules and regulations of the University 
prohibiting such. McMaster University in Canada also cancelled their association 
with Hanban for similar reasons.265 The overall point of these examples is to 
show that while there have been incidents where the Confucius Institute has 
been unfairly targeted, there are plenty of questionable incidents that give the 
Confucius Institute deserved scrutiny. A proper middle ground approach to this 
problem would be not to assume any intentional malice from the Confucius 
Institute and maybe look at it from a point of view of teacher training and 
misunderstanding of cultural norms. Perhaps if Confucius Institute teachers were 
better trained and educated on laws that govern discrimination in universities in 
the US and Canada for example, incidents such as those at McMaster and the 
University of Chicago may not have happened. Another possible solution to the 
problem of discriminatory hiring would be for Universities to come to an 
agreement with Hanban that allows the universities to have a say over the 
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Hanban hiring practices when Hanban sends its teachers to the university in 
question. 
Overall, it is important to see the Confucius Institute as being an 
instrument of PRC soft power. Therefore, the Confucius Institute has every 
reason to suppress bad press and promote good press as they for better or 
worse are unofficial “diplomats” of the PRC, in some cases being the only 
exposure an American student may have with PRC representatives in a 
classroom setting. While it has accomplished the “brand” recognition that is 
important to Nye’s theory of soft power, it falls short in its charm offensive when 
running into the rules and regulations governing universities in North America, 
Europe and Australia. If the Confucius Institute hopes to succeed in North 
America, arrangements will have to be made to make sure that academic 
freedom and fair hiring practices are to be followed. It is important not to 
demonize the Confucius Institute but that does not mean they should be 
pandered to either. The middle ground approach therefore is the most 
constructive way to view criticism of the Confucius Institute, and in the case of 
China may prove a boon to the nation as it attempts to find legitimacy in its role 
as a future global power 
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CHAPTER SIX  
THE FUTURE OF SOFT POWER STUDIES 
 
    Political leaders have long understood that  
    power comes from attraction. If I can get you to 
    what I want, then I do not have to use carrots  
    and sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders  
    in authoritarian countries can use coercion and 
    issue commands, politicians in  democracies  
    have to rely more on a combination of   
    inducement or attraction. Soft power is a staple 
    of daily democratic politics. The ability to  
    establish preferences tends to be associated  
    with intangible assets such as attractive   
    personality, culture, political    
    values and institutions, and polices that are  
    seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If  
    a leader represents values that others want to  
    follow, it will cost less to lead. 
         -Joseph Nye  
          In “Soft Power”266 
 
    In a short period of time, Beijing has proven  
    that it can shift its foreign policy quickly and  
    woo the world, often focusing on countries  
    America has alienated. China    
    has drastically changed its image in many  
    parts of the world from dangerous to benign. It  
    may already be the  preeminent power in parts  
    of Asia, and it could develop China-centered  
    spheres of influence in other parts of the globe, 
    like Central Asia or Africa. American allies like  
    Australia have moved closer to Beijing. 
        -Joshua Kurlantzick   
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                                                                                In “Charm   
        Offensive”267 
 
The Importance of the Study of Soft Power in Medieval  
and Modern China 
 
Now that the arguments for the connection between Ming and Modern 
China’s practice of soft power has been established, it is important to show why 
that the points raised in this study are important and what use this study will have 
on future students of Chinese history and politics. Why for example, does 
studying Zheng He’s life have any value besides what has been established in 
the paper? What use is there in studying the soft power nature of the Confucius 
Institute as a component of a larger soft power strategy of the PRC? The 
importance of studying soft power as a citizen of the United States or any other 
country is important in understanding international politics. In a time where 
isolationism is gaining traction in the United States today, there is a clear and 
present danger that the United States may find itself in a hard situation where the 
US ignores the value of soft power and China fills the soft power vacuum. Even 
ignoring geopolitical considerations for the United States, students of both 
Chinese history and Chinese politics will find a lot of value in the study of 
historical and modern soft power in China. The People’s Republic of China is 
today a growing economy with an incredible amount of both soft and hard power 
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as part of its foreign policy. However, there seems to be a consensus that soft 
power is a new or novel concept in Chinese geopolitics.  
As this paper has argued, historical Chinese soft power has a long 
tradition and Zheng He is probably the most prominent example of it that can be 
found. Students of Chinese history may know who Zheng He was and that he is 
an example for soft power, but perhaps they do not connect the Treasure 
Voyages with the modern day soft power policy of the PRC. Therefore, this study 
has value in teaching students a different perspective, that soft power is a 
historical topic as well and not relegated to the halls of the Political Science 
departments. An MA student studying Chinese history for example, may wonder 
why they have to take political science or economics courses to get a history 
degree, perhaps thinking: what does this have to do with my field of study? This 
study can correct that assumption by showing the diversity the social sciences 
are indeed connected with one another by giving a clear example of different but 
related disciplines: The Journeys of Zheng He (history and geography) and the 
Confucius Institute (political science, geography, economics).  
 Students studying this topic of Chinese soft power will also get a good 
understanding of Beijing’s “charm offensive” which is becoming one of the most 
debated topics in geopolitics today. China’s ability to go from a rather isolated 
state with limited world relations to a twenty first century economic powerhouse 
can have many numerous explanations but one of the most prevalent is the 
charm offensive. It is important for students of Chinese history to look at the 
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success this has accomplished. As Joshua Kurlantzick points out, the pragmatic 
lengths that the PRC goes to be successful in “being everyone’s friend” would 
have been unthinkable to the CCP old guard: 
In supposedly trying to be everyone’s friend (Taiwan and Japan stand as 
notable exceptions), Beijing was displaying a type of pragmatism 
unthinkable to a previous generation of Chinese leaders. For past leaders, 
ideology defined relationships, trumping other factors. Now China would 
deal with any state it thought necessary to its aims. In the Philippines, 
China would ask to mediate between the government and communist 
insurgents, so alienating the communists that they started threatening 
Chinese businesspeople investing in the Philippines. In Nepal the Chinese 
government would offer support to the monarchy, even reportedly sending 
truckloads of arms and ammunition, despite the fact that the king was 
fighting-and eventually lost to-a Maoist rebel group pursuing the very 
military tactics that Chairman Mao himself had pioneered.268  
 This new pragmatic approach to world politics practiced by Beijing should 
be of great interest to students of history and political science. The PRC which 
began as a revolutionary Communist state and the founder of the Maoist doctrine 
was now supplying a “reactionary” force against Maoist rebels. This pragmatic 
approach to world politics may be part of the explanation of how China's 
economy is booming today. However, there are still massive problems with 
authoritarianism that have been having a bit of push-back under the tenure of 
President Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has indeed been using China’s soft power as a 
way to woo countries that have been alienated from the United States and its 
allies as a way to re-assert China’s role in the world. However, there have been a 
lot of hard power efforts being made under President Xi’s tenure such as the 
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artificial islands that China have been creating in the South China sea as a way 
to claim territory, backed by military force. A lot of Xi’s assertiveness is reaching 
back to China’s past when China was the strongest world power and is correcting 
it’s “century of humiliation” in the 19th century. An article in the New York Times 
written by Ian Johnson gives examples of this kind of thinking prevalent in 
Chinese geopolitics regarding the “recapture of glory.” Ian Johnson writes: 
Two weeks after taking China’s top office in November 2012, Xi Jinping 
took part in what seemed like a throwaway photo op. He took his top 
lieutenants to the newly renovated National Museum of China, a vast hall 
stuffed with relics of China’s glorious past: terra-cotta soldiers from Xi’an, 
glazed statues from the Tang dynasty and rare bronzes from the distant 
Shang dynasty. But Mr. Xi chose as his backdrop a darker exhibition: “The 
Road of Rejuvenation.” It tells the story of how China was laid low by 
foreign countries in the 19th and 20th centuries but is now on the path 
back to glory. There, in front of images of China’s subjugation, Mr. Xi 
announced that his dream was to complete this sacred task. This soon 
became the “China Dream” and has shaped his rule ever since.269 
Johnson also writes extensively in the article about Xi Jingping’s authoritarian 
policies that make him stand out from other leaders in post-Mao China who were 
less bold and out in the open about authoritarian practices and indeed were open 
to reform. Johnson now argues that many of those aspects of reform have dried 
up and practices by Xi Xingping like his anti-corruption campaign have been 
used to target political rivals.  
 The study of China’s charm offensive is also important in understanding 
the motivations of the charm offensives of China’s neighbors. For example, India 
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has become something of a rival to China both in a hard power military sense 
with a clear example being the recent showdown between Chinese and Indian 
military forces over a remote Himalaya mountain pass that has the potential to 
explode into a wider conflict.270 But perhaps it’s the soft power cultural war 
between India and China that has been emerging as a threat to China’s soft 
power efforts by India making similar gains through its unique film industry aka 
“Bollywood.” Amy Qin writing for the New York Times explains these recent 
events concerning the release for the Indian movie Dangal: 
While China’s film industry has long sought both to emulate and compete 
with Hollywood, the runaway success of “Dangal” has prompted Chinese 
production companies to turn their gaze from West to East. Suddenly, 
Chinese companies are racing to snap up all things Bollywood — 
partnerships and distribution rights, but also Indian directors and 
screenwriters. And that has led to some unease. China and India are 
engaged in a wary competition for regional influence and leadership. For 
much of the summer, the two nations were locked in a border standoff 
over a remote mountain pass in the Himalayas. But more and more, the 
two Asian giants are also competing to project soft power — or cultural 
influence — outside their borders. And “Dangal” has revived concerns in 
China that it is falling behind.271 
 Judging from Qin’s article it would seem that India has learned a great 
deal from the PRC’s charm offensive and has launched a soft power initiative of 
its own, focusing on its very successful film industry. India has become in many 
the ways the new rising star of Asia and by harnessing a charm offensive of their 
own, India has shown that it may emerge as a serious rival to Beijing. 
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Geopolitically speaking, this could have major consequences in regard to border 
skirmishes and other hard power military actions that the two rising states may 
engage in. For the time being however, India has mostly been content with 
achieving soft power through its film industry which was even predicated by 
Joseph Nye all the way back in 2005.272 Beijing is therefore not alone in the 
charm offensive business and may find some healthy competition from India in 
the future. 
Another use for the study of soft power, is studying how Zheng He’s 
historical narrative has been shaped and modified over the centuries. In Chapter 
Five we examined how Zheng He has been used as a sort of “PR” representative 
for Beijing’s geopolitical aims. There are also other narratives that show an 
interesting evolution of Zheng He’s story such as local legends that bear some 
connection to the Zheng He story. For example, in Malacca there is the legend of 
“The Sultan’s Bride” where supposedly the ruler of Malacca at the time Mansur 
Shah was wed to a Chinese princess named Hang Libo who was supposedly in 
this legendary account, escorted to Malacca by Zheng He, as Louise Levathes 
explains: 
There is a story every schoolchild in Malacca learns. It is a tale about a 
beautiful Chinese princess named Hang Libo, whom Zheng He was 
supposed to have escorted to Malacca to become the bride of Sultan 
Masnur Shah. So that the princess would not be lonely in her new home, 
her father sent five hundred maidens with her, who eventually also 
married and settled at the base of a hill near Malacca’s harbor that 
became known as Bukit China, or China Hill. The princess converted to 
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Islam and bore the sultan a son named Mimat, and the descendants of the 
noble maidens were said to be the nucleus of Malacca’s large Chinese 
community.273   
Although there is no hard-historical evidence for this event and marriage 
happening, it is still interesting to consider the fact that the treasure voyages 
have been used as a method of national pride for China but also Malacca as well 
(or at least by Malacca’s significant Chinese minority). There is a lot of historical 
value in studying legends such as the Sultan’s Bride in understanding 
international relations and how different countries can share national hero’s or at 
the very least have a connection to them. These stories also have a use in the 
diplomacy of the PRC as it can be used to claim a cultural connection between 
China and Malacca and Malaysia in general. The Chinese minority in Malaysia 
have also seen the value of emphasizing the ties between Malaysia and China 
by using Zheng He as a common uniting historical figure between the two 
nations. In 2006 on the site of the warehouse complex Guan Chang, which was 
founded by Zheng He, the Malaysian government created the Cheng Ho Cultural 
Museum, which has exhibits on the life and travels of Zheng He.274  Indeed, 
Zheng He’s historical appeal has shown that nation’s outside of China can 
benefit from the story of Zheng He in a soft power sense. Zheng He sailed all 
over the South China Sea and Indian Ocean so nation’s like Malaysia, especially 
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if they are trying to gain greater relations with Beijing, can benefit by seeing 
themselves as part of the Zheng He story. This has given a lot of soft power to 
Beijing as the historical connection between the two nations and a shared 
national hero can be seen as a force of unity and as a symbol of continuing 
relations between Malaysia and China that stretch back to the Ming Dynasty. 
While the “Sultan’s Bride” may be a legend, the study of legends such as The 
Sultan’s Bride and how they are used in the modern day can be of extreme use 
to students of soft power and geopolitics as well as students of history. 
Overall, the importance of studying medieval and modern Chinese soft 
power cannot be understated. In a modern world where China and other nations 
are reaping the benefits of soft power it would be wise to gain an understanding 
of the historical basis and success of soft power in Chinese history. Zheng He 
and the Confucius Institutes are of course only two examples, but they serve as 
two very large and important ones. By using these examples, we can see that 
both Zheng He and the Confucius Institute both have soft power qualities to them 
that can be used to both praise and criticize China’s embrace of soft power. 
Zheng He has proved a huge boon to China, by giving the nation a national hero 
that transcends borders but also has been used as a way to claim territory in the 
South China Sea and has been used as a propaganda tool to emphasize the 
“close relationship” between China’s neighbors, even if that “close relationship” 
was accomplished through the lens of China being the “Middle Kingdom” and 
under the tribute trade system where China’s “younger brothers” were clearly the 
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junior partners in such a relationship. This leaves one to ponder if the tribute 
trade system is truly abolished or if it has been remade under a form that is more 
acceptable to modern day geopolitics. Likewise, the Confucius Institute has 
proven to be very successful and beneficial in developing nations where Chinese 
is quickly becoming a common second language but on the darker end of things, 
the Confucius Institute has caused numerous problems concerning academic 
freedom as well as discrimination in its hiring practices which in some cases 
make American universities complicit in an action that is illegal.275 Therefore, it is 
very imperative that the study of the history of soft power in China be considered 
an important component in sinology  
 
Final Conclusions on Zheng He and the Confucius Institute 
The research of soft power concerning Zheng He and the Confucius 
Institute in the realm of soft power has resulted into serval narratives concerning 
the portrayal of Zheng He’ s journeys and the Confucius Institute’s soft power 
actions.   Zheng, He as we have seen is a complex hero figure whose status as a 
national hero and legend often conflicts and has indeed grown as large as the 
actual historical narrative. Likewise, the Confucius Institute has been heavily 
criticized for reasons both legitimate and illegitimate but it cannot be denied they 
have had a positive impact on developing nations. Ethics aside, The Confucius 
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Institute and the Zheng He story both rely heavily on soft power both in a 
historical sense and in a sense of purpose since soft power is how these 
historical and modern symbols of Chinese soft power function. Zheng He as we 
have seen, has immense soft power value as both a historical figure and as a 
legendary one. Zheng He can indeed be seen as larger than life and his 
accomplishments either real or legendary have played a role in China’s soft 
power charm offensive. The Confucius Institute, has been both a boon Africa as 
far as second language proficiency goes, nut that does not mean there has been 
opposition on this front too as some citizens for South Africa have raised 
concerns that the teaching of Mandarin comes at the expense of learning local 
languages.276 Furthermore as stated in preceding chapters, there is also a worry 
that the PRC is determining what exactly constitutes the Chinese language. For 
example, the Confucius Institute exclusively teaches the Mandarin language and 
simple Chinese characters, neglecting other Chinese languages such as 
Cantonese and not teaching the more complex characters which may have 
implications of a political nature. Michael Churchman representing the Australian 
National University writes an informative piece regarding these teaching 
techniques centered around the Confucius Institute’s “Tenth Principle” in its 
bylaws that state only Mandarin can be used: 
This Tenth Principle is the only explicit evidence for the exclusion of 
certain subjects from the teaching syllabus of Confucius Institutes, but few 
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commentators seem to have paid it much attention. The significance of the 
regulation, however, is clear: not only is it against the rules to teach any 
Chinese language other than Putonghua within a Confucius Institute, it is 
also forbidden to teach students the non-simplified characters still widely 
used in Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong and many other Chinese communities 
beyond the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party. The reason 
why the most obvious interdiction covering subject matter in the Confucius 
Institutes has been so little discussed probably stems from the fact that 
although outsiders are always on the lookout for evidence that the 
Chinese party-state is trying to exercise control over prominent political 
issues, linguistic matters are generally regarded as being relatively 
insignificant.277 
 Hanban controlling language teaching as implied from Churchman is an 
exercise in soft power in itself deeply rooted in political conflict. As Churchman 
implies it’s also something largely ignored as most criticisms of the Confucius 
Institute tend to be “bigger” targets such as academic freedom and discriminatory 
hiring. Defenders of the Confucius Institute will of course point out that Germany 
and France also have cultural and language teaching center’s such as Goethe 
Institute and Alliance Francaise respectively. The main difference between these 
organizations however is that they are nominally independent institutions and 
they do not embed themselves in foreign universities but instead act as separate 
entities.278  
The Confucius Institute overall, has proven to be an effective tool of PRC 
soft power being wielded in modern times. The organization itself however has 
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been a bit of a “double edged sword” depending which country university the 
Confucius Institute is being hosted by. The University of Chicago shows the 
darker side of this mode of soft power and Marshall Sahlins raises good 
arguments against the abuses of student’s academic freedom and other 
criticisms of the Confucius Institute.  
This not to suggest however that the Confucius Institute has not been a 
victim of false accusations such as the Hacienda Heights incident which was 
rooted not only regular Sinophobia but also in the simmering racial tension of the 
residents, using the Confucius Institute as a convenient scapegoat. Despite all of 
this however, the Confucius Institute remains a soft power force and a lot of its 
success at least in universities in the United States, Canada and Europe lies in 
its enticing funding model. After all a university, especially an underfunded one, 
would have a lot of trouble resisting forming a partnership with Hanban, an 
organization that will provide funding, teachers and textbooks from its own 
money. This enticing model is perhaps one of the most apparent pieces of 
evidence linking the Confucius Institute to soft power. This model is a perfect 
example of China’s soft power policy of giving more than China receives. A 
Confucius Institute will typically give a start-up fund usually up to $100,000 USD 
per annum of the duration of the signed contract which is usually for a period of 
five years. The university usually in return agrees to provide accommodation and 
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infrastructure support for the host teachers.279 This however, gives the Confucius 
Institute a rather powerful bargaining position. If a university brings in a speaker 
that is controversial to the PRC, the Confucius Institute can threaten to withdraw 
funding in protest or encouraging Chinese nationals not to enroll in the university, 
putting a financial and administrative burden on the school’s staff.280  
The Confucius Institute has shown that it is a soft power force that has 
given China considerable leverage and power concerning how Chinese culture is 
perceived by foreigners. It has shown itself to be an efficient model and despite 
criticisms from the opponents of the Confucius Institute, it remains as one of the 
foundations of modern Chinese soft power as seen through the lens of the 
greater charm offensive which is the central part of China’s soft power policy. 
While China in recent years, especially under President Xi has been following a 
hard power policy regarding territorial disputes, the charm offensive itself is still a 
huge part of Chinese foreign policy. Even with its numerous criticisms it would be 
difficult to deny the enormous amount of soft power the Confucius institute has 
brought the PRC. It has also served as an example of the pragmatism of the new 
rising China. An organization named after an ancient philosopher who was vilified 
by the founder of the PRC is now trying to charm the world and putting out a 
narrative that China is a peaceful, happy and prosperous nation with a rich 
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culture. The traditional Chinese culture that is taught in its classrooms was a 
culture that Mao the founder of the modern nation of the People’s Republic of 
China deeply loathed and tried to destroy in the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the 
Confucius Institute is a good representation of the pragmatism that is being 
followed under Chinese foreign policy in general and may be the greatest 
weapon China wields in its soft power arsenal. 
Zheng He himself in summation, also represents a powerful component of 
both historical and modern day soft power. In the second chapter we established 
Zheng He as a historical character in regard to his actions and the effects they 
had on soft power historically. In the fifth chapter we examined Zheng He’s 
actions in a modern day soft power light or rather how the Chinese government 
makes use of the Zheng He story to use as a way to explain China’s historical 
“harmonious” relationship with its neighbors. But what are the other uses that 
studying Zheng He in the realm of both soft and hard power have in 
understanding modern day politics and culture? We have already examined 
Zheng He’s record in his own actions regarding whether or not he had 
Imperialistic tendencies and came to the conclusion that while Zheng He indeed 
had some imperialistic or rather proto-imperialistic tendencies, the voyages were 
for the most part peaceful and focused on trade. However, Geoff Wade’s 
argument against Zheng He seems a bit harsh and overzealous (although 
Wade’s point that the PRC uses his story as a way to claim territory or falsely 
claim that Zheng He was an arbiter of peace in the Indian Ocean is indeed a 
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valid one). Hansen has a very good counterargument that gives a sufficient 
explanation of the failure of expansionism during the Yongle Emperor Zhu Di’s 
reign and Zheng He’s journeys: 
To argue that the Chinese lacked the stomach for empire would be too 
simple. Zheng He’s men did commit atrocities, and they did not hesitate to 
forage for and even steal food when the local people did not provide it. In 
one instance, the Chinese ships killed five thousand pirates in Sumatra on 
the Malacca Strait, and in another, they became enmeshed in a dispute 
between two rulers in Siam and Java. But these military campaigns were 
exceptions. The Chinese had reservations about conquering less civilized 
people so far removed from their own cultural sphere. The objects of Ming 
attempts at conquest, the Mongols to the north and the Vietnamese to the 
south, both lay directly on China’s borders, and their residents had long 
exposure to Chinese ways.281   
 Hansen’s argument attempts to dispel the idea that European style 
colonialism and imperialism is comparable to the Ming conquests of Vietnam and 
Mongolia. Even the conquest of Vietnam was not a long-time occupation since 
after Zhu Di’s death the troops were withdrawn and the invasion deemed a failure 
twenty years later.282 While it is indeed true that Zheng He was not perfect and 
did indeed engage in atrocities as Hansen argues, they were after all exceptions 
to the main rule and arguably often were in response to aggression such as in 
Ceylon or the suppression of pirates in Sumatra. It can be easily explained that 
Zheng He was following the “carrot and stick” approach to soft power as first 
described by Nye. As was noted previously, Kurlantzick gave a wider definition of 
soft power, describing it as “anything outside the security realm” and arguing that 
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sanctions and other economic punishments can be seen as a form of soft 
power.283 In the context of the tribute trade system which Zheng He operated 
under we can see this system as an economic weapon in itself that Zheng He 
and Zhu Di wielded with great effect. After all, if the emperor were to restrict trade 
with foreign powers that could be as much a punishment as a military attack or 
other hard power method, due to the crippling of the economies China’s 
neighbors would suffer if the emperor were willing to restrict trade. Zheng He’s 
kidnapping of king Alakeswara could also be seen as a soft power action in a 
sense since the emperor decided to spare his life rather than execute him.284 The 
humiliation of Alakeswara was considered to be enough along with replacing him 
with a king friendlier to Ming interests. The soft power element in this example is 
that by sparing the king, emperor Zhu Di showed himself to be simultaneously as 
the dominant power powerful party but also willing to show mercy and being 
quick to explain that if Alakeswara were more diplomatic with Zheng He’s fleet, 
he would not be in the position he was now. Carrots and sticks, indeed.    
Zheng He as both a historical figure and a modern day legendary figure in 
southeast Asia has indeed also shown the power a good story has in the study of 
soft power. In summation, Zheng He’s story remains a powerful narrative in 
Chinese politics and has been previously been shown to be used in politics 
today, especially in territorial claims. But what about soft power elements of a 
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different kind like popular culture? With the story of Zheng He becoming more 
popular around the world, how long till we see a Zheng He film in Hollywood or 
be playing roleplaying fantasy video games set in worlds that are based on the 
Ming era age of sail? In China this may be already happening since Zheng He’s 
story in the last few decades have been something of a sensation and been a 
huge part of national pride. In 2009, CCTV created a fifty-nine-episode period TV 
drama directed by Ma Xiao and Liu Hiatiao based on Zheng He’s life titled, 
Zheng He Xia Xiyang.285 It is interesting to wonder how long it will take for a 
western company such as Netflix to make their own series as Zheng He’s 
popularity and story is becoming more known in countries like the United States. 
If Chinese television and movie companies could take advantage of this possible 
rising market it could be another method of soft power that the PRC can engage 
in. The use of Zheng He in popular culture could give China considerable power 
in shaping the narrative of Zheng He’s story as well. Clearly, the future potential 
of Zheng He in popular culture as a soft power icon could prove to be lasting and 
powerful indeed. 
Zheng He has proven to be a perfect example of the historical connection 
of China to soft power politics. This is an interesting turn of events since due to 
the interference of Confucian scholar officials, his story may not have been told 
at all. While it has been previously stated, a good review of the actions of the 
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scholar officials should be given to highlight how close this incredibly important 
historical event was nearly lost to history and thus lost to the study of early 
Chinese soft power. Shin-shan Henry Tsai gives a good summation of the efforts 
that went into suppressing Zheng He’s historical record: 
But as fascinating as these voyages were, Ming Chronicles only used 
some 700 words in the 330 chapters of Ming official history to describe 
such epic events. And perhaps because Zheng He was considered one of 
the “rapacious eunuchs” by his literati rivals, official Ming historians cared 
to spare only thirty words to identify Zheng He, the half man. In fact, we 
might not even know about Zheng He and his most significant 
contributions to maritime explorations had it not been for the three little 
books written by Zheng He’s subordinates. One is called Yingyai shenglan 
or The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, dated 1433, written by Ma 
Huan; the second one was entitled, Xingcha shenglan or The Overall 
Survey of the Starry Rift, dated 1436 and authored by Fei Xin; and the 
third one, written by Gong Zhen, was called Xinyang fanguo zhi or 
Description of the Barbarian Countries of the West. Based on these three 
books, plus many newly discovered monuments, artifacts, and other 
related sources, recent scholars, many of whom are Europeans and 
Japanese, have been able to reconstruct a clearer picture of these more 
extraordinary but least known-so far as the Occidental world is concerned-
maritime activities of the fifteenth century.286  
Shin-shan Henry Tsai’s example shows how dangerously close the 
historical record was in losing the Zheng He story. This would have had a 
detrimental effect on soft power studies as Zheng He is one of the most cited 
examples of historical Chinese soft power and this very study itself would likely 
either not exist or would have had to use other less-documented historical 
examples. Indeed, it was not until 1905 when Chinese revolutionary Ling Qichao 
(1873-1929) a reformer and participant in the late Qing Dynasty’s Hundred Days 
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Reform and one of the historical figures who helped modernized China, 
published an article in his newspaper Xinmin Congbao titled: Zheng He: A Great 
Navigator of our Times, which brought Zheng He back into popular Chinese 
historical thought. Ling Qichao compared Zheng He to Columbus and used him 
as an example to be followed, especially in light of China’s recent humiliating 
defeats to European powers in the previous century.287 If not for the tireless 
efforts of scholars in the recent centuries, Zheng He may have been regulated to 
those thirty humiliating words in the official Ming chronicles. In effect since soft 
power is overall a method of wielding influence, the actions of the Confucian 
scholar officials could also be seen as an example of soft power in itself, using 
their influence with the emperor to destroy Zheng He’s logs and essentially 
making him unknown until his re-discovery in his homeland in the early twentieth 
century.  
The final question concerning Zheng He in conclusion of this study is why 
Zheng He is important as the best example of China’s long history of soft power. 
Zheng He is more than just a man, but also serves as a symbol. Although that 
enough isn’t enough to explain why Zheng He, but it is a good start. The best 
example is due to how Zheng He’s story is used as a PR tool for Beijing’s 
expansionist policies in the South China Sea. Another example is how Zheng He 
is used to promote the idea of the glory of the Ming to the benefit of the Chinese 
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state.  Some of the claims used in promoting that glory regarding are dubious, 
with former president Hu Jintao even claiming that Zheng He had reached 
Australia.288 289 However, even if some of the more outlandish territorial claims 
are untrue, the legendary Zheng He has proved a boon for Zheng He, especially 
domestically. The main reason however that Zheng He was chosen for this study 
was that he is probably the best known historical example of China having a soft 
power foreign policy long before the modern times. Indeed, due to the continued 
use of his story for propaganda purposes it can be argued that Zheng He lives 
until this day still serving the PRC as a soft power symbol.  
  
Sailing Into the Horizon: Future Uses for This Research 
Before this study concludes, it would be of great use to describe what 
future history students could use from this research of historical soft power. The 
research in this thesis has mostly focused on historical aspects of both Zheng 
He’s life and the function and purpose of the Confucius Institute but that does not 
mean that future research in trying to prove China’s soft power legacy should be 
solely focused on just Zheng He and the Confucius Institute. Research into the 
workings of the tribute trade system for example, which far predates the Ming 
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and indeed could be said to have its beginnings in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 
AD) could be and has in the past been used as a very informative way to study 
soft power in a historical sense in China. According to Michael Barr, even the 
philosopher Mencius (372-289 BC) had aspects of soft power in his teachings.290 
Michael Barr uses a passage from James Legge’s translation of The Works of 
Mencius that shows that even in early Chinese history soft power was a concept 
known to the great sage: 
There is a way to gain the whole world. It is to gain the people, and having 
gained them one gains the whole world. There is a way to gain the people. 
Gain their hearts, and then you gain them…If others do not respond to 
your love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others do not 
respond to your attempts to govern them, look into your own wisdom; if 
others do not respond to your courtesy, look into your respect. In other 
words, look into yourself whenever you fail to achieve your purpose. When 
you are correct in your person, the whole world will turn to you.291 
Soft power is shown by Mencius (and also to an extent by Confucius in as 
shown in Chapter 4) as being an old concept in Chinese history, especially in 
philosophy. A prospective student studying both politics could gain further 
research about historical Chinese soft power. It is also important that hopefully 
further research into the nature of historical Chinese soft power can be 
influenced by this work, by examining philosophers such as Mencius and 
Confucius as well as looking at historical figures such as Zheng He and others. In 
order to fully understand the soft power practiced by Beijing today, it is important 
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to reach into the past and understand that soft power as both a philosophy and a 
political tactic have existed in China for centuries and continuing research on this 
topic would be of great benefit to the field of history.     
In modern times, Beijing’s soft power has grown to an incredible amount 
of influence rivaling even Washington in many respects. The research made in 
this master’s thesis could help students further understand what a lot of the 
origins of Chinese soft power comes from and use that history to understand 
China’s actions. China engages today in what Kurlantzick defines as “public 
diplomacy” which shows a serious departure from China’s policies in the cold war 
era.292 Part of this public diplomacy is being seen as more accommodating and is 
an integral part of the PRC’s “peaceful rise”. Concerning the Confucius Institute, 
Hanban’s efforts can be considered part of this public diplomacy which is an 
integral part of the charm offensive. 
 Future students of politics and history, especially in the United States, 
may benefit greatly from this research. One of Nye’s motivations for writing his 
book was that he believed that the United States had lost its grasp on why soft 
power was important and was indeed a contributing factor to America’s victory in 
the Cold War.293 It is no secret that Beijing’s rise has worried many leaders in the 
United States and in order for the United States to catch up with the PRC’s 
charm offensive, Washington will have to re-establish its “brand” by once again 
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looking at soft power as a viable strategy. In the past, “blue jeans and rock and 
roll” were America’s charm offensive in the twentieth century and perhaps it is 
time for America to establish its “brand” as Nye would put it, once again. In the 
realm of politics by studying Beijing’s success with soft power the United States 
may once again keep its soft power hegemony which is just as powerful if not 
more than America’s hard power hegemony. To achieve this, Kurlantzick gives 
some good sage advice for future diplomats in the US Foreign Service: 
Supporting public diplomacy, the United States will need to rethink its 
formal diplomacy-how diplomats operate on the ground, and how its top 
leaders interact with leaders and populaces from abroad. Some of these 
changes should steal ideas from China. China has pushed its diplomats to 
return to one country for multiple tours of duty and to learn local 
languages. Unlike China, the US foreign service cannot force its 
employees to go to any country, but the state department could more 
aggressively encourage its Foreign Service Officers to pick one region of 
the world (or even one country), specialize in that area, and return to it 
over and over.294  
Kurlantzick’s advice of diplomats specializing in one particular country of 
study has some soft power merits to it. By having fully trained and linguistically 
educated diplomats, the US could give of the veneer of being a highly educated 
country with well-trained diplomats which could put forth a charm offensive of its 
own. The supreme irony is however that this is not a new concept in US foreign 
affairs, but in recent decades starting with the Bush Administration in the early 
2000’s hard power has been seen as a more desirable outcome in US 
diplomacy. Perhaps it is time to take the theories put out by Nye to heart and for 
                                                          
294 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 237. 
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Washington to reclaim its soft power legacy much as Beijing wishes to regain its 
legacy in the world after its “Century of Humiliation”. In any case, research such 
as presented in this paper may be useful to those same policy makers who want 
to understand the origins of Chinese soft power and future students who wish to 
gain knowledge about the soft power policies of Zheng He and the Confucius 
Institute may find the information contained here informative into their own 
research. 
As Beijing’s stature rises, the whole world will have to look at the origins of 
this rise and its motivations, and perhaps by looking at the story of one eunuch 
admiral who bravely sailed the oceans to spread his culture and bring wealth and 
prestige to his nation may finally understand why China wishes to reclaim its 
legacy. There are many reasons, most stemming from China’s century of 
humiliation but as has been shown in this paper, China’s pride in its culture and 
accomplishments have also served as a reminder of how powerful China once 
was. Zheng He therefore is not just a symbol but a motivator, for China to once 
again reach out to the world and show off its wealth and prestige in an effort to 
charm others.  As Zheng He once sailed around the South China Sea Indian 
Ocean in the fourteenth century, the Confucius Institute today travels around the 
world using the same velvet fist of charm and coercion to achieve its goals and 
through this institution, the PRC can shape the world opinion of what China is 
and what it should be. As the Confucius Institute sails into the horizon like Zheng 
He, will the Confucius Institute choose a path of charm or coercion?   
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